

# THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY.

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## ARTICLE I.

### THE OLD LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL.

(CONCLUDED FROM PAGE 345).

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In the current volume of THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, p. 158, we stated that at least four of the authors of the Form of Concord had, in earlier life, held a doctrine of Free-will that is different from that contained in the Form of Concord, and we expressed our willingness to prove our statement when requested to do so. The request has come, and we now proceed by the use of documentary evidence to make good our declaration. The citations will be copious, and will thus exclude all suspicion of garbling, or of partiality in the use of the material. Moreover, by means of the copious quotations that follow, the reader can reach independent conclusions as to what the men in question held and taught on the subject of Free-will.

#### I. JACOB ANDREAE.

We begin with Jacob Andreae, Chancellor of the University of Tuebingen in Württemberg. He was the most active, and perhaps the most influential of the six men who are commonly regarded as the authors of the Form of Concord. In 1562 Andreae, and Christopher Binder, Superintendent of Nürtingen, were sent to Weimar to assist in allaying the synergistic strife, and especially to give an opinion in regard to the orthodoxy of a *Declaration* which had been made in March of that year by Victorine Strigel, who had been in conflict with Flacius about the doctrine of Free-will. In said *Declaration* Strigel

"plainly and clearly confessed that by Free-will he understood in harmony with Augustine the Will itself, and that this Will, after the Fall, retains freedom from necessity and compulsion. Otherwise there would be no Will remaining. That God in and by conversion does not take away the Will, but changes it and makes it better, and begins and perfects the good in it, though he does not apply power, but out of an unwilling man makes one willing. The Will is *passive* in so far as God alone works all good, but *active* in so far as the Will in its conversion must be present and must consent and not resist, but accept." \*

With the substance of this declaration the Würtemberg theologians found no fault. "They said that they had read Strigel's confession, in which many obscure and ambiguous words occur. Among these was the statement that our nature is not unlike a traveler who has been despoiled and severely wounded by robbers; and in regard to the human will either assenting or resisting; and in regard to man as in some manner willing;" † and they requested an explanation.

Thereupon Strigel more fully explained his meaning in accordance, as he declared, with Melanchthon's use of the words in question. The Würtembergers now expressed themselves as entirely satisfied, and asked Strigel to put his doctrine in writing. Strigel then wrote what is known as his third *Declaration*, which we now give in full:

"In the controversy about Free-will two points are especially to be considered. One of these is *efficacia*, the other is *modus agendi* or *aptitudo* or *capacitas*. Therefore as regards *δυναμις* or power or *efficacia*, by which we think and will and perform things pleasing to God and salutary to our soul, there is no doubt that that was completely lost in the Fall of our first parents, and that in its stead *ἀδυναμία* or impotence has been propagated upon all men, who are begotten of impure seed, according to the following passages: The animal man receiveth not the things that are of God, the sense of the flesh is enmity against God. He is not subject to the law of God, and is not

\* Salig, *Hist. Augsb. Conf.* III, p. 932.

† Otto, *De Victorino Strigelio*, p. 17. Salig, *ut supra*, p. 883.

able to be made subject. We are not able to think of ourselves as of ourselves. Without me ye can do nothing. If any one absolutely denies this impotence of mind, will and heart, or extenuates it with words, he does not entertain correct views of original sin, which is not only a want of true wisdom in the mind and a lack of righteousness and of holiness in the will and heart, but also a depraved inclination, which begets doubts in regard to God and divine things, and a contumacy of the affections which rashly rush against the law of God. But the efficacia of which I have spoken is restored not by the human powers, nor by the strength of any creature, but by God through the Son the Mediator, and through the Holy Spirit, as the following words clearly affirm: No one can take anything to himself except it be given him from above. No one cometh to me except the Father draw him. It is God who giveth to will and to do. By patience we run the course that is set before us, looking to Jesus the captain and finisher of our faith. It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaketh in you.

"From these and like passages it is clear that the efficacia or power or strength by which we either think or will or do things acceptable to God, does not lie in our own powers which remain after the Fall; but they are the gift and work of God who renews his image in those who for the sake of the Son are received unto grace and become temples and homes of the Holy Spirit.

"But as regards the second point, whether it be called *modus agendi* or *aptitudo* and *capacitas*, it is most certain that man differs from all creatures which are not endowed with either mind or will. For a block was not in any sense created so as to be susceptible of the Word and sacraments through which God operates in the Church. But men are susceptible of the divine call, and by the Holy Spirit not only assent to the Word of God, but also guard this splendid deposit and treasure of great value. In regard to this *aptitudo* or *capacitas* there is extant that noted line in the writings of Nazianzen: *Κεῖνος δεκτὸν ἔδωκε καλοῦ καὶ καὶ ἰσχύος ὁπάξει*: God made me susceptible of the good and supplies the power. And Bernard

distinctly says: God is the Author of Salvation; Free-will is only susceptible. None but God is able to give it; none but Free-will is able to lay hold of it. What therefore is given by God alone and to Free-will alone is not able to exist on the one hand without the consent of him who lays hold, and on the other hand without the grace of him who gives. Also: Take away Free will, there will be nothing to be saved. Take away grace and there will be nothing by which to be saved.

"But though the term Free-will be offensive to many, yet in the words of Bernard nothing else is meant than the substance of mind and will, to which if the power of believing, which the Scripture declares to have been lost, be not restored by the Holy Spirit, the mind or will or heart is moved neither by the Word nor by the Sacraments. Wherefore, if, in the human Will after the Fall you consider the power of doing, it is only the slave and captive of Satan. But if you consider the aptitude it is not a stone or block, but it has been divinely created so as to be susceptible of the heavenly gifts of the Holy Spirit." \*

This is known as Strigel's third *Declaration*. If now we look carefully at the first part we find that the author denies unqualifiedly the ability of man by means of his own powers to do anything well-pleasing to God, or promotive of his own salvation. He is impotent in mind and will as regards spiritual things, and is utterly deficient in righteousness and holiness. Certainly there is no Pelagianism here, neither is there a trace of the Flacianist doctrine of original sin. But we are not now much concerned with this first part of the *Declaration*. Let us look at the second part.

1. It denies unqualifiedly that there is any similarity between a man and a block, inasmuch as the latter is not susceptible of the Divine Word and sacraments.

2. Man has susceptibility for the divine call, and not only can he *assent to the Word of God* (the famous Melancthonian

\* Latin in Schlüsselburg's *Catalogi Haereticorum*, V, pp. 88-91, and in Otto's *De Victorino Strigelio*, pp. 59-61. German in Salig, III, pp. 884-6.

form of expression, word for word in the original), but he can guard (*custodire*) this glorious and precious treasure—which requires determination of the Will and persistence in that determination, or the highest kind of volitional activity.

3. It is declared that there must be *consent* on the part of the accipient of grace, which is a joint action of mind and will, the former cognizing and the latter surrendering to the proffered redemption, that is, an exercise of the *liberum arbitrium* in both of its elements.

4. Appeal is made to Gregory Nazianzen, who is known to have been a down-right "synergist," who, as Dr. Luthardt well says, "nowhere expressly teaches anticipatory grace, but only the help of grace, which he identifies as something added to the grace of creation, government, and revelation. When Paul says, Rom. 9 : 16, that salvation is not of him who wills, Gregory explains thus: That is, not alone of him who wills, but also of God who shows mercy."\* Indeed any appeal to the Ante-Augustinian Fathers on the subject of Free-will is an appeal to "synergism," for they all were synergists.† And to say that Strigel and the other learned men who with him signed the *Declaration* did not know that Gregory taught "synergism" is to impeach their intelligence and their sincerity.

5. Appeal is also made to Bernard, and a passage is quoted from his celebrated Tractate *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*. We quote the entire paragraph of which it is a part: "What then, you say, does Free-will do? I answer briefly: It is saved. Take away Free-will and there will not be anything which is saved. Take away grace and there will not be anything by which to be saved. This work cannot be effected without both: The one by whom it is effected; the other to whom and in whom it is effected. God is the author of salvation, Free will only is susceptible. None but God is able to give it; none but Free will is able to lay hold of it. Therefore it is

\* *Die Lehre von Freien Willen*, p. 20.

† See Thomasius, *Dogmengeschichte*, 2nd Ed. I, p. 487. Kahnias, *Dogmatik*, Zweiter Band, p. 113. Luthardt *die Lehre von Freien Willen*, p. 12 et seqq.

given by God alone, and given to Free will alone. On the one hand it cannot exist without the consent of the accipient, and on the other hand not without the grace of the giver. And thus Free-will is said to coöperate with the grace that works salvation, while it consents, that is, while it is being saved. For to consent is to be saved. Hence the spirit of a beast can in no sense appropriate salvation, for the reason that it does not have voluntary consent by which it can quietly yield to God who saves, or submit to him who commands, or trust him who promises, or render thanks to him who bestows. For voluntary consent is one thing, the natural appetite another. The latter we have in common with the irrational animals. It cannot consent to the Spirit; it is hindered by the enticements of the flesh. Perchance it is that which is called by the Apostle the wisdom of the flesh, where he says: *The wisdom of the flesh is hostile to God; it is not subject to the law of God, nor can it be.* This therefore we have in common with the beasts. The voluntary consent distinguishes us. For it is a habit of the mind, personal freedom. Since I am not compelled I am not carried away by force. It is a matter of the will, not of necessity; nor does he (God) deny himself nor present himself to anyone except by the Will.

"If one could be forced against his Will, that would be a matter of violence, not a voluntary matter. But where there is no Will there is no consent. For there is no consent unless it be voluntary. Therefore where consent is, there is Will. Moreover, where there is Will, there is freedom. And this is what I think is called Free-will."\*

There is no mistaking the meaning of this paragraph. It clearly and distinctly affirms the activity of Free-will in the matter of a man's salvation. Hence we are not surprised to learn that the Flacianists in censuring Strigel's *Declaration*, pointed to the fact that both Nazianzen and Bernard were "synergists."†

Now on May 6th, 1562, Strigel's *Declaration* was signed, not only by its author, but by Andreae and Binder, who "judge

\* *Opera*, curis Mabillon, *Ed. Quarta*, I, p. 1367.

† Salig, III, p. 888, note; Otto, *ut supra*, p. 66.

it to be in harmony with the Word of God, with the Augsburg Confession and the Apology, with the Schmalkald Articles, with the Confutation Book, and with the Württemberg Confession and its Apology" (Brentz). That is, these two Württemberg theologians, one of whom some years later was the leading spirit in the work of Concord, subscribed a doctrine of Free-will that is Melanchthonian through and through, and that was as violently assailed by the Flacianists on account of its "synergism," as was Melanchthon's *Loci* by the same persons for the same alleged reason. That the assailants judged it rightly cannot be denied. It distinctly denies the *lapis-truncus* theory of man, and affirms a *modus agendi*, that is, some kind of activity in man, and the *assentiri verbo Dei*, and the *power of believing*, and the *consent of the accipiens*—which, taken together, present a doctrine of Free-will that stands in marked contrast with that contained in Article II of the Form of Concord.

Another fact: The second part of Strigel's *Declaration* is taken almost bodily, though in condensed form, from Brentz's *Apology* of the Württemberg Confession, and Andreae and Binder declare that the *Declaration* and Brentz's *Apology* agree *de libero arbitrio*. Now there is not one word in the Württemberg Confession that supports the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* doctrine. But how is it with Brentz's *Apology*? Here it is: "But some one will say, If since the Fall no power remains to Free will except to sin, and if Free-will of itself is only the slave, captive and servant of sin, What, I pray, is the difference between a man and a stone or a block? And as a block of wood on being fashioned into a statue does nothing, but only suffers, is thus Free-will in acquiring the true salvation *merely passive*, so to say? Most emphatically, No (*Nihil certe minus*). Free-will does not *of itself* have that by which it can prepare itself for laying hold of salvation, or by which it can merit salvation. But it has that by which it *can appropriate* the favor of God (*Habet autem quo beneficia Dei excipiat*).

"For since man has fallen into sin and has become the slave of sin, he is oppressed by such tyranny that he neither wishes nor is able by *his own powers* to free himself from the bondage

of sin and Satan, and to contribute to the freedom of righteousness. Nor is there any difference between the wills of men if you consider their corrupt nature. The mass of all human kind is one; the natural disposition of all men is the same; in order that the purpose of God according to election may stand fast. Thus Esau does not have in himself, of his own nature, anything by which he can convert or prepare himself for God, nor does Jacob. Both are conceived in sin, both are subject to the tyranny of Satan. Both have sinned, that is, died in Adam, and have become unprofitable. But that God hated Esau and loved Jacob does not result from Jacob's preparation, much less from his desert, but alone from God's gracious election. And yet Jacob does not hold himself in regard to election as a block or a stone. For a block was not created by God in order to be susceptible of the divine election to the true and eternal salvation. Nor is there arbitrium in a block which is able to be converted to the appropriation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit by the ordinary dispensation of God. But Jacob and Esau are men created in the image and likeness of God so that they are susceptible of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and of eternal salvation. In each there is arbitrium, which, though by reason of sin it has become the servant of Satan, nevertheless retains an *aptitude* by which it is able to be turned to the freedom of righteousness. This *aptitude of arbitrium* makes the difference between Jacob and a block. It does not make the difference between Jacob and Esau. Both have this aptitude, and both by reason of their corrupt nature are subject to the bondage of sin. But that the one is elected and receives the gift of the Holy Spirit in order that he may wish and may be able to yield to the call of God and attain to eternal life is the gracious mercy of God. But that the other is left in the bondage of sin and does not receive the gift of the Holy Spirit, is the just judgment of God, who has compassion on whom he will and hardens whom he will." Then after further explanation Brentz declares that his doctrine of Free-will is in accord with the views of the ancient writers who have treated the subject, and he follows this by quoting the passage from Bernard: "Take

away Free-will," etc. \* Italics ours. Now let us analyze this teaching of the great Württemberg master on the subject of Free-will.

1. The first thing that impresses us is the transparency of presentation. There is not an ambiguous word, phrase, sentence or paragraph, from the beginning to the end. He that runneth may both read and understand.

2. We discover at once that Brentz's statement is the model after which Strigel framed the second chief part of his *Declaration*. Not only is the doctrine the same in both documents, but the pivotal words, phrases and forms of expression are identical. In a word, Strigel simply condensed Brentz. Hence we can easily understand why it was that Andreae and Binder could say that the two documents coincide in doctrine.

3. We discover also that this Apology excludes the *lapis-truncus mere passive* doctrine of Free-will in the most unqualified sense,—*Nihil certe minus*. And while it affirms that Free-will has nothing *ex se ipso* or by which it can merit salvation, it has something by which it can *lay hold of* or *appropriate* the grace of God, for the Latin word *excipiat*, here employed, as clearly and as distinctly expresses an action of the *liberum arbitrium* as it is possible for any word to do in the premises, for as Doederlein says, the word means to "intercept, to catch anything that is escaping,"† or as Harpers' Latin Dictionary says, and as the text plainly requires, "to take a thing to one's self." Hence in the first paragraph quoted there can be no two opinions on the main subject, either as to what is denied or as to what is affirmed, unless we are willing to say that the author juggled with words.

4. The susceptibility (*capax*) and aptitude of which Brentz speaks in the next paragraph are not qualified by the adjective *passiva*, as is the case with *capacitas* in the Form of Concord. It is an aptitude which per Spiritum Sanctum is able to be turned to the liberty of righteousness, not as a block is able to be turned into a statue *mere passive*, but because it has ap-

\* *Apologia*, pp. 35-37.

† *Latin Synonyms*, *sub voce*.

titude of arbitrium. The entire course of thought is antithetical to the *tantum subjectum patiens* and the *tantum subjectum convertendum* of the Form of Concord.

5. And when this Apology (somewhat in accordance with Luther's earlier doctrine of Predestination that still lingered in Württemberg) says that one (Jacob) is elected and receives the gift of the Holy Spirit, the matter does not end there; salvation is not yet secured. This precedent work of God has an *immediate* end in view, which is, "that Jacob may both *will and be able to yield* to the call of God"—in which choice and moral responsibility are distinctly taught. The election of God and the giving of the Spirit must be followed by the corresponding activity on the part of man. The giving of the Spirit as here taught is simply *enabling* grace.

6. When we look at the teaching of this Apology *de libero arbitrio* as a whole we see that it sets forth these three fundamental truths: (a) That Free will cannot *ex se ipso* merit salvation; (b) that salvation is of grace through the Holy Spirit; (c) that Free-will appropriates salvation, that is, it appropriates the *beneficia Dei*, and does not simply suffer the Holy Spirit to work conversion in it as only *in subjecto patiente*.

It remains for us to say only these two things in regard to this Apology: (a) It shows us why it was that at Worms in 1557 Brentz and Melancthon could agree "absolutely" "*in doctrina et dogmatibus*." (b) It shows that in 1562 Jacob Andreae (and indeed the Württemberg Church) did not, as regards Free-will, stand on the platform of the Form of Concord; and this is all that we set out to prove in regard to this man. To which it must be added, that in August 1569 he came to Wittenberg and "in a public discourse declared the theologians orthodox and the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum* correct." \*

\* Loescher, *Hist. Motuum*, p. 243. See Hutter, *Concordia Concors*, p. 29 et seqq.; also Balthaser, *Historie des Torgischen Buchs*, I, p. 12; also Calinich, *Kampf und Untergang des Melancthonismus in Kursachsen*, pp. 20-34: Andreae said at Wittenberg repeatedly: *Symbolum nostri consensus debet esse Corpus doctrinae vestrarum ecclesiarum*. Also: *Ich will mein Leben zusetzen über euer Corpus doctrinae*. From the pulpit he declared his entire agreement with the Wittenbergers in every article of doctrine. Calinich, *ut supra*, p. 20.

## II. NICHOLAS SELNECCER.

Nicholas Selneccer was one of Melanchthon's favorite pupils. In 1565 (after the expulsion of the Flacianists) he, with two other Wittenbergers, was called to Jena, "where for some time the Philippistic tendency had found an entrance." Three years later, upon the accession of Duke John William, Selneccer lost his place, and returned to Electoral Saxony, and accepted a professorship in the University of Leipzig. "August 18th, 1568, he entered his new office, and lectured with applause on Melanchthon's *Loci*, defended the Church of Electoral Saxony against the attacks on its Lutheran orthodoxy that had proceeded from Jena and declared here as in the Dedication of his *Commentary on Genesis*, August, 1569, his emphatic agreement with the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum*, which at that time was being energetically pressed upon the theologians and ministers as a standard of doctrine." \*

Surely these facts show where Selneccer stood at that time on the subject of Free-will, for it is exactly in the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum* that we have Melanchthon's most matured views *de libero arbitrio*, as in the *Variata*, in the last edition of the *Loci*, in the *Confessio Saxonica* and in the *Reply to the Bavarian Articles*. That is, in 1569 Selneccer showed himself a thorough-going "synergist." And more: In 1573 he published his *Institutio Religionis Christianae*. It is from this work that we now quote. After declaring that "God himself confers on us grace and faith, which grace and faith are the gift of God," he says: "And yet the Will in the very act and operation of the Holy Spirit who kindles faith in man who hears and meditates on the Word and promise of the Gospel, is not absolutely taken away, is not dead, is not absolutely inactive, but as Will it is moved by the Holy Spirit, as the saying is: God draws, but he draws him who is willing, because there is some action in assent, although somewhat languid and insufficient, just like a weak boy who wishes to carry a burden which is far beyond his strength, and succumbs. Nevertheless, all pious minds

\* Herzog, 2 ed., XIV, 78.

who are not engaged in speculation only, but also in the practice and exercise of faith, worship and repentance, when moved by experience, freely and openly confess that by their own will and freedom they neither prepare themselves for grace and faith nor rightly hear the Word of God, much less rightly assent to the promise; nor are they active even in the least thing which has reference to true faith, conversion, righteousness and salvation; nor can they merit anything; but as regards preparation, and right assent and power and merit they are wholly *subjectum patiens* though not impelled or forced by violence as a workman cuts and shapes a block and a stone by great violence, nor carried by enthusiasm, nor led by excitement and clamor as a driver drives an ass, nor drawn by impetus as wood is drawn, nor by a change in its entire substance, and transformed (for to say this, is both to fight against the will of God and the rational creature and the experience of all the pious). But they are called, accepted, adorned, clothed, renewed, turned and moved by the mercy and goodness of God. But when God calls, it is necessary that we hear and that we come to him. When God accepts and receives us, it is necessary that we commit ourselves to him, extend our hands and wholly give ourselves up, as David says: 'Deal with thy servant according to thy mercy.' When he is adorning, clothing, renewing, turning, and moving us, it is necessary that we permit ourselves to be clothed, and do not contumaciously resist the Holy Spirit, nor reject and pollute the garments. Hence the efficiency is of God alone. We are only material, but not destitute of understanding and will, at least, in things subject to reason, but rational material created in the image of God, and to be formed anew, intelligent, and often willing carnally *per se* and by our own nature, and, also, sometimes assenting to Divine things; but rightly understanding, and rightly and spiritually willing and rightly and firmly assenting to the promise, only by the grace of God and the operation of the Holy Spirit, who though he at first finds us resisting, nevertheless, as soon as he begins to work and to move our mind and will, operates upon us no

longer resisting and contumacious (for otherwise he would not operate), but hearing, willing and submitting." \*

Again: "Nevertheless, the human will cannot be called the cause of conversion, since the thing to be converted is not the thing converting. But, since it is named *συνέργον*, it is shown to be nothing else than the Will not inactive.

"These things are expounded in this way for the purpose of instruction, and they are true and pleasing to God. For the Holy Spirit does not convert a stone or a block or an ox or an ass, but a man who is endowed by God with reason and is created in the image of God, and who is able and ought to hear, to reflect and to understand. And, though man in his own nature since the Fall has become the enemy of God, nevertheless, as an enemy endowed with reason he hears, understands and receives the reconciliation offered him by him whose enemy he is, and permits himself to be moved and turned to peace and becomes a friend. Thus man, hearing the promise of the Gospel and seeing the ambassador of God offering grace and peace, that is, hearing the Word and perceiving the moving of the Spirit in his heart does not repel or reject the offered grace, but joyfully incited submits to the divine voice and movement, as Paul says: Lord, what wilt thou have me to do" ?†

Also: "Although the depravity and perversity of our nature is so great that the imagination of the human heart is evil from childhood, Gen. 8, and the carnal mind is enmity against God, Rom. 8, and contumacy in many ways resists God, as is elaborately shown in the doctrine of original sin, nevertheless, in conversion itself the Holy Spirit so reforms the reason and moves and turns the Will that man by nature an enemy of God and a child of wrath now becomes a friend of God and a son and heir of God, understands and joyfully embraces God's goodness and grace, assents to the promise and in all things submits to the will of God, not indeed by the natural human reason and Will, but by the grace and efficacious action of the

\* Pars. II, pp. 85-86.

\* *Ibid*, p. 88.

Holy Spirit who instructs and illumines the reason and heals and reforms the Will, but nevertheless in such a way that the reason and the Will are not inactive, but both suffering and in their own order doing something, and, to use the words of Luther, coöperating with the Spirit operating in us and renewing us not without us, that is, not contumaciously resisting or spurning, but admitting the Holy Spirit and accepting his grace and obeying and serving God while the Holy Spirit moves and assists."\*

On pp. 284-5, after quoting 1 Cor. 3: "For we are workers together with God," Selnecker says: "Hence usually it is said that there are three causes of a right and good action, namely, the Word of God, the Holy Spirit and the human Will not resisting the Word of God, nor shaking off the Holy Spirit, as Saul shook him off by his own Will." And on pp. 294-5 he quotes the famous dicta of Chrysostom and Basil: "God draws, but he draws him who is willing; Only Will and God anticipates," and says: "The Will is not inactive, nor does it hold itself as a statue, but it does something. For the Will when moved by the Holy Spirit does not hold itself as a statue. Indeed the natural power of following the drawing of God does not reside in man. But when the Holy Spirit is received man acquires the power of obeying, and this is only of grace. \* \* The ability to obey God is not in our power. This is true of man before grace without the Word and the Holy Spirit.

"Man is able to obey God when he calls. This is true of man admonished, moved and drawn by grace, by the Word and by the Holy Spirit.

"The Will is not absolutely passive. This is true in two respects. 1. As already said, in respect of external discipline. 2. In respect of the Will moved by the Son of God.

"The Will is the attendant of the Holy Spirit, as the old saying proves: *Præeunte gratia, comitante voluntate*.

"In the internal renewal of the heart three causes concur:

\* *Ibid*, 282-283.

The Word of God, the Holy Spirit and the Will obeying. This is true of man who has the Word of God and the beginnings of the renewing of the Spirit, or of the regenerate when they stand in spiritual conflict."

These quotations face right against the doctrine of Free-will as taught in the Form of Concord, and are Melanchthonian through and through, and in their essential parts they reproduce the characteristic language of Melanchthon *de libero arbitrio*. That is, if Melanchthon taught "Synergism" in the *Loci* and elsewhere, then truly did Selnecker teach "Synergism" in his *Institutio* in 1573, that is, just four years before he helped to put the Form of Concord in its final shape. Moreover, in expounding his doctrine of Free-will he quotes Brentz's *Apology* (see above) and Bernard's famous passage (see above) in support and in illustration of his own position—thus showing how he understood both Brentz and Bernard, that is, as teaching that there is some activity of the Will in the appropriation of salvation. But Selnecker, like Melanchthon, taught with all emphasis that man does not operate or coöperate meritoriously, nor by his natural powers, but by not resisting, not rejecting, by assenting, by consenting, by accepting, by submitting to the will of God, by obeying the divine call, in which "*est mens et voluntas humana non ociosa*," as he says.

### III. DAVID CHYTRAEUS.

Chytraeus was a pupil and follower of Melanchthon, and had heard Luther one year. It will be remembered that in 1557 he assisted in preparing the *Formula of Pacification* sent to Wittenberg by the Duke of Mecklenburg, for the purpose of reconciling Melanchthon and Flacius. That that *Formula* was through and through "Synergistic," has been shown.\* But already, (1556), he had published a catechism, which, as Walch says, "closely follows the *Loci* and the *Catechism* of his preceptor, Melanchthon."† He declares almost in the very language of his Master: "Three causes concur:

\*See C. R. 9: 92-103, and THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1905, p. 335.

† *Introductio in Libros Symb.* p. 623.

"I. The Word of God and the true knowledge of Christ.

"II. The Holy Spirit kindling in the mind the knowledge of Christ, and faith, and the knowledge of the holy commandments. Thus moving the Will so that it obeys the holy commandments, and thereby regulates the actions of the external members.

"III. The mind and will of man obeying the Holy Spirit and ruling the external members."

In 1558 Chytraeus published a *Commentary on Genesis*, from which we extract the following: "But the three causes of faith are to be united, namely.

"*Αἴτιον*: The Holy Spirit.

"*Συμπαίτιον*: Hearing and meditating on the Word of God.

"*Συμφορὸν*: The human Will which is not absolutely inactive, or absolutely passive; but it does something. It does not resist, but it assents to the Holy Spirit who operates through the Word. This doctrine *de synergia voluntatis* we most firmly fix in our minds, so as not to nourish indifference, nor security, nor unbelief, nor despair in ourselves. Let the following firm and unanswerable arguments be constantly kept in view.

"I. Since the promise of grace is universal God wills that all men shall be saved. Also, as I live I will not the death of the sinner. And it must not be thought that there are contradictory wills in God. If this be true, then it follows that there is some cause in us why some persons assent to the promise, and why others do not assent. Luke 13: I would have gathered you, but you would not.

"II. It is evident that in the wills of the pious who strive to assent to the promise of the Gospel there are great and severe struggles and conflicts, as in Abraham when he was about to sacrifice his son; as in Jacob when he was wrestling with the angel; as every one daily experiences in prayer. But if the Will, like wax on which an imprint is made, were only passive and were absolutely without any action at all, then there would be no resistance, as when water is poured into a vessel.

"III. Paul 1 Cor. 3 and 2 Cor. 6 calls us *συνεργούς* Dei.

"IV. We must not yield to doubt, distrust and security. These curses are strengthened by the doctrine of the Manichaeans.

"V. Because God is no respecter of persons, but is just, that is, truly impartial towards all, according to the one rule which he has given; hence there is some cause in us why some accept the promise and why others are rejected."

Here as in the *Catechesis* we have the Melancthonian doctrine of Free-will set forth almost word for word as we find it in the *Loci*. There is no trace of *lapis* and *truncus* in any shape or form, and the *pure passive* is expressly rejected.\*

#### IV. MARTIN CHEMNITZ.

Martin Chemnitz stands, by common consent, at the head of the list of Lutheran theologians of the second generation. In 1545 he became a student at Wittenberg, where he heard Luther preach and lecture, though he was not formally engaged in the study of theology. In 1554 he began to deliver lectures at Wittenberg on Melancthon's *Loci Communes*. Called the same year to Brunswick he continued his lectures, which in 1592 were published by Polycarp Lyser. His method is first to quote a *Locus* from Melancthon and then to make an elaborate exposition of the same. These lectures exhibit moderation of temper, good judgment, sound interpretation of the Scriptures, and comprehensive acquaintance with the Fathers. Consequently these *Loci* have always stood high in the estimation of the Lutheran Church, and have been much used by subsequent writers on Lutheran theology. In expounding the doctrine of Free-will he takes Melancthon's *Locus de Libero Arbitrio* (including the *Liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam*) as his basis. He then proceeds exactly in the spirit of his Master, often in pivotal points employing the very language of his Master. But as these points were exhibited by us in THE LUTHERAN QUAR-

\* As late as 1572 Chytraeus declared that he still adheres to "the simple and correct form of doctrine in the *Loci Communes*," and retains it in his teaching at Rostock. See his letter in Balthaser's *Historie des Torgischen Buchs*, 1, p. 8.

TERLY for January, 1904, pp. 44-45, we deem it unnecessary to make quotations from the *Loci* at this time. We turn our attention to the *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, which still ranks as the classic criticism of the *Decrees* and *Canons* of the Council of Trent.

In that work the author discusses Free will under the following heads: *The Various Cognate Questions on Free will; The Principal State of the Controversy; The Council of Trent's Doctrine of Free will; The Scripture Doctrine of Free will; Augustine's Doctrine of Free will; The Insidious Statement of the Tridentine Doctrine of Free will.*

It is our humble judgment that we have here the most important and the ablest dogmatic and polemic treatment of Free will to be found in the entire field of Lutheran theology. Would that our space allowed the presentation of the entire chapter! We must content ourselves with one lengthy quotation from the section on *The Scripture Doctrine of Free will* and with a few short ones from other sections.

After stating, in harmony with the *Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free will*, that man has Free will in things subject to reason, but that in spiritual things "ἀδυναμία is propagated upon all men who are born of impure seed, and that to this defect and ἀδυναμία is now joined in this corruption of nature an opposing depravity and inclination," he says: "But the Holy Spirit so heals and renews the corrupt nature, that it begins to mortify that depravity, and in the place of the defects he works in the mind and will a new δυνάμια, efficacia or facultas, from which follow spiritual affections and actions, that is, he works to will, to be able and to do. But these gifts the Holy Spirit works through the medium or instrument of the Word, provided it be read, heard and meditated upon, which man ought and in some sense is able to do. And he does not infuse qualities as liquid is poured into a vessel; but in such a way that affections and actions follow in mind and will. Hence when the Holy Spirit by the Word begins to heal nature, some spark of activity and of spiritual power is kindled, although renewal is not at once perfected and finished but only in great weakness begun.

Yet then neither the mind nor the will is *inactive* (*otoisa*), but they have some new emotions which they ought also to exercise by meditating, praying, striving, wrestling, etc. But that spiritual power, those spiritual emotions, however slight they may be, do not arise, are not born either *ex toto* or *ex parte*, of the natural powers which the mind and the will have from the first birth; but they are the gifts, operations, workings of the Holy Spirit in us. And to the first production of spiritual efficiency and faculty, to the spiritual actions in us the mind and will contribute nothing effectual by their *natural powers*. For these principles must be retained without modification: Not from ourselves as of ourselves, but our fitness is from God. Without me ye can do nothing. What hast thou that thou hast not received? But when a spark of efficiency has been kindled in us by the Spirit, then both mind and will do something in spiritual matters. But the question arises, From what source do we have that which both *wills* and *is able to do something*? From the Holy Spirit of renewal who works *to will* and *to do*, from whom is the salutary ability to know." Italics ours.

After stating in the strongest way that man is not converted as Balaam's ass speaks, or as a stone is rolled, but by meditating on the law and the gospel, by desire, volition and assent, by struggling against security, unbelief and the stubbornness of the old man, he says: "In a word, in conversion there must occur and exist some movements and actions by which some *application* of the mind is made by understanding, of the Will, by *assenting, desiring, willing*, etc., and an application of the heart by serious affections to those things that have been made known to us in the law and in the gospel. For where there is absolutely no change in the mind, in the Will and in the heart, there no new knowledge, no reflection, no assent, no desire, no striving, no wrestling, etc., follows, but the entire man only resists and presents a contrary action. In a word, where there is no act of knowledge, of reflection, of desire, and of the affections, and where there is begun no *application* of the mind, the Will, the heart, to those things that are set forth in the law and in

the gospel, there, it is certain, no conversion takes place or exists. A workman uses an inanimate tool in one way. The Holy Spirit works conversion in mind, Will and heart. For he causes us *to will* and to be able to understand, to reflect, to desire, *to assent, to accept, to work, etc.*" Italics ours.

In the fourth section he declares that Augustine "joins grace and Free-will," and he says: "Where in the divine commandments action of the Will is required for doing or for not doing Free-will is clearly demonstrated. Likewise: To the grace of God it is necessary that *our consent* be added. That our good action is not *ex necessitate* but voluntary. As regards spiritual things some power *must be attributed* to Free-will. But omitting equivocations, it is easy to understand Augustine's meaning. For the things enjoined upon us by God in his Word, viz., the knowledge of himself, contrition, faith, hope, love, patience, worship, obedience, etc., are such as cannot be begun nor be effected without a movement and action of the mind and will. For without mind and understanding, no one can understand, reflect on or judge a thing; without Will no one desires, longs for, seeks, strives after, struggles for, wrestles, etc. Augustine says that men do many things *volentes*, but no one can believe except *volens*. Beyond all controversy this is self-evident." And while he declares most unqualifiedly that the mind and Will of man do not have the ability to obey God *per se* or *ex se*, yet equally decided is he in declaring that when grace has illumined the mind and given new powers, "from being ignorant men become intelligent, from being unwilling they become willing, so that in conversion, the mind and Will now *begin* by means of the gift to do that which before by their natural powers they were not able to do, and by the operation of the Spirit of renewal they have spiritual *movements and actions*, by knowing, meditating, judging, desiring, striving, wrestling, willing, doing, etc. This certainly is the view of Augustine." Italics ours.

These quotations taken almost at random from the *Examen* (1565) show what Chemnitz taught in regard to Free-will at that time. Not only does he not in any sense liken man to a

block or a brute beast, but he expressly denies any such likeness. And instead of speaking of man as absolutely passive in conversion, he ascribes to Free-will, when illumined and assisted by grace, all the different kinds of activity that belong to mind and Will, and says expressly that when the Holy Spirit has *begun* his work, "then neither mind nor Will is inactive." Nay more; he tries to show, against the Papists, that even Luther "non docuit, sine cogitatione mentis et consensu voluntatis fieri conversionem," p. 144.

We follow Chemnitz to a later period. He assisted in the composition of the *Corpus Doctrinae Pruthenticum* in the year 1567. In this official statement of doctrine we find no trace of the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* theory of conversion. On the contrary the activity of man in conversion, after the working of the precedent divine grace, is distinctly affirmed: "Man does not by his own Will anticipate God so as to know and seek that grace. But God by his most compassionate grace anticipates the Will of man who does not know and does not yet seek him, in order that he may cause him to *know* and to *seek* him. \* \* \* The good purposes and the good desire of man, although they *are assisted* by grace when they *have begun to be*, nevertheless *do not begin* without grace. \* \* \* We indeed *will*, but God works in us to will." Pp. 15 *et seqq.* Italics ours.

And still further in the *Sententia D. Martini Chemnitzii de facultate liberi arbitrii non renati, ad inchoandos et efficiendos motus spirituales, in conversione, seu renovatione*, given by Schlüsselsburg, \* we read among other things the following: "Augustine has most splendid views of *Grace and Free-Will*, chap. 16: It is certain *that we will when we will, but he who works to will causes us to will*. It is certain *that we also act when we act, but he who works to perform, causes us to act*. *De Correp. et Gratia*, chap. 2. They know, if they are the sons of God, that they are led by the Spirit of God, so that they do what is to be done, and, when they have done it, they know by whom they are led, and they give thanks; for they are led that they may

\* *Cat. Haeret.*, pp. 639 *et seqq.*

do, not that they may do nothing," And *De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis*, Chap. 32: "God works in us to will and to do, and in us he does not suffer those things to be inactive which ought to be active, nor does he give them to be neglected. But since conversion in all its parts is not completed immediately, or in one moment, it must not be said that the Will ought to be inactive or purely passive until it perceives that conversion is completed; or since conversion and renewal are the work of God, it must not be said that faith ought not care whether it be effected or has been effected, but ought to submit to God who is able to accomplish his own work. There were such in the time of Augustine, and for these he wrote the tractate *Of Grace and Free-will* and likewise *Of Reproof and Grace*. But when the beginnings of conversion have been given us by the Holy Spirit, immediately there arises a struggle between the flesh and the spirit which manifestly takes place not without an action of our will, and this *συνεργία* of the will, not of the old will, but of that which begins to be renewed, and those beginnings in great weakness grow and increase not without an action of our Will. And thus it is rightly said: *Præcunte gratia, comitante voluntate*. But that *συνεργία* always depends upon the grace of God, which if we desert, the gifts also cease and are lost."

It is unnecessary that we make any elaborate comment on this quotation. It plainly teaches that when the Holy Spirit has once begun a work of grace in the heart of man, then the mind and will are not inactive. They do something. They do not remain absolutely passive until the Holy Spirit has perfected conversion. And this plainly is the teaching of the four men who have been made special subjects of discussion. The three last named were through and through Melancthonian, even in their vocabulary, and in the employment of the same characteristic quotations from Augustine and other Fathers. Andreae and Brentz do not express themselves in the language of Melancthon nearly to the extent that the others do, because they had not been his pupils; but they teach essentially the same doctrine of Free will, namely, that man is not like a stone or a block, and that in conversion the Will is not *absolutely pas-*

sive, but that it assents to the Word of God and appropriates the *beneficia Dei*. And they all five show this common characteristic, namely, that they do not set up Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* as a standard of doctrine on the subject of Free-will; and this is a point particularly to be noted in view of what is to follow.

But before we make an application of the facts established, and draw conclusions, let us exhibit the Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will, and that of the Form of Concord, in comparative statement.

#### V. THE COMPARISON.

##### THE OLD LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF FREE-WILL.

In matters appertaining to this earthly life in so far as they can be known by the natural understanding man has Free-will, that is, the power to know things subject to reason and the power to choose between the things known. Consequently the natural man even before regeneration is able to lead an externally virtuous life. This is called Free-will in *civilibus*.

In things appertaining to the true knowledge, worship and service of God, the natural man does not have Free-will, that is, he cannot by means of the natural power of his mind know God aright, nor can he by the natural power of his will serve and obey God acceptably. Nor can he by means of the natural powers of his mind and will do anything to save himself from sin or to procure justification before God. That is, the natural man does not have Free-will in *spiritualibus*.

But the natural man differs in every respect from a block, a stone, a statue. For he has *arbitrium* and is susceptible of salvation, and has that in him by which, under the operation of divine grace, he

##### THE FORM OF CONCORD.

It is maintained that in external and civil affairs which appertain to this life man is intelligent, rational and very active; "but in things spiritual and divine, which appertain to the salvation of the soul man is like a pillar of salt (into which Lot's wife was changed). Yea, is like a block, a stock, a stone, a statue destitute of life, which does not have the use of eyes, or of any senses, or of heart." And prior to his illumination, conversion and regeneration, man continues knowingly and willingly in his security and thereby falls into eternal death; and prior to his conversion he can of himself do as little as a stone or a piece of clay. Yea, in his relation to the gospel he is *even worse than a block*, and has not an active, but only a *passive* capacity, in the sense that through God's grace Free-will can be turned to the good. Man has Free-will in a certain sense to go to church, and to hear or not to hear the sermon. But man prior to his conversion has no *modus agendi* in divine things, and can assent to the divine Word only after he has been converted.

can assent to the Word of God, can appropriate the grace of God, can lay hold on salvation. That is, when he reads or hears the Word of God, and begins to be assisted by the grace of God, and to be illumined and quickened by the Holy Spirit, he is not now *wholly inactive*, but he begins to do something, such as to assent to the Word of God, to pray, to strive, to resist his own weakness, to will to yield to the divine call. Hence in and during conversion man is not *absolutely passive*, nor is he in understanding and will only *subjectum patiens* or *only the subject to be converted*. Nor does he resist the Holy Spirit until conversion *has been perfected* in him. But this activity of Free-will *præcedente gratia, adjuvante Spiritu Sancto*, contributes nothing meritorious toward our salvation. Nor is it that for or on account of which God bestows additional grace, or pardons our sins, and justifies us in his sight. For salvation is by grace alone through faith alone on account of Christ alone. Even the power to will and to do is the gift of God, but the *willing* and the *doing* are ours.

"Man in his conversion is *absolutely passive*, that is, does nothing whatever, but only *suffers* that which God works in him;" not that conversion occurs without the preaching and hearing of the divine Word; but conversion is not only in part, but *entirely* an operation "of the Holy Spirit alone, who accomplishes and effects it by his own virtue and power through the Word in the understanding, will and heart of man as in *subjecto patiente*, where man does or works nothing, but only *suffers*," though not in the way in which a statue is cut in a stone, or as a seal is impressed on wax. That is: "Conversion to God is the work of God the Holy Spirit alone, who alone is that excellent workman who works these things in us, meanwhile nevertheless using the preaching and hearing of the divine Word (as his ordinary and legitimate instrument). But the understanding and will of the unregenerate man are only the *subjectum convertendum*, for they are the understanding and will of a man spiritually dead, in which the Holy Spirit works conversion and regeneration, to which work of man to be converted the will contributes nothing, but *suffers* God to work in it until it is regenerated."\*

Now when we come to study the contents of these two columns we discover a marked difference in their teaching. The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will repudiates the conception *in toto* that man is like a stone or a block. The doctrine of Free-will contained in Article II of the Form of Concord affirms such a conception, and declares that man in his relation to the gospel is even worse than a block. The former affirms

\*All the italics, except those in the sentence: *Man in his conversion is absolutely passive*, are ours.

that in and during conversion the mind and will of man are not *absolutely inactive*, but that Free-will does something; moreover, that conversion is not instantaneous, but has its beginning and its progressive movements. The latter affirms that in conversion man is *absolutely passive*, and in understanding and will is *tantum subjectum patiens*, and is *only the subject to be converted*; and consequently, since man only resists until he is converted by the Holy Spirit alone, conversion is instantaneous. That is, in conversion man is absolutely destitute of Free-will. Hence the two teachings are different in kind. The fundamental predicates of the one are different from the fundamental predicates of the other. What the one affirms the other denies. ut to get the full conception of this difference the reader must read again Strigel's *Declaration*, Brentz's *Apology*, and the quotations made from Selnecker, Chytraeus and Chemnitz. And if he will compare our right-hand column with Article XVIII of the Augsburg Confession, and with the corresponding article of the Apology, he will discover that there are elements in it that are not in those confessions; hence that Article II of the Form of Concord is not a logical and legitimate conclusion from the two oldest Lutheran confessions; that it is, or at least contains, a doctrine of Free-will that had had no official recognition in the Lutheran Church (except in very limited circles) prior to the year 1580; that it is a new doctrine of Free-will; consequently that there are two *different* doctrines of Free-will in the Lutheran Church, though it may be noted as an historical fact that the later doctrine has not had universal endorsement in the Lutheran Church, inasmuch as there have been at all times since 1580, not only individual Lutheran congregations, but even entire national bodies of Lutherans, which have not accepted the Form of Concord.

But the question now arises, What brought this later doctrine of Free-will into the Lutheran Church? Or, Why is it that we find in the Form of Concord a doctrine of Free-will that is *different in kind* from that which exists in the Augsburg Confession and in its Apology?

#### VI. THE SYNERGISTIC CONTROVERSY.

Our question finds its proper answer in what is known as

the *Synergistic Controversy*. In the year 1555 John Pfeffinger, a Leipzig pastor and professor, published an academic programme in which he had discussed certain propositions on Free-will, as for instance: "When we inquire about spiritual actions it is rightly answered that the human will does not have freedom of such a nature as to be able to effect spiritual conduct without the aid of the Holy Spirit.

"Three acting causes concur: The Holy Spirit influencing through the Word, the mind thinking and the Will not resisting, but in some sense yielding to the Holy Spirit now influencing. Some consent on our part ought to concur when now the Holy Spirit illumines the mind, the Will and the heart.

"We perceive that the Will is different from stones. But if it were like a statue, there would be no wrestling, no struggle in retaining faith. The Will is not inactive. If the Will were inactive or absolutely passive, there would be no difference between the pious and the impious, between the elect and the damned, between a Saul and a David. Also God would be a respecter of persons, and the author of contumacy in the impious and the damned.

"It follows, therefore, that there is in us some reason why some assent, and why others do not assent."\*

This is essentially the old Lutheran doctrine of Free-will, though the author was not happy in the use of certain words. But now after three years, when the Jena Academy was being erected into a university, and a theological faculty especially hostile to Leipzig and Wittenberg, † was being installed therein, Nicholas von Amsdorf, who was residing at the Weimar court, as in honor of the occasion, and in the execution of a matured plan, attacked Pfeffinger's *Propositions*, and

\* See Herzog, *Realencyclopaedie*, 2nd, XV., 105. Schmid, *Dogmengeschichte*, pp. 212 *et seqq.*, Thomasius, *Dogmengeschichte*, II, pp. 497 *et seqq.* Münscher (von Coeln) *Dogmengeschichte*, 2, pp. 427 *et seqq.* Preger, *M. Flacius Illyricus*, II, pp. 114 *et seqq.* Pressel, *Nicholas von Amsdorf*, p. 125.

† Salig, III, p. 377; Planck, IV, p. 571. In 1555 John Stolsins, court preacher to the Dukes at Weimar, wrote a reply to Pfeffinger, but it was not published until Oct. 1558. Given by Musaeus in *Disputatio Vinarieusis*, pp. 354 *et seqq.*

declared that it was insolent and presumptuous for Pfeffinger to say "that man by the natural powers of his Free-will can fit and prepare himself for grace without the aid of the Holy Spirit, just as the godless sophists, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus and their followers, had affirmed."

This is a direct falsification of what had been taught by Pfeffinger, but it served the purpose of hate, jealousy and hostility. Pfeffinger at once republished his *Propositions* and indignantly repudiated all such teaching as had been charged against him by Amsdorf.\* The next year Amsdorf replied to Pfeffinger and declared, among other things equally absurd, that "when God justifies a man he acts precisely as a carver does when he makes a statue out of wood. Out of a sinner who loves sin God makes a man righteous and holy without any participation on the part of the man. As stone and wood are in the presence of the statuary, so is the Will of man in the presence of God."†

Meanwhile Flacius, who was now professor at Jena, entered the lists and carried the fight into the schools, and "accused the entire University of Wittenberg of error."‡ He affirmed that man in conversion is not only absolutely passive, but that "he is toward God by whom he is made a new creature as a block is toward the statuary, and in conversion holds himself *adversative, vel repugnante seu hostiliter* towards the operation of God."§

This same doctrine in regard to conversion was subsequently repeated by Flacius in a *Disputation* held in Jena, and in the

\* Thomasius, *ut supra*, p. 498; Münscher, *ut supra*, pp. 430-1; Pressel, *ut supra*, p. 125; Planck, IV. pp. 574-5.

† Herzog, *ut supra*, 105. In his *Sententia*, Schlüsselburg, V. pp. 546 *et seq.*, Amsdorf says that "God has only one *modus agendi* with all creatures."

‡ Thomasius, *ut supra*, p. 498.

§ See *M. Fl. Illyrici Refutatio Propositionum Pfeffingeri de Libero Arbitrio* in Musaeus, *Acta Disputationis Vinariensis* (the Weimar Disputation), pp. 380, 382, 436, *et passim*. Also the Weimar Disputation, pp. 2, 134, and several tractates by Flacius on Original Sin and Free-will, in Musaeus' *Acta*, *passim*. Flacius's *Refutatio Pfeffingeri* is little else than a repetition, exposition, and application of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, which he calls "an invincible book," p. 395.

Weimar *Disputation* of 1560, where again and again, in the face of denials and protests and documentary evidence to the contrary, he charges that his opponents teach that "there are three efficient and coöperating causes in conversion." \* In his various treatises and disputations he rings the changes on words and propositions that afterwards found defining place and use in the Form of Concord, as: "Man is absolutely passive and does nothing in conversion;" "Our will in conversion is like a block, a statue or stone;" "Corrupt human nature is worse than a block;" "*Tantum ut* subjectum patiens *nos habemus*;" "The Scripture attributes the conversion of man to God alone;" "God alone converts man."† In addition he, Amsdorf and others canonize Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* and make that book and certain extracts from Luther's writings normative and final in the premises, and charge it as a vicious defect that their opponents have not followed the *De Servo Arbitrio*. They also heap reproaches upon their opponents, and call them opprobrious names, such as Synergists, Adiaphorists, Erasmians, Pelagians, Hypocrites, Sophists, Sacrilegious,

\* Melancthon, as we have shown, never speaks of the Will as a coöperating, or as an efficient, cause of conversion. He says that "there are three causes of a good action." With him the Holy Spirit is the sole *efficient* cause; the Word of God is the instrumental cause. The Will assents. And very truly does Salig say: "Strigel never spoke of three efficient and apprehensive causes of conversion, but of three *concurring* causes. The Holy Spirit is the *efficient cause*, the Word the *instrumental*. If it be asked, Is the Will a cause? the answer is: The Will does not have the nature of an *efficient cause*, but in so far as it is assisted, urged, moved, turned, by the Holy Spirit, who works in one way in children, and in another way in adults. The Holy Spirit draws us. The Will does not draw itself, but is drawn by the Word, though not as a block. It has its own *modus agendi*." III, pp. 613-4. See Strigel's own declarations to the same effect in the Weimar *Disputatio*, pp. 8, 40, 102, where he says that neither he nor his preceptors (the Wittenberg Faculty) "had ever used the new words, coöperation and synergia." See also Strigel's *Loci, Prima Pars*, pp. 368-9. Also Strigel's *Confession* in Musaeus' *Acta* p. 585. For Pfeffinger to the same effect see Münscher *ut supra*, pp. 430-1. For the Wittenbergers and Pezel see THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, July, 1905, p. 321, note. It is demonstrable that Flacius simply calumniated.

† See *passim* in Flacius *De Originali Peccato* given in Musaeus' *Acta*, pp. 398 *et seqq.* Also in *Disputatio*, pp. 429 *et seqq.*, *passim* and in the Weimar *Disputatio passim*.

Church robbers, Philosophico theologians, Corrupters of Luther's books, Disturbers of the Church, and the like. In a word the Flacianists carried on a campaign of slander and defamation against their opponents, and proclaimed themselves the teachers and defenders of the pure Lutheran doctrine.

By such methods they brought the Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will into discredit, and precipitated violent controversies upon the Lutheran Church. Strigel and the aged pastor Hügel, both of Jena, were arrested, thrown into prison and inhumanly treated. The Weimar Disputation brought no reconciliation, and Strigel's *Declaration* only intensified the strife and widened the breach. The commotion is thus described by Salig: "It (Strigel's *Declaration*) was a new apple of discord flung among the Thuringian clergy, some of whom had signed it at Weimar, as we have already said. The Württemberg theologians, as mediators, had declared it correct and orthodox. The Court was entirely satisfied with it, and if it be regarded as to its fundamental principles, it is Christian and Scriptural, and today no theologian would teach differently from Strigel. Let the reader turn back to the reflections made by us on the Weimar Colloquy. The situation was extremely awkward. The Flacianist pastors, about sixty in number, could not chide the Württembergers as being synergists; and yet they preached and declaimed throughout the land from the pulpits against Strigel's *Declaration*, and told the people that man in conversion is like a block, a log, and is converted like a swine, in spite of himself (*repugnante*).<sup>\*</sup> And in order to place their cause in the more favorable light they declared that they stood by Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, and that what it contained they accepted to the last letter (which is done by very few Lutherans of today), and that the party that accepted Strigel's *Declaration* were Erasmians and Pelagians. They charged the Duke and his counsellors and the Württembergers with driving Luther's doctrine into exile. They sought help from the exiled theologians, who faithfully assisted them, and they had spies in all Thuringia who reported to them all that transpired in the country, as can be seen by the originals which are often

<sup>\*</sup>Musaeus' *Acta*, pp. 2, 382 et *passim*.

still quoted in the Acts. Wigand and Judex, who were then at Magdeburg, come out with a criticism of Strigel's *Declaration* almost as soon as they saw it. Then followed Dr. Hesshuss, the Mansfeld ministers, Nicholas von Amsdorf, Nicholas Gallus, Flacius at Regensburg, and others, who—some from misunderstanding, and others from party-feeling because they thought that such great men as Flacius, Musaeus, Wigand, Judex, could not be mistaken, or regarded it as a piece of unnecessary strife—rejected Strigel's *Declaration*, or regarded it as obscure, ambiguous, heretical, and contrary to Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*.

"When after long years we look at these polemical tractates we are amazed to see how the people fought like blindfold gladiators, and how their hearts, embittered against each other, and enraged, would not listen to reason, nor look at the matter aright, nor by explaining terms and by learning the truth, come to an agreement in a Christian and fraternal manner, not by disputing on metaphysical questions, but by apprehending the sole operation of God's grace and the power of the Holy Spirit in true conversion and regeneration. Of the two parties, one was necessarily right, because in things that are contradictory they thought that they stood in antagonism to each other. The Würtembergers were orthodox, and the exiled theologians announced themselves as extra-orthodox. And yet the Würtembergers had declared that Strigel's *Declaration* accorded with the Augsburg Confession, with the Schmalkald Articles and even with the Saxon Confutation. What conclusion can we now come to in regard to the matter, other than that the people did not know what they were fighting about, and that the Flacianists wantonly urged on these ungodly contentions from a quarrelsome disposition and from an insolent spirit."\*

As early as August twentieth (1562) the Mansfeld ministers published a statement in which they say that "the proposition of the whole case, that which the Holy Scripture and the Holy

\* *Vollständige Historie der Augsb. Conf.*, III, pp. 887 et seqq. The author gives in elaborate notes the documentary proof of his narrative and the grounds of his conclusion. See also Otto, *ut supra*, p. 65, 66; Walch, *Einleitung*, 4 and 6, pp. 100-101.

Luther lay down, is this: "In conversion man is absolutely passive and in no sense whatever coöperates by his own powers with divine grace." They further say, "that man contributes not more to his conversion than an infant in its mother's womb contributes to its own formation;" "he is *subjectum mere patiens*; has no *modus agendi*," and "can do no more in conversion than a block." And to give authority to their affirmations they say: "This doctrine is handed down by the holy man Luther and is firmly established in the Scriptures." They also allege it as a special fault that Strigel's *Declaration* makes no mention of the *De Servo Arbitrio*, which is to be accepted as the standard of teaching on the subject.\*

And Dr. Hesshuss, whom we shall meet later, declared that man is *subjectum patiens*, and is absolutely passive in conversion and is like a block, and only suffers. "He does not assent, nor embrace, nor believe, but only resists so long as he is not converted, regenerated, and changed by the Holy Spirit." "Man only suffers." "The Will is *causa materialis*, *subjecta et patiens*." "Subjectum passivum." "Man is absolutely passive and is a block, as regards spiritual actions." "Mind and Will are the material in which, or subjectum patiens, in the operation of the Holy Spirit."† The usual appeal is made to Luther as to a final authority, and the "synergists" come in for their customary share of misrepresentation.

We now go back a little and then forward. In the year 1561 the Flacianists were driven from Jena on account of their turbulent spirit,‡ and their places, as has been already noted, were filled by Wittenbergers. There was peace now between the theologians of Ducal and those of Electoral Saxony. But when Duke John William took the government in 1567 the Wittenbergers were dismissed, and the Flacianists (not Flacius himself) were reinstated, whereupon the war broke out afresh. Soon Jena was in arms against Leipzig and Wittenberg. In the years 1568-9 a colloquy was held at Altenburg. In this col-

\* See the *Sententia* of the Mansfeld ministers in Schlüsselburg's *Cat. Haeret.*, V. pp. 473 *et seqq.*

† Schlüsselburg, V. pp. 315 *et seqq.*, *passim*.

‡ Preger, II, 173.

loquy and in the *Endlicher Bericht* the theologians and superintendents of Electoral Saxony planted themselves squarely on the Augsburg Confession and its Apology and on the *Corpus Doctrinae Philippicum*, and maintained unequivocally that Free-Will by its own native powers can contribute nothing whatever to man's conversion and justification; but at the same time they declare that Free-will is not a block or a stone, and that in conversion man is not absolutely passive, as the Flacianists so persistently taught.\*

In March (1569) the theologians of Ducal Saxony, headed by John Wigand, presented a Confession,† in which almost at the very beginning they say: "We embrace the doctrine and the view of Dr. Luther, the Elias of these last days, as they have been transmitted most luminously and skillfully in the *De Servo Arbitrio* against Erasmus, in the Commentary on Genesis and in other books, and we judge that this view of Luther's harmonizes with the everlasting *Word of God*." True to this declaration they accept and quote the *De Servo Arbitrio* and other works by Luther as final: "It is certain that Free-will is nothing else than the supreme enemy of righteousness and of man's salvation." "We are like a block marred in every possible manner." "In theology man is verily a pillar of salt, as was Lot's wife;" "Man is absolutely passive and does nothing, but is wholly made;" "We are only passive;" "We do nothing, but we suffer;" "God himself converts us, not we ourselves." It is also said in this Confession: "As in the beginning in the womb of the mother God creates and forms us men without our coöperation, so also does he recreate or regenerate us by water and the Spirit, as Prosper beautifully says: '*Vasque novum ex fracto fingit virtute creandi*.'" That is, the Confession of these Thuringian theologians teaches the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* doctrine of conversion without equivocation or qualification, just as we have found that Flacius does in his numerous discussions *De Peccato Originali et Libero Arbitrio*, and alike these Thuringians and Flacianists go back

\* See *Endlicher Bericht*, pp. 70-5.

† Given in full in Schlüsselburg, V. pp. 132-200.

to Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, which, we repeat, they avowedly lay down as canonical, and hence as final in the premises.

Now, it is exactly in this Thuringian Confession and in Flacius's tractates and discussions *De Libero Arbitrio*, and in other Flacianist writings, that we find the true antecedents and pre-suppositions of Article II of the Form of Concord. The central idea and the doctrine in all are identical to all intents and purposes, so that, following the law of cause and effect and of natural sequence, we can say, If the former had not been, the latter would not be. The pivotal words are the same. Even the *ratio disserendi* is strikingly alike. Moreover, this Confession begins its argument by appealing to Luther's teaching on the subject; and the Article begins its argument with what purports to be a quotation from Luther's Commentary on the 90th Psalm,\* and they both lay down Luther's teaching as normative even before they begin the argument from the Scriptures. They both quote from the same works of Luther, though the quotations in the Confession are more abundant, because it is much larger than the Article; and they both quote to a large extent the same passages from the Scriptures, and alike they omit those passages of Scripture which do not support their theory of Free-will. Also in both we find great

\* We consider that the argument in Article II of the Form of Concord really begins with the declaration *alleged* to be found in Luther's *Commentary* on the 90th Psalm. But Luther did not write what is here attributed to him. On verse 11, 90th Psalm, he wrote this: *Philosophi hominem definiunt esse animal rationale. Sed hoc quis dicet in theologia esse verum? Ibi enim vere homo est statua salis, sicut uxor Lot, quia magnam iram Dei non intelligit, et ruit imprudens in mille pericula mortis, imo saepe volens et sciens.* *Erlangen Ed.*, Latin, XVIII, p. 318.

The Form of Concord here followed the example of Flacius, who in the Weimar Disputation (Musaeus' *Acta*, pp. 211-2) appealed to Luther, and, probably quoting from Spangenberg's "corrupt translation" (See Erlangen Ed., Latin, XVIII, p. 260), or as the St. Louis editor calls it: "An exceedingly prolix and completely arbitrary elaboration" (Vol. V, p. 732, note), grossly misrepresents Luther. Let the reader compare Luther's few simple words given above in Latin with the putative quotation found in Article II, Form of Concord (Müller, *Libri Symb.*, p. 593; Jacobs' *Book of Concord*, p. 556; New Market edition, p. 614), attributed to Luther. Such a radical change of text, in form, and in matter, and in intensification, deserves to be branded as a forgery.

similarity of phraseology, the same method of misrepresenting the position of the opponents and the same manner of making reference to "the three causes," and the same misinterpretation of Melanchthon's definition: *Liberum Arbitrium in homine esse facultatem*, etc.

Consequently we can say that Article II of the Form of Concord, finished in the cloister of Bergen in 1577, existed in essentials, and in substance, and in purpose, since March, 1569, though the later document shows abbreviation, condensation, omissions, adaptation, improved arrangement, but absolutely no difference in idea and in substance of doctrine *de libero arbitrio*, since both teach unequivocally that in conversion man is *absolutely passive*, and both reach that conclusion substantially by the same methods.

Hence he who can unqualifiedly subscribe Article II of the Form of Concord, can unqualifiedly subscribe this Thuringian Confession in so far as the doctrine of Free-will is concerned, indeed is logically bound to do so, for the dominant note, the major and the minor, are the same in both; both are based fundamentally on what, since 1558, Flacius had taught on original sin and on Free-will, though the Form of Concord and Wigand and Hesshuss rejected the Flacian absurdity that original sin is the substance of man. Hence we can say, and in fidelity to the facts in the case, it must be said, that the Synergistic Controversy was settled (in so far as for a time it seemed to be settled) by the Form of Concord *essentially in the sense of Flacius*, who laid hold of certain hyperbolic expressions found in Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*, and elsewhere in his writings, tore them from their contextual relations, assigned them canonical authority and (practically ignoring Luther's explanations and modifications) employed them dialectically as the basis of argument, and as guides in the interpretation of Scripture, though it is notorious that Luther did not desiderate those expressions in the older confessions, and did not place them in his catechisms, nor in the Schmalkald Articles; but, by his unqualified endorsement of Melanchthon's *Loci* in 1535 and again in 1545, he did, to say the least, acquiesce in *The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will*, that is, in what Melanch-

thon taught in his *Scholia on Colossians*, and more plainly in the Confession and Apology, and then elaborated in the *Loci* and in other text-books that proceeded from his pen—facts which no scholar will presume to deny, and if facts, then proofs that the Flacianist doctrine of Free-will is not the genuine old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-Will.

But we have not yet answered the question, Why do we find in the Form of Concord a doctrine of Free-will that is different in kind from that which exists in the older Lutheran Confessions? Or, how did it come to pass that the Flacianist doctrine of Free-will entered essentially into Article II of the Form of Concord and imparted to that article its generic idea and its specific determination? We have shown that four of the six men who are reputed to have been the composers of the Form of Concord had previously taught and confessed a doctrine of Free-will that does not have in it a single element of the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* theory—taught a doctrine that distinctly affirms that in conversion the mind and will of man are in some sense active, that the Will assents to the divine Word, and that man has some power to appropriate the *beneficia Dei*; and this doctrine those four men taught and held as being in harmony with the teaching of the older confessions. It is also a fact that the *lapis-truncus-pure passive* doctrine did not have place in Andreae's *Six Sermons* (1573), nor in the *Swabian-Saxon Concordia* (1575), nor yet in the Torgau Book without qualifications.

But now, inasmuch as the Swabian-Saxon Concordia, the work of Andreae, Chemnitz and Chytraeus, had been rejected by the Flacianists, chiefly because it still contained large remnants of Melancthonianism, it was resolved at Lichtenburg, February 16th, 1576, under the leadership of Selnecker, to exclude Melancthon's *Corpus Doctrinae* from the plan of union, and to retain the three ecumenical creeds, "the Unaltered Augsburg Confession," the Apology, the catechisms of Luther and the Schmalkald Articles.\*

\*This resolution known as the Lichtenburg *Bedenken* (given in Hutter's *Concordia Concors*, pp. 77-79) was composed by Selnecker. See his speech in Heppé, *Geschichte des deutschen Protest.*, III, pp. 88-90. In the *Saxon-Swabian Concordia*, chiefly the work of Chemnitz and Chy.

In accordance with this plan was the Torgau Book composed (May 28th-June 7th, 1576), and although its authors did not succeed in excluding all distinctly Melanchthonian teaching from the Article *De Libero Arbitrio*,\* yet they gave it a decidedly Flacianizing coloring and sense.

#### VI. THE TORGAU BOOK.

And now it was that Selneccer, Andreae and Chemnitz set to work in the most systematic and diplomatic way, by concessions, by intercessions, and by flattery, to satisfy and win over the Flacianists, particularly Hesshuss, who was now bishop of Samland, and Wigand, who was bishop of Pomesania, both of whom had refused to sign the Swabian-Saxon Concordia, † and who together controlled and determined the doctrinal position of the Prussian clergy, without whose coöperation the plan for Concord must have inevitably failed.

The procedure was as follows:

June 23rd Chemnitz writes to Hesshuss about the Torgau convention and about the Torgau Book, and informs him that the Lichtenburg resolution, that Melanchthon's *Corpus Doctrinae* "should no longer be held as a norm and form of doctrine and confession, nor be imposed on anyone, since it contains certain errors, as *de libero arbitrio*, *de evangelio*, *de coena*, etc.," had been carried out. "In the *Locus de libero arbitrio* we have referred expressly to Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio* and to his Declaration on the twenty-sixth chapter of Genesis. Mention of Philip's books has been expunged, and for justification in this part we have referred to the Lichtenburg resolution." "The Elector contemplates the reorganization of the Wittenberg University, so as to have it genuinely Lutheran." He solicits Hesshuss' prayers and counsels. "But I think you do not need to be exhorted. For I do not doubt that you pro-

\* See Heppe, *Der Text der Berg. Concordienformel*, p. 67. Semler pp. 96-8. THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY for January 1904, p. 58. Balthaser, I, p. 11.

† Pressel, *Martin Chemnitz*, p. 60.

traeus, the writings of Melanchthon "are justly commended" and he and Luther are named together as "our dear Fathers and Preceptors." Pfaß, *Acta et Scripta*, pp. 385, 446; Balthaser, p. 7.

pose that corruptions shall be rejected, and that the purity of the Lutheran doctrine shall be retained. Since to this end we have tried to make a modest preparation, and have followed the example of the *Prussian Corpus Doctrinae*, I do not doubt in regard to your willingness to promote this matter. I understand that there are certain pseudo-Lutherans who entertain the hope that this matter will be interrupted and hindered by you. But at Torgau I said and I still say what I think of and hope about you." Here now was material concession, for the Flacianists had constantly insisted on the extinguishment of Melancthon, and on the unqualified endorsement of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*.

He also tells him that the Elector of Saxony has spoken about him, and has expressed the hope that he will approve what had been done at Torgau. Here is the flattery, since he gives Hesshuss to understand that he is an important factor in promoting concord.

He also informs him that he and others had petitioned the Elector in behalf of "the Thuringian exiles" (among whom were Hesshuss and Wigand), who had been banished from Thuringia by said Elector. Here was the intercession. He says that Andreae (whom the Flacianists had not forgiven for having signed Strigel's *Declaration*)\* and Selneccer (whom the Flacianists had classed among the "synergists") had both conducted themselves nobly at Torgau, and had contributed not a little to the results attained.

Indeed this letter, which lies before us in the full text, is a revelation, and it throws a flood of light on the history of the Torgau Book, and on the methods used to conciliate the Flacianists. It more than justifies Loescher's declaration that "Chemnitz took pains to win this hard-pated man, who, almost everybody said, would oppose the work of concord."†

Also: In a strain that is almost obsequious Andreae writes

\* See Hesshuss' letter in reply to Chemnitz's letter in Hospinian, pp. 72-3. Also, Loescher, *Historia Motuum*, pp. 252, 289.

† *Historia Motuum, Dritter Theil*, p. 254. Chemnitz's letter is found in Rehtmyer's *Kirchenhistorie der Stadt Braunschweig, Beilage Zum VIII cap. Num. 47*, pp. 255-259. In part in Heppe, *Geschichte des Deutschen Protest. Dritter Theil*, p. 113.

to Hesshuss and Wigand (July 24th, 1576) begging them to forget the evils of former days and to rejoice over the things that God is now doing. He assures them the Elector of Saxony is intent on the restoration of the pure Lutheran doctrine. He says: "Luther, that is Christ, whose faithful servant Luther was lives. What more do you wish? Here nothing is counterfeit, nothing is cloaked, nothing concealed, but is according to the spirit of Luther, which is the spirit of Christ. Everything has been done candidly, openly, piously, sacredly, for illustrating and promoting the truth." He tells them Chemnitz and Chytraeus feel and judge as he does. "Truly this is the change of the right hand of the Most High."\*

Now there is no mistaking the meaning and the purpose of these two letters, which bear internal evidence of having been written in concert. They show that the Torgau convention had virtually surrendered to the Flacianists, and that two of its leaders had taken upon themselves, or perhaps had been requested, to announce the fact. Also: There was great rejoicing among the theologians at Torgau over the result of their deliberations,\* which were declared to be in harmony

\* Anton, *ut supra*, pp. 175-6. Balthaser, *ut supra*, p. 13.

with the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, the Schmalkald Articles, and Luther's catechisms, and the theologians witness before God and all men living and yet to be born that this their explanation of the controverted points, and no other, "is our faith, doctrine and confession, in which we are willing to stand indismayed before the judgment seat of Christ and render an account."†

Copies of the Torgau Book were sent to various princes for examination. The Duke of Prussia placed the copy sent to him in the hands of Hesshuss, who had copies made and distributed among his clergy. Later Hesshuss and Wigand at the command of the Duke rendered each an opinion on the Book. These opinions were afterwards made into one (chiefly according to the concept of Hesshuss), which was sent to the

\* Letter given by *Heppe in Geschichte des Deutschen Protestant.*, III, p. 111, note.

† Semler, *ut supra*, p. 322.

Elector of Saxony.\* This *Prussian Opinion*, entitled *Bedenken von der Formula Concordiae*,† praises the Torgau Book in general as a grand and noble book, but criticises it sharply in many particulars. It demands the emphatic condemnation by name of the "authors and patrons of corruptions," as Flacius in the doctrine of sin, and Melancthon and others in the doctrine of Free-will. It expresses the hope that Selneccer and Crell, who had opposed the Flacianists in their writings, "have been truly converted to God," and its authors say that if Andreae will truly repent, they as Christian men will forgive and forget the injuries received at his hands.

Coming to the article: *Of Supposed Free-will*, they demand, among other things:

1. That the paragraph in which the Torgau Book treats the passage, Gal. 3 : 24 : "The law is our schoolmaster," etc., in a Melancthonian sense, be supplanted by Luther's explanation of the same passage.

2. That the comparison by which the Torgau Book likens the natural mind and will of man to our eyes, which see the earth, but cannot behold the bright sun, be dropped, because it is too weak, since the natural understanding is stark blind and dead to the good.

3. That the declaration that the question, Whether man before, in, and after conversion, resists the Holy Spirit, is only a scholastic dispute, be not so understood, "for Luther was not a scholastic disputer when he earnestly and justly contended for the *pure passive*."

4. That the Melancthonian *Hominis voluntas in conversione non est otiosa* (which in the Torgau Book is explained in the Melancthonian sense) be supplanted by: *Rectissime Lutherus contendit hominem in conversione se habet pure passive*.

5. That the *tres causae concurrentes*, which had received a somewhat Melancthonian explanation in the Torgau Book,

\* Anton, *ut supra*, pp. 190-1. Also Heppé, *ut supra*, pp. 137 *et seqq.*

† This document (dated January 8th, 1577), which has never been printed, is in the hands of the present writer in the form of a type-written copy made expressly for his use from the Original Protocol in the Kgl. Staatarchiv zu Königsberg, Pr. Briefarchiv, J. 2. Indispensable for the proper understanding of the history of the Form of Concord.

be rejected as dangerous and false and as favorable to the Synergists.

6. That the dictum of Chrysostom: "God draws, but draws him who is willing," be rejected as false and pelagianizing; and they close by saying that Melancthon's teaching on Free-will as contained in the *Loci* and in the *Examen Ordinandorum*, and in his other writings, and the teaching of Strigel and others on the same subject, and the doctrine of "the three efficient causes," are rejected by them, "because contrary to the Word of God."

#### VII THE FORM OF CONCORD.

Finally, in March 1577, in the Cloister of Bergen, near Magdeburg, Andreae, Chemnitz and Selnecker, whom Chytraeus calls "the triumvirate," revised the Torgau Book by the aid of the numerous opinions that had been received, and transformed it into the Bergic Book, that is, the Form of Concord. In the Article, *De Libero Arbitrio*, every demand made by the *Prussian Opinion* (Hesshuss, Wigand, *et al*), is conceded either in form or in substance. The paragraph on Gal. 3 : 24 is simply dropped. The Melancthonian formulae given above in Latin, which, we repeat, were explained in a Melancthonian sense in the Torgau Book, are now declared "to be contrary to sound doctrine, and are justly to be avoided." In a word, the demands of the Flacianists *de libero arbitrio* as they have found concentrated official expression in the *Prussian Opinion*, have been complied with in the essential things. The offensive Melancthonian formulae are not indeed stricken out, but they are expressly condemned, and the last trace of *The Old Lutheran Doctrine of Free-will* (except in matters purely formal) is supplanted by an essentially Flacianistic repristination of Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*. The *lapis-truncus-pure passive-tantum subiectum patiens* doctrine *de libero arbitrio*, as it stands in the Form of Concord, is declared to be "the pure doctrine concerning this article according to God's Word, and conformable to the Augsburg Confession and to other approved writings"—all done essentially as the *Prussian Opinion* had demanded. The proof is documentary. In a word, Flacianism *de libero Arbitrio* has triumphed. Andreae (Aet. 49), Chemnitz (Aet. 55), Selnecker

(Aet. 47) have capitulated. Under Flacianist pressure, and to the behoof of the Flacianists, they now promulgate a doctrine of Free-will which is contrary to Strigel's *Declaration*, and contrary to what is taught on the subject of Free-will in Chemnitz's *Loci* and *Examen*, and in Selneccer's *Institutio*; and which cannot by any fair process of logic be drawn out of the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, and which is in direct antagonism to that explanation of the same which had prevailed in the Lutheran Church almost universally until the University of Jena was called into existence in opposition to Wittenberg and Leipzig.

Hence we really have here in the Form of Concord a *new* Lutheran doctrine *de libero arbitrio*. In the controversy that was begun in 1558 the end constantly affected by the Flacianists was the resurrection and the formal installation of Luther's doctrine of Free-will, as the same had been set forth in the *De Servo Arbitrio*. But in pursuing that end they out-Luthered Luther. Not only did they set up the *De Servo Arbitrio* as canonical (which neither Luther nor the Lutheran Church had done); not only did they translate Luther's rhetorical flourishes into confessional and didactic formulae (which neither Luther nor the Lutheran Church had done); not only did they expand and intensify Luther's comment on verse 11, 90th Psalm, in a manner that suggests forgery; but they stated their central proposition: *Hominem in conversione sua sese pure passive habere* in a form and in language that Luther had not employed, though they attributed the proposition directly to Luther. For instance: In the *De Servo Arbitrio* Luther, after quoting John 1 : 12, says: *Johannes non loquitur de ullo opere hominis, neque magno, neque parvo, sed ipsa innovatione et transmutatione hominis veteris, qui filius Diaboli est, in novum hominem, qui filius Dei est. Hic homo mere passive (ut dicitur) sese habet, nec facit quippiam, sed fit totus.* That is: "John is not speaking of any work of man, whether great or small, but of the very renewal and changing of the old man, who is the child of the Devil, into the new man, who is the child of God. This man is merely passive (as the saying is) and does nothing, but is made whole." \*

\* Erl. Ed., Latin, 7, p. 239.

The Flacianists and the Form of Concord, without quoting the passage of Scripture, and without giving Luther's full explanation, condense the paragraph into *Hominem in conversione sua pure passive sese habere*—a proposition found nowhere in the writings of Luther. Moreover, Luther is speaking in a general way of regeneration, which is very different from conversion in the specific sense used by the Flacianists and by the Form of Concord. Also: They change Luther's *mere passive* into *pure passive*, which is decidedly more intense, and expresses the antithesis to the opposite (*active*) much more positively and exclusively, as the merest tyro in Latin knows. Besides, they omit the parenthesis, *ut dicitur*, and by so doing they turn a popular saying into a solemn dictum, into an article of faith. In short: When the Flacianists and the Form of Concord present their version of Luther's comment on verse 11, 90th Psalm, and when they say: Lutherus affirmat: *Hominem in conversione sua pure passive sese habere*, they sin against the eighth Commandment, inasmuch as Luther made no such comment and no such affirmation as they attribute to him. And to say that that is what Luther meant is to commit a barefaced *petitio principii*. Hence the Form of Concord in these central propositions does not *represent* Luther. It in so far *misrepresents* him. To say the least the Form of Concord in so far presents Luther's doctrine of Free-will in a form that must inevitably make an impression such as is not made by Luther's own words. That is, the Flacianists and the Form of Concord teach a doctrine of conversion that is not justified by their own canonical standards; to which must be added the facts that their principal standard had been written in heated controversy when Luther was yet fully under the powerful hand of Augustine, five years before the Lutheran Church was born, and had become a relatively forgotten book, until it was called out of obscurity and canonized by Flacius *et al.* in 1558.\*

\* No edition of the *De Servo Arbitrio* seems to have been published after 1526 until 1553, when it appeared in a collected edition of Luther's works. In 1591 Jacob Remedoncius published an edition at Heidelberg for the purpose of showing that this book agrees with the Reformed in the doctrine of grace and of the absolute decree of God. See St. Louis Edition, vol. XVIII, p. 1670, note.

## VIII. CONSENSUS ECCLESIAE.

The conclusion thus based on the facts given above, is that the doctrine of Free-will contained in the Form of Concord is not the generic and catholic Lutheran doctrine, and that outside of small partizan circles it had no official authorization until half a century after the Lutheran Church was born. Yea, more: This Flacianist doctrine of Free-will does not have the *consensus ecclesiae*: "Justin, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, teach that neither the will of man nor even grace alone lead to salvation in Christ, but a co-working of the two."\* "All the Greek Fathers taught in a semi-Pelagian way."† *Αὐτεξουσίον* is *libertas arbitrii*, *liberum arbitrium*, which the Greeks also call *το, ἐφ' ἧ μὴν*. This *αὐτεξουσίον*, *liberum arbitrium*, is defended by all the Fathers."‡

"The Greek and Latin church teachers are in general one in the decided emphasis which they place on human freedom."§

"All the Latin fathers also maintained that Free-will was not lost after the Fall; but they did not express themselves so strongly on the point as the Greeks, and especially the Alexandrians."||

"It was not the view of Augustine that man is like a stone or stick, upon whom grace works externally; he could conceive of grace as working only in the sphere of freedom. 'For the grace of God is not offered to stones, nor to blocks, nor to beasts, but man merits this grace because he is the image of God.' Not as in insensate stones, nor as in those things in whose nature he did not place reason and will, does God work our salvation in us.'"¶

Dr. Shedd presents Augustine's scheme as follows: "The Holy Spirit is the efficient; the human spirit is the recipient.

\*Kahnis, *Dogmatik, Zweiter Band*, p. 113.

†Luthardt, *Die Lehre von Freien Willen*, p. 16.

‡Suicer, *Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus*, *sub voce*.

§Dr. Landerer, *Jahrbuecher fuer Deutsche Theologie*, 1857, p. 513.

||Wiggers, *Augustinianism and Pelagianism*. Eng. Trans. p. 336.

¶Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*. Translation from the fifth edition, vol. I, p. 428.

The former acts independently; the latter acts as it is acted upon. The consequence of the divine efficiency is regeneration; the consequence of the human recipiency is conversion. God regenerates, and as a consequence therefrom man converts."\* And Dr. Warfield: "Towards the end of this treatise (*De Spiritu et Litera*) he (Augustine) treats in an absorbingly interesting way of the mutual relations of Free-will, faith and grace, contending that all can exist without the voiding of any. It is by Free-will that we believe; but it is only as grace moves us, that we are able to use our Free-will for believing; and it is only after we are thus led by grace to believe, that we obtain all other goods."†

Such are the judgments of three eminent Augustine Scholars of the Reformed Church. We have already seen that three eminent Lutheran Scholars, Melanchthon, Chemnitz, and Selnecker, appeal to Augustine and interpret him as teaching the activity of the will in conversion. And he who knows Augustine's doctrine of *Prevenient Grace*, and hears him say (Anno 414): "Free-will is not destroyed when it is aided, but it is aided when it is not destroyed" (Epp. 157, chap. 2;) and, "the grace of God makes one not willing, to be willing;" and, "to yield our consent to God's summons or to withhold it is (as I have said) the function of our own will" (*De Spiritu et Litera*, 34), and knows of many other passages of similar character, will be forced to conclude that Augustine, notwithstanding his doctrine of *irresistible grace*, recognized some action of the human will in conversion. We may not be able to find in the great African Doctor exactly the same doctrine of Free-will that we find in Melanchthon, Chemnitz, Selnecker, Chytraeus; but much less will it be possible to find in him the *lapis-truncus pure passive* doctrine of the Form of Concord.

The Synod of Orange (529) softened the asperities Augustinianism, and promulgated the Catholic doctrine of sin and Free-will. It declared that man cannot by his own powers, without the illumination and quickening of the Holy Spirit, begin faith. But when the Holy Spirit is given he can do so,

\* *History of Christian Doctrine*, vol. II, p. 68.

† *Introductory Essay*, p. xxviii, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers.

and when the grace of baptism has been bestowed, by the *aid* and *coöperation* of Christ he both *can* and *ought* to do those things that pertain to the salvation of the soul.\* Of the *pure passive* doctrine there is not a trace

We pass on to Peter Lombard, Master of Sentences, who summed up into a system the teaching of all the preceding Christian ages. The Flacianists repudiated his doctrine of Free-will. He taught the coöperation of Free-will and grace in unmistakable terms: "Grace anticipates the Will by preparing it to will the good, and assists it when prepared that it may perform. This is grace operating and coöperating. For operating grace prepares man's will that it may will the good; coöperating grace assists it that it may not will in vain. By coöperating God perfects in us what by operating he begins, because he by beginning operates that we may will. He coöperates with those willing by perfecting." †

There is not a sentence, nor a line, in the Lombard that indicates that in his view "*Man in his conversion is absolutely passive.*"

But it is superfluous to pursue the matter further. It is clearly demonstrable that the Form-of-Concord doctrine *de libero arbitrio* does not have the consensus of the Lutheran Church, nor of the Catholic Church, nor even of the Roman Church in so far as we learn from the writings of the Fathers. Whether Article II, *De Servo Arbitrio*, of the Form of Concord, contains a fair and impartial exhibition of the teaching of the Scriptures on the relation of grace to human freedom, and whether, and to what extent, it contains and really exhibits the Augustinian doctrine of irresistible grace—for the leading Flacianists, Flacius, Amsdorf, Hesshuss, Wigand *et al.*, whose fundamental propositions *de libero arbitrio* found central and defining position in the Form of Concord, were out and out Augustinian predestinarians, and held as a fundamental proposition that "in spiritual things man is absolutely dead to the good"—these questions the intelligent student of theology must settle for himself; but it may not be out of place to say

\* Mansi, *Councils*, 8, pp. 728, *et seqq.*

† Migne's *Patrologia*. Tom. CXCII, pp. 709, *et seqq.*

here that said Article does not quote and apply the following passages of the Divine Word : Matt : " All things are ready : come to the marriage feast ; " John 3 : 16 : " God so loved the World, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life ; " Acts 3 : 19 : " Repent ye therefore, and turn again ; " Rev. 22 : 17 : " And the Spirit and the bride say, Come. And he that heareth, let him say, Come. And he that is athirst, let him come : he that will, let him take the water of life freely ; " Luke 15 : 11-20, the Parable of the Prodigal Son ; and certainly the Article makes a very superficial exposition and application of Matt. 23 : 37. Hence we may well ask whether Article II of the Form of Concord has declared unto us the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation. Acts 20 : 37.

## ARTICLE II.

## THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO THE STATE.\*

BY JUDGE SAMUEL D. SCHMUCKER, LL.D.

The sixteenth Article of the Augsburg Confession is not a prominent one. It does not deal with the great questions of faith and doctrine over which the herculean struggle of the Reformation was made. It alone, of the twenty-one articles which compose the body of the Confession proper, relates to purely secular matters, and it seems almost as if it had been introduced into the Confession incidentally in order to round out the general statement of the position assumed by the protestants.

It declares: "Concerning civil affairs our churches teach that legitimate civil enactments are good works of God; that it is lawful for Christians to hold civil offices, to pronounce judgment and decide cases according to the imperial and other existing laws; to inflict just punishment, wage just wars and serve in them, to make lawful contracts, to hold property, to make oath when required by the magistrates, to marry and be married.

"They condemn the Anabaptists who forbid to Christians the performance of these civil duties. They also condemn those who make evangelical perfection consist not in the fear of God and in faith, but in the abandonment of all civil duties, because the gospel teaches the necessity of ceaseless righteousness of heart whilst it does not abolish the duties of civil and domestic life, but especially requires them to be observed as ordinances of God and performed in the spirit of Christian love. Hence Christians ought necessarily to yield obedience to their civil officers and laws, unless when they command something sinful, for they ought to obey God rather than man. Acts 5 : 29."

The Article begins and ends with the assertion of the duty of obedience to the civil authorities within their legitimate sphere.

\* Lecture on the Holman Foundation, May 12th, 1905.

All the subordinate statements in the Article lead up to that one fundamental principle.

It seems strange to us living in this day that it should ever have been found desirable to include in a great protesting declaration of faith so elementary and axiomatic a proposition as that it is the duty of a Christian citizen to obey the legitimate laws of the government under which he lives. But the framers of the confession lived in a different age from ours. The fine hand of the ecclesiastic had for centuries so commingled the exercise of civil and spiritual authority that the principles underlying them had become confused in the minds of the people and required fresh definition and assertion. The Reformers recognizing the inherent distinction between the spheres of secular and religious control asserted in effect, in this article of the Confession, the principle that legitimate civil enactments are binding upon the Christian citizen *ex proprio vigore*, or at least without reference to ecclesiastical sanction or censure. They were aware of the fact that the logical conclusion of the position which they assumed was the separation of the Church and State, as two inherently distinct authorities concurrently operating in separate spheres of action, for they distinctly avow in the seventh article of the Abuses corrected that "The civil and ecclesiastical governments ought therefore not to be united."

Luther personally held strongly to this view. In his work on *The Civil Magistrate* issued in January, 1523, dedicated to Prince John, he says: "God has ordained two governments among the children of Adam, the reign of God under Christ and the reign of the world under the civil magistrate, each with its own laws and rights. The laws of the reign of the world extend no further than to body and goods and the external affairs on earth. But over the soul God can and will allow no one to rule but himself alone." \* It is also said that at the time of the framing of the Confession both Luther and Melancthon were in favor of taking a formal stand for the separation of the Church from the State, but they were dissuaded

\* Schaff's *Church History*, vol. VI, p. 524, *et seqq.*

from pursuing that course by the opposition of the German princes.

The participation in civic affairs accorded to the mass of the German people in the sixteenth century was much more limited than that which we now enjoy. Outside of a moderate control of local interests in the larger cities the citizens had slight concern with the function of government. The extent of their privilege was to obey laws made for them by their rulers and assume the burdens laid upon them by those in authority. Hence the Confession naturally treats of civic duty from the standpoint of obedience to existing enactments and has nothing to say about the responsibility for the proper use of the law making power with which we are so greatly concerned today.

The Confession assumes a moderate attitude upon the subject of the meritorious character of obedience to secular authority avoiding alike the monastic view that the withdrawal from all civil duties and the abandonment of domestic life promoted spiritual perfection and secured Divine favor, and the anabaptist unrestrained conception of liberty which threatened the destruction of the social order.

It would serve no good purpose to recount here the events that led up to the mighty social upheaval in the sixteenth century, of which the German Reformation formed so important a part, or to enumerate the abuses which then called for correction, the grievances which demanded redress, the errors and superstitions which required removal, or the heroic achievements of the men who were the chief actors in that great struggle for civil and religious freedom, or the many and far-reaching results of their labors. All of that has already been done and well done by many hands. Our time can be more profitably devoted to a consideration of the cardinal proposition of the 16th article of the Confession which, as has already been said, when extended to its logical conclusion involves an assertion not only of the dignity and authority of civil government and the duty of the citizens to yield obedience to its enactments, but also of the propriety of the complete separation of the

Church and State as sovereigns of the respective domains of the body and soul.

In most of the nations of antiquity, Heathen and Judaic, there was some form of union or co operation between the administration of religious and secular affairs, the two kinds of authority being often blended into one government and not infrequently exercised by the same set of officials. The churches, failing by mere moral suasion to enforce their edicts upon society and subdue the outbreaks caused by immorality, leaned upon the civil arm for efficient though forcible means of upholding their authority. The civil rulers perceiving the unbounded influence of religion over its sincere votaries, who readily yielded life and treasure to its demands, welcomed the aid of so valuable an ally and soon utilized its forces for the achievement of their ambitions. As the combination of the two powers in those ancient times was almost universal, and, in the case of the Judaic system, enjoyed the Divine sanction, such unions were doubtless fairly adapted to the then existing types of religion and condition of society.

When Christ appeared upon the earth He did not interfere with existing civil institutions nor did He, as the founder of the Church which bears His name, give any positive directions touching the formation of organizations for the government of His followers, much less did He require their formation, or specify their structural character if they should be formed, or indicate the extent of the authority which it would be proper for them to exercise. He declared His kingdom to be a spiritual one and not of this world, and He yielded obedience in secular matters to existing civil governments recognizing them as ordained of God. When He was tempted to repudiate the despotic rule of the Roman conqueror He crystalized the statement of the concurrent but distinct civil and spiritual dominion over the realms of the body and soul, in the brief sentence "render to Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to Christ the things which are Christ's." It involves no violent assumption to infer from His conduct and declarations that it was His purpose to permit the precise relation of His Church to civil in-

stitutions to be from time to time modified with the advance of civilization and intelligence until a perfect adjustment between them could be obtained under some form of institutions which would insure its permanence. It may be possible that such institutions have been found in our own political system where the civil government has no official connection with any church organization and accords no special favor to any form of faith but leaves to its citizens complete liberty of conscience and belief with the right to practice any form of worship which does not interfere with property rights or disturb the public peace.

Christianity started on its career as a matter of faith and conscience unconnected with the civil power, but in a few centuries when princes and rulers began to be converted to the faith they first became its patrons and defenders and then sought to use its influence to strengthen their own power. But the wit of the clerk proved superior to the sword of the knight, and by the end of the 15th century the Church had got its grasp so tightly about the neck of the State as almost to strangle civil authority. Since the Reformation of the 16th century the authority of the State has under protestant influences been restored to something like its normal condition and a better adjustment has been reached of its relations to the Church, but, except in our own country, the two powers have not been completely emancipated from their unnatural union or the Church placed upon that voluntary basis which alone accords with the free exercise of the will and conscience involved in genuine acts of faith and worship.

It is surprising that the Reformers, with the clear words of Christ touching the spiritual nature of his kingdom ringing in their ears and the example of primitive Christianity before their eyes, were unable to completely dissolve the entangling alliance of the Church with the civil power, but they failed to accomplish that result. Burdened by the opposition of a powerful and vigilant adversary and perplexed by the disorders in some of the Protestant communities who failed to use their liberties aright, the leaders of the Reformation turned to princes and

rulers for the aid of the strong arm of the law and entered again into the union with the civil power from which no important State in Europe has as yet fully emerged. Although they thus failed to entirely sever the fetters which bound these two jurisdictions together they by their mighty strokes for freedom of thought and conscience set in motion a chain of events which has gone so far toward the realization of their aims that to-day in every Protestant nation of Europe and in many of the Catholic ones the civil power is practically free from ecclesiastical dominion and a degree of religious toleration exists which approaches substantial independence in forms of faith and mode of worship.

In the protestant Kingdoms of Great Britain, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the prevailing denomination, which is Episcopal in England and Lutheran in the other four nations, is established by law and supported by public taxation, but all other denominations are *freely tolerated and protected* in the open conduct of public worship according to their respective methods, although in most if not in all cases they derive no support from the public purse, while their members remain liable to taxation for the maintenance of the State religion. In the Catholic Kingdoms of Austria, Italy and Spain the Roman Catholic Church is established and is maintained at the public expense, while some measure of toleration of the several forms of Protestantism exists by law although the position of dissenters from the State Church is not always comfortable.

In Germany the imperial constitution is silent on the subject of religion, and no religious tests are required as a condition of holding office under it, but in all of the States composing the empire the union between civil authority and either the protestant or Catholic Church continues in force. The French constitution of 1870, like the German one, is silent on the subject of religion, but various churches, chiefly Roman Catholic, are recognized and supported by the State. Current events in France point strongly toward an early and complete divorce of the State from all churches, if not from all religion. The Bel-

gian constitution guarantees religious liberty to its citizens, but the establishment of religion in so far remains that the State contributes to the support of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish congregations. The Swiss Federal Constitution declares, that the freedom of belief and conscience are inviolable, and it guarantees freedom of worship within the limits of morality and public safety, but in the several cantons of the Republic the Catholic, or Protestant Church, according to the faith of the inhabitants, is established by law. In Russia the closest union still exists between the Church and the State.

The salutary scheme of separating the civil government from all ecclesiastical control, so clearly indicated in principle by Christ and again asserted by the Reformers of the 16th century in the Confession now under consideration, first found its full realization at the end of the 18th century in the formation of the government under which it is our privilege to live to-day. The best opportunity, therefore, to briefly observe the practical operation of the concurrent but independent administration of temporal and spiritual authority advocated by the Reformers, will be found in a short examination into the origin, growth and present status of the relation existing between the civil power and religion in our own country. Neither our theory nor practice of religious freedom was acquired by our ancestors in their European homes. Our system is indigenous to our own soil and has received its development here. Some of the early colonists doubtless came to America to escape religious persecution, but their conduct after they had come ashore made it manifest that few of them escaped the intolerant spirit of their age.

In every one of the colonies except Rhode Island and Pennsylvania some religious denomination was established by law or supported by public taxation. In the Carolinas, Virginia and Maryland the Episcopal Church was early recognized by law as the State Church and was supported by taxation. This was true of Virginia throughout almost its entire colonial history. Maryland began its career under the Catholic Lords Baltimore with a liberal form of toleration, but as early as 1692,

under the provincial rule of William and Mary, the Church of England was formally established in the province by legal enactment. In New York, New Jersey and Delaware, the Church of England was also the State Church under the charter for the New Netherlands granted by the Stuarts in 1694 to the Duke of York, afterwards James the Second. In the New England colonies, except Rhode Island, there was a slightly different style of official relation between the State and the churches. There was in those colonies no legal designation or establishment of any particular denomination as the State Church but the laws authorized and required local taxation by the parishes, towns and other political subdivisions for the support of religious services which were currently held according to the then prevailing puritan type of congregationalism. Under the legislation of the colonial period at certain times in some of the colonies a liberal degree of toleration was exhibited toward dissenting denominations, but at other times and places the legislation discriminated, to a degree amounting to persecution, against persons not in fellowship with the established or prevailing form of faith.

After more than a century of experience with this species of church establishment at home and with the discouraging spectacle before them of many centuries of European alliances between the Church and State, which had almost invariably debased the former and weakened the latter, our forefathers threw off the yoke of transatlantic dominion and addressed themselves to the task of establishing civil liberty and representative government on this continent. It is not strange that under such circumstances they did not permit the status of the State toward religion to rest upon mere usage and tradition, but declared by adequate provisions in both State and National constitutions what the nature of that relation should be.

The primary purpose of the far-seeing and sagacious framers of the Federal Constitution being to found a civil government they produced an instrument adjusting and distributing the civil powers of government and defining and securing the rights of citizenship in a manner which has ever since challenged the

admiration of the civilized world, but they also by a few brief constitutional provisions declared the inflexible purpose of the nation to secure complete freedom of religion and prevent any form of alliance between the Church and State. These provisions are found in section 2 of Article VI of the Federal Constitution which declares that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to hold office or public trust under the United States," and in the first amendment to that instrument which provides that "Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

An admirable historical review of the causes and events leading up to the adoption of these two clauses of the Constitution is found in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Reynolds vs. the United States*, 98 U. S. 145, where it is said: "Before the adoption of the Constitution attempts were made in some of the Colonies and States to legislate not only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in respect to its doctrines and precepts as well. The people were taxed against their will for the support of religion and sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose tenets they could not and did not subscribe. Punishments were prescribed for a failure to attend public worship and sometimes for entertaining heretical opinions. The controversy upon this general subject was animated in many of the States, but seemed at last to culminate in Virginia. In 1784 the House of Delegates of that State having under consideration 'A bill establishing provision for teachers of the Christian religion' postponed it until the next session and directed that the bill should be published and distributed and that the people be requested 'to signify their opinion respecting the adoption of such a bill at the next session of the Assembly.'

"This brought out a determined opposition. Amongst others Mr. Madison prepared a 'Memorial and Remonstrance' which was widely circulated and signed in which he demonstrated 'that religion or the duty we owe the Creator' was not within the cognizance of civil government. Semple's Virginia Bap-

tists Appendix. At the next session the proposed bill was not only defeated but another 'for establishing religious freedom' drafted by Mr. Jefferson, 1 Jeff. Works, 45, 2 Howison History of Virginia 298, was passed. In the preamble of this Act, 12 Hen. Stat. 34, religious freedom is defined, and after a recital 'That to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.' In these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the Church and what to the State.

"In a little more than a year after the passage of this Statute the convention met which prepared the Constitution of the United States. Of this convention Mr. Jefferson was not a member, he being then absent as minister to France. As soon as he saw the draft of the constitution proposed for adoption, he in a letter to a friend, expressed his disappointment at the absence of an express declaration insuring the freedom of religion, 2 Jeff. Works, 355, but was willing to accept it as it was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people would bring about the necessary alterations. 1 Jeff. Works, 79. Five of the States, while adopting the constitution, proposed amendments. Three, New Hampshire, New York and Virginia included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom in the changes they desired to have made, as did also North Carolina where the convention at first declined to ratify the constitution until the proposed amendments were acted upon. Accordingly at the first session of the first Congress the amendment now under consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views of the advocates of religious freedom and was adopted. Mr. Jefferson afterwards in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, 8 Jeff. Works, 113, took occasion to say: 'Believing with you that religion is a matter which

lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or worship, that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their Legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation, in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all of his natural rights, convinced that he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.' Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.

These two provisions of the Federal Constitution operated only to relieve federal office-holders from religious tests and to limit the legislative powers of Congress over the subject of religion, and therefore the people of the several States in making the transition from the colonial to the State form of government gave further evidence of their determination to establish and perpetuate religious liberty by inserting in the State constitutions which they adopted fuller and more detailed provisions to that end. The provisions of the several State constitutions upon this subject are not uniform in their terms and import, but they all give unmistakable evidence of the purpose of their authors to secure complete freedom of religious opinion and worship and at the same time to protect the State from religious interference with its administration of civil affairs.

Judge Cooley in his excellent work on Constitutional Limitations sums up these constitutional provisions as prohibiting the States from enacting any laws :

1st. Respecting the establishment of religion, which has

been construed to cover all laws giving to one sect or denomination an advantage over other sects however slight the advantage may be.

2nd. Requiring compulsory support, by taxation or otherwise, of religious instruction. All such support must be voluntary, it not being within the sphere of government to coerce it.

3rd. Compulsory attendance upon religious worship, for the obvious reason that it is impossible by compulsion to produce true religious belief or worship

4th. Restraining the free exercise of religion by any person according to the dictates of his own conscience.

5th. Restraining the expression of religious belief.\*

The religious freedom which we enjoy in the United States has been thus defined by its Supreme Court in the case of *Watson vs. Jones*, 80 U. S. 679: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the dissemination of any religious doctrine and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations and officers within the general association is unquestioned." Strictly speaking our government is neither a Christian nor a pagan one. It is a civil government created and administered for the regulation of the secular affairs of its citizens. It does not deal directly with the subject of religion, but leaves each citizen free to act upon that subject according to the dictates of his own conscience within the limits already mentioned.

Lord Hale † and Sir William Blackstone ‡ are both credited

\* Cooley's *Constitutional Limitations*, 7 Ed. p. 663.

† *Rex vs. Taylor* 3 Keble 607.

‡ Blackstone's *Commentaries*, Book IV, p. 60.

with the statement that Christianity is part of the Common Law of England, and similar expressions have been used by many of the Courts of last resort in this country in reference to our common law which we have inherited from England, but as was said by Justice Story in the Girard will case,\* this is only true in a qualified sense. It has never been formally adopted as part of our law nor are all of its commands enforceable by the agencies at the service of the civil government. Of the commandments of the Decalogue, murder and theft are universally punishable at law as crimes against society, and adultery is generally so punishable, but the law does not undertake to enforce filial respect, nor to punish lying or covetousness, or idolatry if it be so practiced as not to endanger the public peace and good order. The law requires men to abstain from secular labor on Sunday and not to disturb the quiet of the day but it does not compel obedience to the divine command to keep it holy or to devote its hours to religious worship.

Nor can the law compel the practice of those Christian virtues which pertain especially to the spiritual domain, such as brotherly love, charity, forgiveness or purity of heart. If you, when passing along the highway, see your neighbor lying by the way side so grievously injured by accident or violence that he will die unless his wounds be promptly dressed, and you fail to stop and aid him you violate one of the highest precepts of Christianity, but the law will not take cognizance of your act or punish you for your inhumanity. Again, if your neighbor hunger and you do not feed him or if he thirst and you give him no drink you are deeply culpable before God but you are guiltless before the law. Blasphemy was indictable as a misdemeanor and profanity as a nuisance at common law, and in most of the American States both offenses, especially when committed in public, are made punishable by statute, but the weight of modern authority holds that they are not punished as violations of religious precepts, but as temporal offenses against civil society, which tend to subvert its good order and to provoke breaches of the peace. In the maintenance of

\* *Vidal vs. Girard* 2 Howard U. S. 198.

public peace and good order for the protection of the citizen the civil government has of necessity enacted many regulations of conduct that are identical with precepts of Christianity and it compels obedience to them with the strong arm of the law, but it does not do so because of their divine origin or sacred character, but because their enforcement promotes the welfare of society. The civil power does not presume to attempt the vindication of the Divine authority or to punish infractions of its laws. God does not require human assistance to enforce his commands. He has attached to sin its own penalties, which are adjusted to the offense and imposed upon the offender with an unerring wisdom that no human tribunal can supply.

Our government recognizes the existence and providence of God and the moral obligation laid upon men of gratitude to Him and obedience to His commands. It is also convinced of the beneficent influence of religion upon human character, of its restraining power over the lives and conduct of its votaries and of the sure foundation furnished by its rule in the hearts of men for a well ordered civil society. Our people have also given abundant evidence that they are in so far religious that an appeal to that side of their nature will stimulate them to virtuous action or hold them to an honest line of conduct. Accordingly our laws provide for the appointment and support of chaplains to look after the spiritual welfare of those engaged in the military service, for the exemption of Church property from taxation, for the administration of oaths by legal tribunals in order to more strongly bind the conscience of witness, and for the proclamation of days of national thanksgiving, or in great crises for national humiliation and prayer. In some of the States no one is competent to be a juror or a witness who does not believe in the existence of God and that He will hold him accountable for his conduct and reward or punish him accordingly.

In the absence of any form of alliance between the Church and State in the United States the genius and spirit of our free institutions has operated to develop a system of voluntary representative organizations which by the consent of their

membership have been made the depositaries of the power employed in the regulation of the religious interests of the community. The unit of these organizations is the parish or congregation whose affairs are ordinarily managed by the suffrages of its members. It in turn, in most denominations, selects delegates to higher bodies, such as synods, presbyteries, conferences and conventions which exercise a general supervision, with a certain measure of control, over given districts or territories. In some of the denominations there is an ultimate representative body or tribunal which exercises supreme authority over all persons and organizations in fellowship with it.

The State allows to those various forms of religious organizations the privilege of legal incorporation for the better management of their temporal concerns and it accords to them when so incorporated the right to hold, manage and dispose of a limited amount of property suitable for their legitimate purposes, but it retains as complete legislative and judicial control of the civil and property rights of these religious corporations as it does over similar bodies created for secular purposes. It also recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of ecclesiastical tribunals not only in matters of doctrine and belief but also in all matters of government, organization and discipline and in other interests pertaining solely to the Church as such, and having no relation to civil or property rights. The Civil Courts will therefore not ordinarily review or pass upon the acts of ecclesiastical tribunals or governing authorities of religious organizations with relation to their internal affairs where the subject-matter of the controversy is purely religious in its nature and does not directly involve or affect property rights.

In the more than a century of our national life numerous cases have come before the State and Federal Courts calling for a construction of the constitutional provisions to which we have adverted touching the relation of the civil power to the religious rights and interests of the people. It is beyond the scope and compass of a lecture like this to review these many cases or discuss the various issues presented by them, but certain general propositions, mainly relating to property rights,

are deducible from them, some of which may be noticed with advantage here. \* The great majority of the cases are broadly speaking divisible into two classes one of which relates to the property held by or on behalf of religious bodies and the other concerns the protection of the citizens in the enjoyment of the liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship secured to him by law.

The cases involving property rights are the simpler of the two classes because the title to property rests upon long settled principles and is regulated by rules of almost universal application. Controversies over property, held by or on behalf of religious bodies, generally hinge upon some incident of the form and character of the organization entitled to its benefit, or upon the purposes to which it has been dedicated by the conveyances under which it is held.

When property has been devoted, by the express terms of a deed or will made in accordance with the laws of the State where it is located, to *some specified purpose* such as the support or propagation of some specific religious belief or form of worship, the Courts will, when their jurisdiction is properly invoked, prevent a diversion of the property from the purposes to which it has been dedicated. If by the terms of the deed or will the property has been conveyed to a particular religious congregation for such specified uses and the majority of the congregation radically change their views and adopt other and opposite doctrines, it is beyond their power to apply the property to the support of the new and conflicting doctrines, as that would amount to a diversion of it from the uses to which it was limited by the conveyance, a result which the law will not tolerate in reference to property limited either to sacred or secular uses.

Where the conveyance has been made *to an independent and self-governing* religious body or congregation for its *general uses*, and not for any specified purpose the congregation may use the property for any lawful purpose, and if it afterwards change

\* For a more extended discussion of this subject see *Watson vs. Jones*, *supra*, and Vol. 24 pp. 348 *et seq.* and 360 *et seq.*

its faith and embrace new doctrines such change will not deprive it of the title to the property. In such cases if there arise a schism in the congregation which results in a division of it, the right to the property would not be determined upon questions of faith and doctrine, but would depend, as with secular bodies, upon which one of the two factions was at law entitled to be regarded as the original organization or its legitimate successor. But when a congregation holding property *for its general uses is not independent*, but belongs to a general denominational body or organization which has an ecclesiastical government and tribunals of its own with a jurisdiction more or less complete over the persons and associations in fellowship with it, and a schism or division in the congregation occur resulting in the assertion of conflicting claims to the property, the Civil Courts in passing upon those claims will recognize the title as being in that part of the congregation which is true to the rules and standards set by the governing body of the denomination, and in determining what those rules and standards are the Civil Courts will accept as controlling precedents decisions theretofore made by the highest tribunal of that denomination as to its ecclesiastical usages, customs and laws. Modifications of these general propositions must necessarily occur in order to adapt the relief sought to the special facts and circumstances of particular cases, and especially to carry out the variety of purposes manifested by donors of property to different religious uses.

The cases in which the courts have been called upon to define the limits of the liberty of the conscience of the citizen and protect its exercise present mere subtle problems than those concerning property rights. By our fundamental laws we have proclaimed liberty of conscience in the broadest terms consistent with the preservation of the public peace and good order, but when we are called upon to determine whether the exercise of that liberty is impaired by particular kinds of legislation the question presented for solution is often an extremely delicate one. The line between liberty and license is often hard to draw.

Sometimes the task is simple and the answer clear. For

instance, when Congress in 1874 in exercise of its jurisdiction over the territories passed an Act prohibiting the practice of polygamy, a member of the Mormon Church residing in Utah was indicted for violation of the law. He admitted committing the acts with which he was charged, but set up as a defense that he had not done them with criminal intent, but in conformity with the rules of his faith and in pursuance of what he believed at the time to be a religious duty. The Supreme Court of the United States, when the case came before it on appeal, rejected the defense and affirmed his conviction by the lower court. The Supreme Court although admitting that Congress had no power to pass any law for the government of territories which prohibited the free exercise of religion held the Statute in question to be within the legislative power of Congress, saying in that connection: "It (the law) is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the territories and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the Statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished while those who do must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose that one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?

"So here as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practice to the contrary because of his religious belief? To

permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances."\*

A much more delicate question is that of the right of the State under our system of government to enforce the compulsory reading or study of the Bible by the pupils in the public schools. Except in the territories, Congress has no power over this subject as the Federal constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberty. This is left to the State constitutions and laws which are not uniform in their provisions on the subject. It may be conceded that none of the State constitutions permit the public authorities to compel distinctly denominational or sectarian religious instruction to be given to the pupils in the public schools, yet most of those constitutions contain such assertions of the right of freedom of conscience and religious belief as to present a question of the legality of the compulsory use of the Bible as a text book in the public schools by the children of those parents who have conscientious scruples as to the propriety of such employment of that book. To a Protestant its use is of course free from objection on that score, but, giving as we should to our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens credit for sincerity in their objection on conscientious grounds to such use of the Bible, we are confronted with a question, directly germane to the discussion in hand, which is so close that the Courts of last resort of the several States have not been able to agree in their conclusion upon it.

The laws prohibiting the pursuit of secular occupations and all forms of labor except works of necessity and charity on Sunday have in many instances met with opposition by those who conscientiously think that the Sabbath or seventh day and not the first day should be so observed. They insist that, as they in obedience to the dictates of their conscience and the teachings of their faith, actually observe the seventh day as sacred and abstain from all labor on it, it is unconstitutional and vio-

\* Reynolds vs. The United States, *supra*.

lates their freedom of conscience and religious liberty to compel them to similarly observe also the first day of the week.

Sunday laws have however been generally sustained as constitutional not upon the ground of enforcing the sanctity of the day, but because they are valid exercises of the Police Power, as Sunday is not only a sacred day, but also a civil and political institution established and maintained as a periodic day of rest, the observance of which is requisite for the moral and physical welfare of society. Some deviations from this view have, however, been sustained, for in Michigan a law was held to be constitutional which prohibited barbers from carrying on their business on Sunday, but excepted from its operation such barbers as observed another day as Sabbath and abstained from labor on that day; and in New York a law was upheld which prohibited barbers from carrying on their business on Sunday, but excepted barbers doing business in New York City and at Saratoga Springs until one o'clock on Sunday afternoon.

The immunity from liability to taxation accorded in most of the States to property held by or for the use of churches and other religious bodies has at times met with decided opposition upon the contention that it violated the spirit if not the letter of the constitutional inhibition of the passage of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, in that it accorded special favor and advantage to the portion of the community composing christian churches, but the Courts have held with practical unanimity that in the absence of a positive constitutional restriction the State has so complete control over the subject of taxation as to authorize it to allow such exemptions from taxation as it deems expedient.

It thus becomes apparent that even with the most just and liberal delimitation, in the organic law of the land, of the respective spheres of civil and spiritual authority, the difficulties of a correct application of the general principles governing the subject to the concrete facts of special cases are very great. Such difficulties are however inherent in every attempt to apply abstract principles and general propositions to concrete situations of human experience.

Neither the acumen of legislators nor the wisdom of courts has succeeded in locating with entire precision the invisible dividing line between the temporal and spiritual worlds which, lying side by side, compose the domains of the body and soul. Our lives are not lived in only one or the other of these domains, but in both, and their boundaries so touch and overlap each other that now we can discern their dividing line and again it is lost in impenetrable mist. Their influences ever contend for mastery over us; for a time the one is paramount and then the other gains dominion over us and again they hold us in their joint embrace. As civilization advances and society becomes more highly organized novel phases and presentations of this ever present conflict will be produced for which it is impossible to provide a precise solution in advance. The utmost that we can do is to correctly settle the principles on which the civil and spiritual jurisdictions rest and then by applying those principles in a spirit of fairness to the situations which from time to time arise, effect the best solution of these vexed questions of which human wisdom is capable.

## ARTICLE III.

## THE INCARNATION.

BY M. VALENTINE, D.D., LL.D.

The incarnation stands in theology as the miracle of miracles, the greatest of all, central to all, carrying all others with it. It puts into time and the world, in a unique and sovereign way and for a specific and eternal purpose, the presence and action of the Supernatural—all preceding miracles and theophanies being its anticipatory and preparing action, all succeeding miracles and powers its continuance and reverberating movement. As warranted by the Scriptures and held in the faith of the Church, this incarnation was the supreme event in the world's history, all other providential movement being in view of it and adjusted to its significance, and all after ages recognizing its sublime increment of divine self-manifestation and saving goodness, as concerned with the realization of the earth's intention and destined to exhibit its issues. It was and forever is God's supreme thought and act of love for the world.

We obtain the most illuminating and assuring view of this fundamental and central truth of Christianity by a consideration of its essential and explaining pre-suppositions, opening to view at the same time its all-justifying design. Its place and aim in the divine economy fully vindicate the mysterious transcendence in its supernaturalism. There are especially three of these pre-suppositions.

The first is such a constitution or reality of the Godhead as to make an incarnation possible. Christian theism universally maintains that God can make Himself known in His power and doing. A God unable to manifest Himself would not be God. This generic self-revelation is properly understood as implied in the designation "Logos" or Word applied to the only begotten Son, (compare John 3 : 16 ; 1 : 1—4 ; Heb. 1 : 1, 2). It is thus placed in close connection with the entire doctrine of the Trinity, and belongs indeed to its profoundest import. Evi-

dently the incarnation, as a specific act of self manifestation, must be viewed as resting back upon the same interior reality in the Godhead. The supreme unity consists with distinctions. The truth of the Trinity is thus a logical pre supposition of the incarnation. This mystery in the interior of the being of God holds the possibility and power of the divine self manifestation according to His will. And in thinking of the "second Person" of the Trinity as representing to us the Divine Being or nature as self-disclosing or self-imparting, we must bear in mind that this is equally true whether the self-expression be in creative action or in redemptory sacrifice of love. For by "the Word all things were made," before human need was answered by the grace of the incarnation. The doctrine of the Trinity is no mere speculative truth, without practical import, but a vital reality, underlying the whole creational and providential economy of the world.

So practical is it, that wherever it has been denied or obscured nearly all the great truths in the order of the divine love and grace, emphasized in the Scriptures, have fallen away with it, especially those pertaining to the way of salvation, such as the true Deity of Christ, the incarnation, the atonement, regeneration, etc. We do not say that without the Trinity, an incarnation would have been absolutely impossible; for Sabellianism is not metaphysically inconceivable. But we say, first, that the Scriptures clearly link the incarnation with the tripersonality of God (John 1 : 1--4, 14, 16, 27 ; 17 : 5, 24, 25 ; Rom. 8 : 32 ; Heb. 1 : 6) ; and secondly, that the truth of the Trinity furnishes what may be termed a natural basis for it, in the mysterious being of the one absolute eternal God, opening to us an intelligible view of the distinctly declared economy of salvation.

A second pre-supposition is such a constitution of *humanity* as to made the incarnation possible. It is especially proper that this pre-condition should be looked at fairly. For plausible difficulties may be suggested. The incarnation of God in a human being is so strange an event, so foreign to the regular order of life, as to justify a raising of the question of its credi-

bility. It is not necessary that it should be relieved of mystery, since mystery meets us everywhere in the immense realm of reality. But impediments to faith may be removed, if the mystery can be shown to be not essentially an impossibility, nor incredible. And this can be done.

The asserted possibility may indeed be made to seem doubtful if the confessedly great difference between God and man be allowed to hide from view the great truth of likeness, as taught by revelation and sustained by reason. If, through theories of man's origin, or discrediting appearances in his actual condition, he is reduced to classification with mere animal existence, with no given life or endowment constituting him in any attributes kindred with his Creator, with nothing but positive antithesis to the Divine Nature, then, indeed, we could not conceive of an incarnation as possible. There would be nothing in common, no elements of the same kind of being, which could coalesce in conceivable union. But in proportion as consideration is given to the unique place of man in relation to all other created existences on earth, confessedly marked by essential characteristics exalting him far above all other species of living beings, unquestionably constituting him alone an intelligent, rational, free moral personality, after God's own "image," capacitated to "think His thoughts after Him," to understand Him through His works, and to enter reverently into fellowship with His will and purposes, in love, obedience, and worship, the difficulty diminishes. God is absolute, eternal *mind*. As God formed human personality essentially in *created mind*, finite indeed, but with powers in the likeness of His own nature, it would seem that immeasurable possibilities of kindredship, affinity and communion may have been provided for. If God is the Absolute, perfect Spirit or Mind, man is created finite spirit or mind. Revelation declares the human mental or spiritual faculties to be after the mould of the divine, and the deepest scientific thought of the ages sustains this conception. We are fully entitled to believe that God has made thought, love, and volition essentially the same in man as they are in Himself. Though infinite in Himself, and only finite in humanity, they

are correspondent realities, creatively adjusted in man for true knowledge, obedience, and fellowship. The "religious nature" of the race, to which philosophy and science are giving special emphasis, is but an expression and witness of this. It is heard in the forever repeated cry of Augustine: "O God, my heart was made for Thee, and cannot rest till it finds Thee." This revelation of *likeness* of capacities, not equality of them, is the point specifically involved in the possibility of the incarnational union.

The evidence of features in common, between the Divine Nature and the human, as thus established, is supported by further truths integral in the teaching of revelation. The reality of "image and likeness" carries us to the truth of *sonship* in man's nature and position. And this human sonship is most wonderfully found resting back on the Trinitarian reality of an "Eternal Sonship" in the being of God Himself, as exercising the divine agency of creation. We find this work of creating humanity in features of likeness, to be true children of God, is by the same Son who comes to redeem. Sonship, constitutional and ethical, appears to be the ultimate principle that underlies the creation. The principle of sonship is in God Himself. The physical world is not an end in itself, but is relative, as means, to spiritual ends towards which is the outflow of God's love. Thus the divine love cannot rest in creative activity through the successive stages of the inorganic and animal spheres, till it has embodied in its works a realm of self-likeness in personal constitution and character. "Man is made in the image of God, because he is the analogue in creation of the uncreated Son whose working is in him consummated." \*

In the light of this analogy of human personality with the divine, the incarnational assumption of humanity, while not divested of mystery, is relieved of contradictoriness. Nothing forbids the conception that the Infinite Spirit, the Eternal Revealer, may take the limited human capacities within the movement of the infinite Divine, so as to blend the two natures into a single personality. God could not communicate to the human nature

\* See Forrest's *The Christ of History and Experience*, p. 183.

self-existence ; for that would obliterate the very distinction between Himself and created being ; but He, conceivably, can communicate all communicable attributes to the Divine Human Person within the measure in which humanity has been capacitated to receive, and which shall fill them with the Divine. We are without warrant, then, should we undertake to say that the Logos could not personally identify Himself with and reveal Himself through humanity. The eternal Son of God could unite Himself with the humanity of created sons of God formed after the divine likeness. Very significant is it, too, that we must add that, along with the fact of man's "religious nature" with its deep sense of need of divine fellowship and perhaps as growing out of this, different ethnic natural religions have developed belief in some manifestation of God in human form. Incarnation has not been contradictory to, or even wholly alien from, human thought. The logic of the mighty need has been the logic for the conclusion involved in the conception. Incarnations appear in the Buddhas of Buddhism and the Vishnus of Brahmanism ; but paganism's false conceptors of both Deity and man made possible only gross and distorted ideas of the divine reality.

1. The third pre-supposition is *the fact of sin*. It was not for creational work, but redemptory, providential, soteriological. Though part of the eternal purpose, it was eternally in foreview of the lapse of man out of the status and competence which creation had given him. It was to recover to the life and destiny for which God had formed and capacitated him.

The question arises, could not the needed recovery have been accomplished except through this divine incarnation ? To this we answer : First, that no man can know the possibilities of God so as to be able to say that it was absolutely impossible. But, secondly, no one can show that it could have been accomplished in any other way than through the incarnate Son. Reasoning from the actual fact, we are entitled to conclude with Augustine and general Christian thought since his day, not only that it was an eminently fitting way, but also that it was really necessary. God does nothing in vain. And we are en-

titled to add that, as nothing else than the manifestation of God's love in such an approach and appeal to the human soul as was presented therein, and in all that it involved, can be conceived of us victoriously inspiring faith and restoring real communion between God and man, justifies the conclusion that just this was the first great condition of human salvation.\* The denial of the true Deity of Christ, reducing Him to a mere man or some semi-deified creature, leaves the rupture made by sin unbridged.

But a further question has been raised and claims notice: Whether sin was its sole ground, or whether it does not rest on a deeper and non-contingent basis, and would have taken place though sin had never entered the world? Speculative theology has here and there been setting forth the conception that the incarnation rests not alone in a redemptive need and work, but belongs to God's creative work and its necessities, as required for the perfecting of human nature, irrespective of the fall. The first appearance of this is found in the scholastic age, in Rupert, abbot of Deutz, a theologian of mystic temper. He was followed in its maintenance by Alexander Hales, Dun's Scotus, Raymond Lullus, John Wessel and others, and earnestly confuted by Thomas Aquinas and Boneventura. At the Reformation Osiander adopted it. No advocacy of it is found during the period of Protestant dogmatic theology until its modern revival by Lieber, Martensen and Dorner, in Germany and Sweden, and some "progressive" theology in England and our own country. The aim of the theory is to offer what its supporters think better ground for speaking of Christianity as the "absolute religion," by lifting it above the contingent basis of dependence on man's lapse into sin through abuse of his freedom. And while its advocates formulate it in different types of view, these have converged in conceiving of the incarnation as an immanent necessity of the love of God, or as involved in the best possible creation—as determined by the necessities, not of redemptive need, but creative love. Its fundamental and supreme end is the *perfecting* of man, while subordinately and incidentally it

\* Sartorius, *Doc. of Div. Love*, pp. 146-7.

answers the need that has contingently occurred through sin. But neither the Scriptures nor reason authenticate this view, as a few points suffice to show.

To begin; the asserted *necessity* of the incarnation for "perfecting humanity," apart from man's fall into sin, is a pure assumption. The intimation that God's "creative" action was incompetent to perfect His creative work according to His "purpose," has no warrant in Scripture or reason. The anthropology of both the Old and New Testaments negatives the idea. They represent man as actually made "in the image and likeness of God," declared "very good," (not "a torso," simply pointing to the future, "merely destined" to ethical goodness, as Dr. Dorner puts it), called a "Son of God" (Luke 3 : 38), placed, in fact, in living fellowship with God. He was endowed, by creative love and power, for all that he was to become and enjoy. When the regenerative and restorative work of redemption is defined by St. Paul, it is in being "*renewed* unto knowledge—after the image of Him who created him, in righteousness and the true holiness," Col. 3 : 9. 10 : Eph. 2 : 24. Christ Himself puts it as "*being born again*," John 3 : 5. The only perfecting function asserted for the God-man is with respect, not to unfallen, but fallen men, and with these marked as a *restoration* into the "image and likeness" with which human nature was originally endowed. The Headship of the "second Adam" exhibits necessity of a *redeemed* humanity, not of the natural as something which God's creative power failed adequately to endow or put in right and necessary relation to Himself.

Perhaps the evolutionary hypothesis of the genetic origin of man and the unity of creation, may seem to some to give a scientific place and justification of the asserted necessity of this completing step. Dr. Dorner's suggestion \* concerning the original man, that the creative work made him "innocent" but "*not yet pneumatic*," might appear thus to obtain real place. It might be imagined that the genetic origin from physical and animal existence failed to endow with a true *πνεῦμα* or *pneuma*.

\* Sys. Christian Doc. vol. II, pp. 210-212.

tic principle, and that nothing short of a personal incarnation in humanity could confer it. It is said: "More stress is laid in recent theology upon the cosmical relations of the incarnation. The old truth of the natural headship of Christ receives new significance in view of modern theories of the origin and unity of creation. If theistic evolution be assumed, the Christ is not dethroned, but exalted as the goal of the whole ascent of life, the end and completion of all conceivable development, the perfect man beyond which there can be none higher, the Head of all, in whom Humanity is raised to the throne of Divinity, the second Man who is the Lord from heaven."\* But the intimation in this representation is gratuitous, that the necessity of the incarnation was primarily to help out the failure of the eternal Son, by whom "all things were made," (John 1: 1-3), by *creative* power to endow man with spiritual or pneumatic principle. It not only reflects on God's creative work as inadequate, but is compelled to abandon the very principle of evolution to which it appeals. For that principle, even theistically viewed, is that the creative and perfecting processes are purely *naturalistic*, i. e., found simply in the forces and interactions of nature under law. From monera to fish, from fish to reptile, from reptile to mammal, from brute to man, with whom Christianity has come to deal, the process is naturalistic only. When Prof. John Fiske, as its prophet for the "destiny of man," interprets theistic evolution, he finds the reality of what theologians term "original sin," in the incomplete evolution, as "the brute inheritance which every man carries with him;" and he sees redemption and regeneration in such further transformation that "nothing of the brute can be detected in him, the ape and the tiger become extinct." The process of natural evolution is thus the true progress toward salvation—the creation and perfecting of man being the goal toward which nature's work has been all the time tending.† But in locating the primary direct function of the supreme *miracle* of the incarnation in the necessity of completing the creation of

\* Schaff-Hertzog Ency. Art. *Incarnation*, by Dr. Newman Smith.

† *Destiny of Man*, pp. 25, 103.

man, this new theology, while reflecting on God's creative power, at the same time contradicts the evolutionist principle itself, that the formative and perfective cosmic powers belong to nature by original divine constitution and reach their goal by simply *natural process*. Whatever may have been the *mode* of God's creation of humanity, there is no warrant for assuming that it was left without its right endowment for its high position and blessed life. And still further, it must be noted that should human nature *per se* be thought necessarily to require incarnation for right endowment, must we not, on parallel logic, hold that the perfecting of the nature of angels demands it in their nature also? But an apostle declares: "He took not on Him the nature of angels."

But further, the Scriptures positively give another and different reason. They make sin its distinct pre-supposition. The given relation is: "incarnation in order to redemption." Everywhere, from the *proto-evangelium* in the forfeited Eden to the songs "unto Him that loved us and washed us in his blood" in the new heavens of the restored state, the explanation of the glorious phenomenon presented in the person of Christ as "God manifest in the flesh," is declared to be the world's need of a Saviour. Take the classic text in which Jesus Himself expressed the whole gospel of the divine love: "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should *not perish*, but have eternal life, John 3 : 16. The object in view was that men might not "perish" in want of that regeneration just spoken of to Nicodemus. Jesus makes the affirmation still more explicit when He tells His disciples: "The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost," Luke 17 : 10. Again, He is come "to give His life a ransom for many," Matt. 20 : 28. He pictured His own mission and the reason for it in the parable of the lost sheep—the fact of its being lost forming the definite and alone ground of His leaving the ninety and nine, and going after the wandering one. Christ's own distinct answer, thus given, why the Word was made flesh and dwelt among men, thenceforward clearly formed the regulative conception on the subject

in the minds of the apostles, and it is the monotone of their statements throughout the Epistles. "For what the laws could not do," writes St. Paul, "in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin condemned sin in the flesh," Rom. 8 : 3. "But when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth His Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that He might redeem them which were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons," Gal. 4 : 4, 5. "Since the children are sharers of flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death He might bring to nought him that had the power of death, that is the devil; and might deliver them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage. For verily not of angels doth He take hold but He taketh hold of the seed of Abraham. Wherefore, it behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people," Heb. 2 : 14-18. Could it be more definitely and explicitly stated than it is here, that the revelation of the Son in human nature had its great end in His *priestly* action, to *make propitiation for sin*? "Faithful is the saying," further explains St. Paul, "and worthy of all acceptance, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners," 1 Tim. 1 : 15. "To this end," declares St. John, "was the Son of God manifested, that He might destroy the works of the devil," 1 John 3, 8. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the world." "And we have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world," 1 John 4 : 10, 14. Many other passages might be quoted. Indeed the web and woof of the gospel representation is woven to this pattern.

It is to be borne in mind that all this is but the culmination of the voices that, in the long centuries of the Old Testament preparation, had been prophecy of the needed Messiah as the Immanuel, God with us. From the first and all through, the promises marked the coming blessing as a Deliverer, a Saviour,

through whom the sinful and guilty might have hope. His mission was centralized in a royal priesthood, His work typified in altars and sacrifices, in atoning and reconciling blood, in self-offering, in being bruised for men's iniquities, and making intercession for the transgressors. Through great preparing dispensations, the people had been taught that the coming One, who was at once the seed of the woman, the son of David, and the Son of God, was coming that He might bruise the serpent's head, and by the one offering of Himself for sin forever perfect them that believe; so that when John the baptist discovered in Jesus the long looked for Messiah, he but expressed the ages of divine shaping thought in announcing Him and His mission in the characterizing terms: "Behold the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world," John 1 : 29. Thus we have the spirit of prophecy in the Old Testament, the words of Christ Himself in the New, continuously and constantly, instead of seeing and announcing a reason for the God-man back of sin and redemptive need, connecting the divine coming with the "eternal purpose" to provide salvation to fallen man.

It is but fair to note that several Scriptures have been offered in behalf of the new view. They are: Eph. 1 : 9-12, 22, "Having made known the mystery of His will, according to His good pleasure which He purposed in Him unto a dispensation of the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon earth; in Him, I say, in whom also we are made a heritage, having been fore-ordained according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His will; to the end that we should be unto the praise of His glory, we who had before hoped in Christ. \* \* \* \* And he put all things in subjection under his feet, and gave Him to be head over all things to the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all:" and Col. 1 : 15-17, "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities

and powers, all things have been created through him and unto him; and He is before all things and by him all things consist." Now it seems to us impossible to read this new ground of the incarnation out of these passages without first reading it in. There is neither distinct assertion of it, nor fair implication of it. For they simply declare relations of the Son to other orders of intelligences than man—relations of creation and government—without even a suggestion that these relations have come only by virtue of the incarnation, or that the incarnation was necessary to them. The Logos, of course, by becoming the God-man, is none the less thereby the eternal Son in whom all things consist, their natural Head by creation, and under whose dominion they are forever. There is no assertion that it has been through the incarnation that the Son became or eternally is the Head of the angels, or that only thus He became revelatory of the Godhead to them or the centre of their union in God. Moreover, the incarnation for *redemption* is the only consistent idea that will explicate the apostle's statement of Christ's purpose to "sum up," "gather together again," (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι*) all things in heaven and on earth. The *ἄνα, iterim*, "again" in the compound word points back to a state in which no separation as yet existed. The disharmony came by *man's sin and fall*. The redeeming work of Christ, annulling this disharmony, re-establishes the unity of God's Kingdom in earth and heaven. The gathering together is "in Christ." He is the central point of the union. But it takes place by the recovery of *man* and the necessity was *redemptive*. There is not a word in all this that legitimately implies that the harmonization of the things in heaven and earth, or the gathering of them under one blessed headship, required the incarnation apart from the lapse of humanity. To connect the necessity of a God-man with the placing of the *angels* in right harmony would not only be *per se* singularly inept as implying that *man* is the centre about which the things in heaven are to be summed up, but utterly incongruous also with the non-relation of the purpose of the incarnation to the angels clearly indicated in the declaration: "Not of angels doth

He take hold, but He taketh hold of the seed of Abraham." These texts, critically examined, give no different conception of the incarnation from that for redemption. The most that can be claimed for them is, that if the theory we are studying were elsewhere distinctly taught, these *could* be interpreted in accord with them. But in themselves they are utterly inadequate to establish it.

The theory, moreover, is unnecessary for the very purpose for which it has been formulated and urged—a supposed better and absolute basis of Christianity. The supposed gain is illusory. If the aim is to lift the reality of the God-man out of all relation of contingency into that of eternal certainty and sure divine purpose, this, in all essential features, clearly belongs to it without this new view. It is generally admitted that God's foreknowledge, whether based on foreordination or not, is absolute and eternal. It covered the fall of humanity and the need of redemption as completely as it did the forepurpose of creation; and this at once gives the same absolute certainty to the redemptive basis as belongs to the creational and perfective. For all theology acknowledges that creation is a free action of God—not an absolute reality like the immanent activity or *opera ad intra* of the Trinity. Absoluteness of that kind is not sought or supposed in the necessity for the incarnation. The only absoluteness is that of the free eternal purpose of love in Jesus Christ. And as the foreknowledge of God covered the future fact of sin as truly as the creation, though He stood in a different causal relation to the two, His love could act as absolutely in the purpose to redeem as in the purpose to create. Each purpose was a purpose of free love, and eternally chosen in the same absoluteness of love's foresight and free foredetermination. Redemptive Christianity is the "absolute religion."

Further, transfer of the motive of the incarnation to the creative aim would take from it the unique and incomparably inspiring significance it has as a *specific revelation of God's love to recover and save a self-ruined and undeserving race*. No merely cosmic working can disclose such a view of the reach

and possibilities of the divine goodness. It has, indeed, been urged that since the incarnation is so transcendently the world's greatest exhibition of God's love, it is something that cannot reasonably be supposed to have been left contingent on human sin. But the impressive fact is rather that it is just its relation to the necessities of the race as self ruined and guilty in sin, that it *becomes* such an unequalled exhibition of the heart of God, that we have no calculus to measure it. The sore heart of a lapsed humanity, struggling in the faith that has caught a glimpse of the vision and hope it offers, is not easily ready to surrender it. It has even an apologetic value, as having in itself the very reason why we may believe it. The soul opens in confidence toward God through the very thought of such supremely Godlike goodness. There is a correspondence between means and end. "The incarnation, apart from the *cross of redemption*, would lack precisely that revelation of God's love which is to us the most immediately impressive and soul-subduing—His yearning compassion for the unworthy."\* "God commendeth his love toward us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us," Rom. 5 : 8. It is this all-surpassing vision of redemptory self-manifestation that has inspired the mind and shaped the songs of the Church, breathing out even in the rapt strains of "*O felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem*," as being a vision that more than compensates for the damage done by sin, and forms the supreme environment of the moral universe. The exstatic strain is no bewildered concession to sin, but a recognition of the supreme reach and triumph of God's love. And it is in line with the truth of the incarnation for recovery, that philosophical thought is beginning to obtain, if not a solution of the mystery of moral evil in the world, yet glimpses that offer some light for the problem.

For it is conceded that the problem is inseparably connected with God's creation of free personal beings capable of abuse of freedom in wrong-doing. Such creation, indeed, raised creature existence into attributes kindred to God's own life,

\* Forrest, *The Christ of History and Experience*, pp. 189-190.

with correspondent fellowship and blessedness. But with this supreme endowment, in His "image and likeness," and its correspondent exaltation of the world system above the mere aggregations of matter, "things," or forms of material or physical motion, into the sublime realm of intelligence, reason, ethical character, and the blessedness of holy communion in love, came also necessarily the possibility of the misuse of freedom in sin. The principle of freedom is alternativity of choice. The elevation of life into this realm involved the possibility of lapse into moral evil. But God, as we must conceive, could not find His true measure of satisfaction in a universe of mere mechanics and incapable things, unable to respond to creative love or share in its meanings. God could find his own, i. e., kindredship, only in the life of a fellowship in which creature thought, life, love, and goodness may meet His own and be made blessed in and by it. The only kind of creature that could satisfy a Being of absolute personal goodness would be a creature capable of the highest form of excellence, in filial relation and blessedness. "Creation, to be agreeable to Him, must be of creatures like him; spirit as he is Spirit, intellect as he is Intelligence, love as he is love."\* The material creation is only relative and subsidiary. "The only creation worthy of a personal God is a universe of persons," freely obedient to duty and love, respondent to their motives, and advancing in the high life of free goodness.

Some further things need to be distinctly perceived. (1). God's purpose in forming a creature world in the supreme grade of exaltation of life and excellence, was neither to introduce sin, nor as *necessitating* it. At the fullest import, sin thereby became a possibility, to the *actuality* of which through creature will, God's will is an eternal moral antagonism. He neither created sin nor any necessity for it; on the contrary He incorporated, in the dowry of a moral personality kindred with His own, a law of utter condemnation of it and of absolute obligation to righteousness. (2). If the ethical world-system is in-

\* See suggestive presentation, by A. M. Fairbairn, *Philos. of the Chn. Rel.*, pp. 152-168.

deed the best, and the only one worthy of God, His eternal self-consistency and goodness forbids us to think that He could then, by acts of preventive interference with freedom, have secured against the possibility of any but right moral choices. For such system of control would annihilate the very principle of free self-determining personality. The intervention would be destruction. The lofty grandeur of self-moving spiritual life in holy love would be lost in a show of will-less automata.

(3). The term "permission," often used to state God's relation to the entrance of sin, needs distinct interpretation before its use can be true to the truth. It suggests a degree of "consent" that cannot possibly have been involved. "Non-prevention" would better express the reality, as accordant with the principle of responsible freedom in which He himself had constituted human life. The moral law, with its behests and prohibitions, had been written in that life. The moral elevation had been given for blessed preservation and its fellowship of holiness. The creature's use of it for sin was a direct antagonism to God's will or eternal purpose of creative love, and God's attitude permitted the sin in no more positive sense than simple abstention from physical prevention. Sin is eternally that with respect to which God says to those made in His image of freedom: "Thou shalt not." (4). But here, from the incarnation, enters light upon the mystery of unprevented creative disobedience. While God did not, foreseeing the disobedient purpose, arrest it by annihilation of the creature freedom which His wisdom and love had created, and, going back upon His plan, drop His world-system down to the low grade of impersonal things, with no capacity of fellowship in thought, aim, or love, a universe of will-less automata, He *did*, just as truly as He fulfilled His purpose to create with foresight of possible or even actual fall, also, in the same foresight, determine to establish a providential administration of redemptive grace and recovery of the fallen, through this remedial incarnation and its otherwise unrevealable love. The true theodicy of creation must include, with the foreseen possibility of sin, the pre-determined incarnate manifestation of love for restoration of moral

life. God thus gave the universe the supreme revelation both of His love and of His opposition to sin. He turned the creature's self-ruin and guilt into occasion of transcending creative goodness by the new glory of the compassionate and self-sacrificing goodness of redeeming love. He thus added to His creational expression against moral evil, in the ethical behests made constitutional for guidance of human freedom, the infinitely surpassing expression of antagonism to it given in the incarnational and redemptory administration for salvation from it. Though God could not fail creationally to lift the world-system up unto the worthy range of ethical life, nor then retract the system by annulling freedom, yet in His infinite resources of wisdom, power, and love, He could establish a providential economy of recovery through motives appealing to personal freedom itself. The incarnation stands for this whole economy of provision and persuasion for man's return from self-wreck to the true relation and life to which his creation looked. It has its appropriate agencies, means, and spiritual influences. "Marvellous was the absolute primal creative love, which made something, nay, everything out of nothing. But still greater is redeeming love, still greater is God as the Redeemer, inasmuch as He conquers the contradiction of Himself (Heb. 12 : 3), the enmity of sin, by His divine *love of His enemies, or grace.*" \*

This view explains and justifies the fact that the conservative evangelical theology of our day is increasingly emphasizing the incarnation. Its significance and value are more and more clearly seen. It is viewed not only as a necessary prerequisite to the teaching, ministry and atoning sufferings of Christ, but as itself, in its place and aim, the sublimest and most assuring revelation of the holy character and love of God. In it, sin-smitten and enslaved humanity is given a vision of His goodness and beneficence than which nothing can be conceived more impressive, or appeal more mightily to the soul for abandonment of sin and new life in righteousness. It is a vision the world cannot afford to lose. Yet over against this supremely needed, significant, and inspiring truth is the fact

\* Sartorius, *Doc. of Div. Love*, p. 128.

that evangelical theology is facing an active movement appealing to science and philosophy against acceptance of it. Materialistic evolutionism, and idealistic monism or pantheism also evolutionistic, have been elaborating cosmogonies that, even if claiming to be theistic, wholly exclude from the creative process for both the world and man any forces but those that operate under the form of natural causation, and leave no place for any direct divine working or supernatural manifestation in the world—God forever remaining, either apart from it, an absentee God, or pantheistically self-revealed in it, in all its naturalistic forms and individualities of being, but without any direct, miraculous self-manifestation. Their teaching deletes the whole supernaturalism of Christianity, to which the incarnation preëminently belongs. In the law of cosmic creation and procedure God is regarded as self-barred from all direct working or transcendence of natural causation. We are told: "The modern perception of the uniformity of nature and the unbroken domain of law makes the idea of miracle inconceivable, save in the line of natural causation. We do not, and we ought not to expect God to act otherwise than in accordance with those modes of his action which we have learned to designate natural law." If natural law be understood, as rightly, the unbroken uniformity of causation established by God's creational will and work, the redemptive self-manifestation of God, the incarnation is absolutely excluded from his administration, or is strongly discredited to faith, and we are pointed to Christ only as the divinest of men and the best religious teacher of the world. The miracle of the incarnation is eliminated from Christianity, and Christianity is reduced to a natural religion, though the highest that human thought has thus far read from God's self-disclosure in nature. No wonder that conservative theology resists these destructive urgings, based only on speculative science or pantheistic theorizings, tending to darken out of sight this vision which the incarnation gives of God's redeeming love and saving aim for humanity—the vision that, above all others, has been the inspiring power of Christianity and remains the supreme appeal to the human soul to forsake sin and turn to righteousness.

## ARTICLE IV.

JOHN ARNDT.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN O. EVJEN, PH.D.

Three hundred and fifty years have passed since Germany saw the nominal close of the Age of the Reformation, the Peace of Augsburg, 1555. The Emperor, who almost personified Spanish Catholicism, found himself compelled to grant religious liberty to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession. But since the treaty made no provision whatever for the Reformed Church, and since the Lutherans were accorded the right of free religious worship only under the pressure of the infamous "*cujus regio, ejus religio*," the Peace of Augsburg was at most a compromise which gave no satisfaction to the contending parties. The Peace of Augsburg did not establish liberty of conscience (that was left to Oliver Cromwell); on the contrary it brought about the Thirty Years' War, which broke out in the following century. It is therefore doubtful if any one will celebrate the three hundred fiftieth anniversary of the religious Peace of Augsburg, even if some fancy a mild form of superstitious belief in the almanac or show a certain preference for round numbers.

In the mean time the year 1905 offers another link which connects the past with the present, and which is both opportune and interesting. It is *interesting* to know that it is in this year exactly three hundred and fifty years since John Arndt was born, and three hundred since he wrote his first book of *True Christianity*. As this book is one of the most widely circulated devotional books in the world, and as Arndt is known to all Protestants, and to many Catholics, who regard him as the Fénelon of Lutheranism and the Thomas a Kempis of Protestantism, we wish to dwell on his memory and ascertain if our age cannot learn something of him. To remember him now is, moreover, *opportune*, especially since the present year is making strong efforts in bringing about a better understand-

ing among the several denominational bodies of American Protestants.

John Arndt was born Dec. 27, 1555, in Ballenstädt, in the Duchy of Anhalt, Germany. His father was an upright Christian, a minister, who would have been overjoyed, had he known the future of his son. He died when John was ten years old. To him as well as to many others it was not revealed that Arndt should write a book which should be for the Protestant Church that which *The Imitation of Christ* was for the Catholic.

The life of Arndt covers that period in which the articles of the treaty of Augsburg determined the fate of the German people in confessional matters until the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, which closed with granting free religious worship also to the Retormed. His life and work can therefore throw much light upon the religious phase of his times. He was too original and independent to follow the theological program of his day: The mere framing and shaping of theoretical views and doctrines. As an heir of the Reformation he became its heir in a special sense: Contrary to the greater number of his contemporaries, he understood how to make use of the great spiritual treasures of the Reformation without turning them into dogmatical coin.

Before we relate anything further about Arndt let us turn our eyes to the Reformation. The inheritance left by this movement was exceedingly great. No period in the history of the world has to such an extent been so creative as that of the Reformation. It broke the ascetic view of life. It burst the unity of the middle ages. It transformed, to speak in philosophical terminology, the world-view.

The Middle Age was ruled by Asceticism. The monk's view of life, to renounce the world, was the ideal of that time. No distinctions were made between the world and the sinful world. If the world is contaminated with sin, it has nevertheless relative goods, which we may use freely and gladly, as the gifts of God. But Asceticism saw something positively good in the renunciation of real goods. Marriage for instance was sinful for the clergy; for to marry was natural, but nature and what

was natural should be renounced. The unmarried monk or nun was consequently more perfect than the married man or woman. According to the idea of the Church it was also sinful to engage in mercantile pursuits. Thus the Jew became the merchant, who then laid the foundation for the wealth that he controls to-day. He stood under the jurisdiction of no Church. The same spirit of renunciation commanded the other secular fields. Asceticism in this form is found among the heathen in Egypt. The root is heathenish. Christ and his apostles were not ascetics.

The Reformation caused the barriers of Asceticism to fall. From now on Asceticism is regarded as a means, no longer as an end. It can be useful or useless, as the case may be. As Luther wrote about fasting, it can be a "good external discipline." The liberating view of life engendered by the Reformation now supplanted that of the Middle Age. The Roman Catholic ecclesiasticism was overcome by the sword of the Spirit. The Bible became an open book. The power of Hierarchy met with opposition from the doctrine of Justification by Faith. It was again clear that man could no more be justified by fasting and renouncing the goods of the world than he could by making proper use of them. For faith justifies.

Therefore the Reformation taught that the natural goods are not to be despised; there is no merit in despising them. Such goods as art and science are to be cultivated. Schools must flourish. The State must be supported in such a way that it can solve the problems which it has to face. Family life is to be regarded as high and as sacred as the life in the monastery. Work—physical as well as intellectual—is a duty. The laboring man and the servant girl are no less personages than the mendicant monk or the saint. The calling of the statesman is just as honorable as that of the priest. Work, trade, calling, station in the service of the honorable neither adds nor detracts in the process of sanctification. For the Christian is free. The truth has made him free. And he is saved through faith in Jesus Christ.

Luther was the great spirit in the work of the Reformation,

a man of God, a religious genius, who understood the needs of his times, which had sunk down into spiritual slavery and carnal apathy. He became the Reformer of the Church, and his co worker Melanchthon the Reformer of Theology. Luther furnished the material for Lutheran theology, he thought out the thoughts: Melanchthon put them in theological form and logical formulae; but his influence on the development of Luther's theology must have been great, perhaps very great.

The consolidation of the blessings of the Reformation was left in the hands of a new generation. Luther had furnished materials for centuries. A necessity was soon felt for collecting his thoughts, for putting them into a system so as to obtain a firmer hold on the truths which he, much less by logic than by intuition, in a hundred writings had presented in so many different ways. It was then especially the dogmaticians who took up this work of consolidation. They wished to produce the doctrines of the Bible in a dogmatic system. But the system was to be built up according to the main view-points in Luther's theological thinking.

Luther was not a dogmatician, Melanchthon was. Hence the "*Loci*" of the latter, though strictly speaking not a dogmatic system, became the fundamental type for the dogmatics of the future, and remained so until Schleiermacher three hundred years later, gave the *loci* method its death blow. Many of the post-Reformation dogmatics of the *loci* type bear witness to a wonderful and unparalleled diligence. The most minute details were measured and weighed. But in the process of this work great controversies arose among the theologians. The exposition of "pure doctrine" became the favorite past-time of Latin speaking theologians. The aim and the result of the Reformation, at least for the time being, consisted in pure doctrine, revision of dogmas. The Formula of Concord set the pace. And the natural development of doctrine as well as the healthy growth of Christian life in the congregations was retarded. Various dogmatic systems because of their restraining qualities were like theological strait-jackets. The dogmatics of

the seventeenth century became the Alpha and Omega in Germany. It was developed at the expense of Church life. And the other theological branches such as Exegesis and History were overshadowed by the dogmatic colossi, which even in our day possess such intrinsic merit in the eyes of so many on this side of the ocean. Fortunately it is known that not every dogmatic system possesses canonical worth, and that not every dogmatician is a saint even if his greatest concern consists in keeping the dogmatical rubrics of himself and others in faultless arrangement. Dogmatics has ever been an apple of discord. It is loved and it is hated. Its ardent lover does not see its faults; "love is blind." Its passionate hater sees nothing good in it; for "hatred strikes blind." But why go to extremes? Our age unfortunately is about to show dogmatics the door, like the salt which has lost its savor, thenceforth good for nothing but to be cast out. (Math. 5 : 13). This threatening attitude is the reaction against the exalted opinion that an earlier age held of dogmatics, which it regarded as the noblest and most important branch of theology, as its blossom and crown—yes, as identical with the whole field of theology.

In such an age it was that John Arndt lived, a time when the ministers brought into the pulpit the paragraphs of dogmatics and argued a doctrinal issue before the congregation as a lawyer would before a jury. This was a time, when many seemed to forget that Christianity is Life in God and not alone a doctrine about God. While the ministers could preach sermons of three hours or more about "pure doctrine," spiritual death and ungodliness spread within the congregations in many places. Pure doctrine and pure doctrine mean two different things. To preach the pure doctrine is to preach the good tidings that the faith which lays hold of Christ is saving faith: Believe in Jesus Christ. Another preaching of "pure doctrine" is: Believe in the doctrines laid down and developed in dogmatics with all its definitions, formulae and paragraphs; it contains the precious truths of and about God, is *the* doctrine concerning our faith, the only true and genuine faith; believe in this pure doctrine, believe in Belief.

Every one ought to know that the preaching which we mentioned first is evangelical, scriptural. The other falls short of the principles of the Reformation, and does not make it clear that we are saved through faith in Christ, for it demands a *plus*—belief in the system. The whole reduces itself to this: We are justified by faith and works. These are the practical consequences of this kind of preaching, the presuppositions of its advocates be whatever they may.

It was a blessing for the seventeenth century to receive divine truth in a form which could appeal to something else than the mind of the theologian who theologized in Latin and breathed the air of post-Reformation scholasticism. An appeal to the heart was necessary. It came in the form of devotional works and Church hymns. Who does not know the beautiful hymns of Paul Gerhardt, and who is ignorant of John Arndt's *True Christianity*? Arndt and Gerhard were both such strong Lutherans that they sacrificed their pastoral charges rather than to make any—what seemed to them—vital concession in favor of the Reformed. But their confessionalism was free from bitterness. With each, doctrine meant more than theory, it was life.

With this historical setting in mind we are in some degree prepared to appreciate a character like Arndt. Let us now take up the thread of his biography where we left it. It will verify as well as exemplify the general statements given above.

We left him bereaved of his father in the hands of his good mother in a Christian home. Generous hearts provided him with means to get an education, the rudiments of which he received in Aschersleben, Halberstadt and Magdeburg. At the age of twenty-two we find him at the University of Helmstädt, where he studied medicine. He wanted to become a physician. But under a severe sickness which almost proved fatal he promised God to study for the ministry if he ever recovered.

His mystical bent of mind found much pleasure in the writings of authors like Bernhard, Tauler and Kempis. After recovering, true to his promise he turned his attention to theology. After leaving Helmstädt he studied under ultra-orthodox professors in the universities of Wittenberg and Strassburg. He

then went to the University of Basel, Switzerland, where he came under the gentle sway of the Lutheran Prof. Simon Sulcer. At the same time he attended the classes of some of the lecturers in medicine, and gave lectures himself on philosophy and theology. He distinguished himself in interpreting the Epistle to the Romans. Once near drowning in the Rhine, one of his private pupils, a Polish nobleman, rescued him. This event was of no small psychological importance in shaping the future of John Arndt.

At the age of twenty-six he was appointed teacher in his native city. In the next year he was ordained a minister, and married Anna Wagner, the daughter of an eminent jurist. They were childless. But no cloud was permitted to overshadow their domestic happiness. After seven years of laboring in his pastoral charge, Badeborn and Ballestädt, the little household received a severe blow in the deposition of Arndt. The duke—and here we notice the coarse hand of territorialism supported by the godless "*cujus regio, ejus religio*"—who sympathized with the Reformed faith, ordered the discontinuance of the act of exorcism, an ancient baptismal form consisting simply in a sentence adjuring the evil spirit to depart from the subject of Baptism. The duke designated the act as an "impious ceremony." He likewise ordered the removal of the pictures from the churches. Arndt interpreted this move as an indication of the duke's abandoning the Lutheran faith. He did not err, for a few years later the duke publicly adopted the Reformed faith. But Arndt, who refused to comply with these ducal commands, lost his charge. He would not have staked his charge on an adiapheron like exorcism, if he had not seen that a principle was involved, for he was no bigot. The same may be said about the removal of the pictures. In the iconoclastic controversy which followed Arndt's first writing appeared. It dealt with the use and abuse of pictures, and embodied the reasons for the author's refusing to obey. Arndt was then forty-one years of age.

The deposed pastor soon received a charge in Quedlinburg, about five miles from his first field of labor. The members of

his old congregation, who had made strenuous efforts to keep him, did not forsake him. They came regularly to hear him. But some of the inhabitants of Quedlinburg became busy in circulating evil reports about him. They tried in different ways to make him appear disreputable and to cut down his salary. Arndt was grieved at this. He had done his utmost to win the love and confidence of his congregation by preaching assiduously—for a long time every day in the week—and by laboring unremittingly among the sick and bereaved during the several visitations of the pest, which took away over 3000 lives from Quedlinburg. But his holy zeal and devout spirit were misunderstood, his efforts were in vain. Anything was considered good enough for the preacher who had once been deposed. He longed to get into a new field of labor, and was glad to accept the call tendered him from Brunswick. In this his third charge his life was comparatively peaceful and happy until his colleagues, moved by a spirit of jealousy, made him the victim of a hostile persecution. Several political riots occurred in the city at this time. They closed with the gruesome execution of the burgomaster of the city. Arndt, who was ever ready and often invited to support the magistracy with counsel, suffered much when he thought of the uprising of the mob and the malice of his fellow ministers. We learn this from his letters to the young student, afterwards the famous dogmatician, John Gerhard, with whom he corresponded for many years. The letters are full of sad and bitter complaints. He was tired of the world and longed for eternal rest.

Then—fifty years old—he began to write his famous work *True Christianity*. In a few months the first book was published. It came late, but it was the mature work of a matured spirit. One of the true signs of a truly great man is his modesty. Arndt spoke of his work with the greatest modesty. What he had to say was new, because forgotten. But it raised a storm of opposition, as truth always does.

The book was a protest against the "ungodly and impenitent life of those who loudly boasted of Christ and of his Word." "It is not sufficient to acquire a knowledge of the Word of God; it is also our duty to obey it practically with life and power.

There are many who suppose that Theology is merely a science, or an art of words, whereas it is a living experience, a practical exercise. Everyone is very willing to be a servant of Christ, but no one will consent to be his follower." These sentences taken from the author's preface strike the keynote of the book.

In their zeal for the doctrine of justification by faith the vast majority of theologians and preachers left out of consideration the renewal of life. Only too many taught justification by faith as a shibboleth, never inquiring about the fruits of faith. Faith with them meant holding fast to certain truths rather than laying hold of Christ. Little thought was given to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. But much room was given to the antinomian spirit, though Antinomianism was nominally condemned. The gospel was shamefully abused by those "who loudly boasted of Christ and of his Word, while their unchristian life resembles that of persons who dwell in the land of heathens and not of Christians." It was against this that Arndt protested in his *True Christianity*.

The pastors of Brunswick immediately attacked the book and its author. Poisonous words were spoken and fell on fertile ground. Slander promoted their growth. The motives of Arndt's opponents were various. Envy, personal dislike, "doting about questionings and disputes of words," littleness of heart, were the chief ones. But the injustice which they did Arndt, was enormous.

Fortunately he received in the year 1608 a call from Eisleben, the birthplace of Luther. He accepted. Perhaps no place ever pleased him as much as Eisleben. But he remained there only a short time. John Gerhard had recommended his old and tried friend for the office of General Superintendent of ecclesiastical affairs in the principality of Lüneburg. The sole motive for Gerhard's recommendation was Arndt's ability; Gerhard as well as Arndt was opposed to everything that savored of nepotism. And when Arndt accepted this fifth, the last and most important, call in his life, he was actuated only by warranted motives. Money, gain, or dignity had no

attraction for him, but the new, wide field of work needed him. Celle became his headquarters. It was here that the active life of Arndt reached its zenith.

He labored indefatigably in Celle for ten years, till his death. He wrote and preached, made extensive journeys, visiting the schools and congregations in his territory. He possessed a great administrative talent, and was a strict disciplinarian, painstaking and conscientious, kind towards those who were faithful in the discharge of their duties, but severe in cases of sloth and unfaithfulness.

It is in this period that he wrote most of his literary works. In Eisleben he had completed *True Christianity* in four books. He now wrote "The Garden of Paradise," a postile, an interpretation of the Psalms in 451 sermons, and an interpretation of Luther's catechism.

In the meantime a great controversy was taking place regarding Arndt's orthodoxy. Men with little hearts and narrow minds made savage and persistent attacks on his expressions and belief. The Lutheran theologian Lukas Osiander called *True Christianity* a "book of hell." After the death of Arndt, a theologian in Danzig gave vent to his feelings by bursting out, he hoped Satan would pay Arndt for his words; he (the theologian) would not ask to come to the place to which the soul of Arndt had departed.

It had been discovered that the thirty-fourth chapter of the second book of *True Christianity* reproduced almost verbatim a passage from the prayer-book of a certain Weigel, who differed very much from the doctrines of the Church. For this reason the orthodox became suspicious. Arndt excused himself by making the statement, that a friend had communicated to him an extract from Weigel's work without mentioning the author's name; since this passage contained no doctrinal error he had inserted it in his book, though he rejected the Weigelian errors. Arndt was innocent in this matter. Though he was subsequently released from censure, the seeds of suspicion already thrown out made his path one of thorns.

Some of the university faculties entertained scruples about the new terminology in *True Christianity*. Many of the terms

which Arndt had used were taken from the mysticism before the Reformation. Even John Gerhard became cautious in his statements about the book.

In the course of the controversy Arndt was accused of Papistry, Pelagianism, Osianderism, Calvinism, Flacianism, Schwenkfeldianism, Weigelianism, Paracelsism and of other isms and enormities. But he had also many admirers and defenders. The whole Lutheran Church was drawn into the controversy.

Under these wranglings Arndt passed away. He was certain in his cause and laid all things in the hands of God. He longed to be released from this world. On the third of May, 1621, he delivered his last sermon. The text was the two last verses of Psalm 126: "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy, etc." After the sermon he remarked to his wife, To-day I have preached my funeral sermon. He felt ill, a violent fever set in and within a few days his exhausted frame yielded to the assault of disease. On the eleventh of May after receiving the Lord's supper he prayed: "Enter not into judgment with thy servant." After having slept a short time he awoke, looked upward and exclaimed: "We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." His wife asked him, when he had seen that glory. He replied: "I saw it just now. O what a glory it is! It is the glory which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man to conceive of. This is the glory which I saw." His last words were, "Now I have overcome all." On the eleventh of May 1621 he fell asleep. It was midnight. The soul of Arndt went home to God.

Arndt was a gentle, truth-loving character, honest and straight-forward in everything he said or did. His generosity was great, so great that the common people suspected him of having learnt the art of making gold by the aid of the "stone of the wise." His learning and humility equaled his generosity. His interests lay more in the sphere of religious feelings, and in an active development of Christian virtues than in "doctrine" or the "system."

His sermons were practical, of a didactic nature. They contain no anecdotes, nor do they indulge in rhetorical artifices,

but they make copious use of scripture passages and Bible history. Bengel, the greatest exegete of the eighteenth century, says about Arndt's writings: "In these writings we inhale an air as fragrant as the fragrance from the flowers of Paradise. His speech sounds as gentle and beautiful as the music of the home bells to the weary wanderer returning home from distant lands." Perhaps the preacher of modern times could learn from Arndt. His draughts from Scripture were heavy, his vocabulary was large, his thoughts were profound. There are biblical thoughts, words, and phrases *en masse* which are seldom heard in a pulpit. A certain circle of scripture verses, a certain scheme of thought, a certain number of set phrases and words often constitute the kernel of sermons on the most varied themes. In preaching, as well as in other matters, we thus often note that spirit of indifference and despondency which is satisfied by repeating—and each time more wretchedly—the material used a first time.

But it was not Arndt's sermons which made his name famous. It was his literary works, *True Christianity* and *Garden of Paradise*, now generally published in one book under the title of the first. No devotional book excepting *Imitation of Christ* has been translated so frequently as *True Christianity*. It has been rendered into almost every European tongue: Latin, Norwegian-Danish, Swedish, Bohemian, Polish, Low-Dutch, English (1712, revised American edition 1868), French, Turkish, Russian, etc.

The effects were extraordinary. We have noted that many looked upon *True Christianity* with disfavor. One pastor tried to suppress its publication. Many preached from the pulpit against Arndt and advised those who came to the confessional to keep at a distance from an "Enthusiast" and "synergist." But a great number acknowledged the greatness in the efforts of Arndt and showed him their gratefulness. Letters of thanks were sent to Arndt, even from distant Sweden. Arndt's spiritual son, John Gerhard, praised the book as did Gerhard's pupil, Glassius, who often said: "He who does not love Arndt must have lost his spiritual appetite." Even Quenstedt, the "bookkeeper of Lutheran orthodoxy," recommended the work,

though he felt it his duty to add that it contained some "hard phrases." Baier, the dogmatist in Jena, delivered lectures on it. And Spener was inclined to place Arndt by the side of Luther.

*True Christianity* gradually overcame the opposition raised against it and was finally, by general consensus, received as a Lutheran work. True, it contained alongside genuine Lutheran thoughts "mystic-pantheistic thoughts and sentiments." But the latter being of little prominence as compared with the former received a charitable interpretation or were regarded as of no account. Gerhard could write: "Since we are not offended at the many errors contained in the writings of the Fathers we ought to show the same fairness with respect to Arndt. In such writings we must take into consideration what their purpose is. They do not contain exact investigations, but earnest exhortations to lead a godly life."

There were two things which made *True Christianity* famous. 1. Arndt's book was the first ascetic book in the German language. Prayer-books were not by any means wanting; but there were no devotional books for the people. True, the work laid much stress on asceticism, but asceticism is here no longer an end, as in the middle ages, but a means. 2. The book called the people's attention away from the vain doctrinal controversies to the practical problems of Christian life, at the same time, however, emphasizing the contemplative side of Christianity.

Arndt himself tells in a letter what purpose he had in view in preparing the work. 1. He wished to withdraw the minds of students and preachers from an inordinately controversial and polemic theology, which had well-nigh assumed the form of an earlier scholastic theology. 2. He purposed to conduct Christian believers from dead orthodoxy to such faith as might bring forth fruit. 3. He wished to guide them onward from mere science and theory, to the actual practice of faith and godliness. 4. He wished to show them wherein a truly Christian life consisted, with the true faith, as well as to explain the apostle's meaning, when he says: "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."

Arndt's book was therefore a protest against dead orthodoxy, a summons to bring forth the fruits of faith, a peace-maker among the warring members of the Church. As the author of such a work, Arndt has been respected by Lutherans, Reformed and Catholics. An Italian translation of *The Garden of Paradise* was for a long time catalogued in the Vatican library as a work on horticulture. At the Jesuit library in Madrid, Spain, a German Professor in the year 1687 asked the librarian what book was the greatest "asceticus" in the collection. The librarian answered the inquiry by exhibiting a Latin book the title-page and last leaves of which were wanting. He declared that it was the most edifying work that they possessed. It was Arndt's *True Christianity*. Popular tradition often relates how this work was wonderfully rescued from fire and floods. This shows how the common people clung to it.

Arndt had spoken betimes. Three years before his death the "Thirty Years' War" broke out (1618-48), the worst war which has been fought on German soil, a punishment to that people that disregarded the law of love.

The war became a trade, the soldiers made no oath, and received no other wages than what they could get by stealing and plundering. Women and children, and hordes of harlots followed the men in camp. All bonds of discipline were relaxed, untold cruelties were perpetrated regardless of vocation, age or sex. One day the armies would be on the verge of starvation, another they would revel in luxury and licentious gluttony. After thirty years of fighting we see an unruly, ignorant, godless, dissolute generation let loose, a generation which had never known what peace was. It is despondent, cowardly, incapable of work. It begs and steals. But the serious are filled with grief and sadness. The plow is covered with rust, the fields with weeds.

The desolation caused by pest and sword remained a long time fresh in the memory of the people. Their spiritual power seemed to be paralyzed. The whole of Germany was now in the hands of foreign powers. Before the Reformation it had been split up into two hundred sovereign parts, the result

of territorialism. After the "Thirty Years' War" the number was doubled. The German provinces distrusted each other. Hundreds of courts were established and filled with fawning courtiers, French customs and French morals. Everywhere were seen the marks of a maimed existence, of vanity and littleness. The dismissed trumpeters were turned out as schoolmasters, they nourished the academical coarseness which we often meet with in European universities of this day, but which is really a production of the seventeenth century. Germany was put back two hundred years in its development. Just at the beginning of the nineteenth century did Germany again number as many people as it did in 1618. Not since the migrations of the Teutonic tribes can history tell of a destruction like that which followed the religious wars of the seventeenth century.

It was especially in this century that Arndt's *True Christianity* proved itself a source of consolation to those who humbled themselves before the Lord. And Arndt's life became an example for the pastors, whose eyes were more and more opened for the necessity of preaching and living Christ rather than supplying fuel for uncharitable polemical theology. Arndt lived to see only the beginning of the horror of war and only the first fruits of the blessings of *True Christianity*. But in his writings he lives forever. One of the lines of his tomb reads: *Arnidius in scriptis vivit ovatque suis*.

We have said nothing about Arndt's style; nor have we given any topical analysis of his writings or catalogue of the symbolical books in which he believed. These are formal matters, which need not be considered in this article. It may be mentioned that he accepted the Formula of Concord. But he was no doctrinarian, no defender of a polemical confession-alism. His work was through and through *irenical*. For that all nations bless him. Catholics, Reformed, and Lutherans have vied with each other in calling Arndt their own. The spirit of this book has overcome confessional barriers. If our age would pay less attention to party watch-words, shibboleths and names, and give more heed to the working of the Holy Spirit, many imaginary barriers would fall. The wanting title-

page in the copy of Arndt at Madrid would likely, if discovered, have modified the librarian's opinion of Arndt's fame as an "asceticus." As it was, the book was judged by its contents, independent of any confessional bias.

America has had no "Thirty years' war" with bloodshed. And it has never been oppressed by a "Cujus regio, ejus religio." But it has had—only to look at our own field, Lutheran America—more than twice thirty years of doctrinal controversy. And it has been as much oppressed by the tyranny of petty customs, usages, practices as any State-church under the whims of a secular head. Faults have been magnified, virtues belittled. But truth liberates; and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty. May we become less polemical, more irenical. Arndt, as one of the servants of Jesus Christ, has shown us the way. Blessed be the memory of John Arndt.

## ARTICLE V.

## "REMOVE NOT THE OLD LANDMARKS."\*

BY REV. W. H. DUNBAR, D.D.

In taking up the duty laid upon me this evening I can not avoid calling attention to the significant fact that this is virtually the third time within two years that we are called upon to induct into office new men in the professorial chairs of our Seminary. It solemnizes our hearts with the thought of how the men to whom we looked for guidance are passing. It gives an even greater solemnity to our thoughts by the sense of vast responsibility which comes upon us as a new generation comes to fill the places of our trusted guides.

It is not my purpose to touch upon the time which properly belongs to him who is to be inducted into office. Entering into a position of sacred trust the Church will await with eager interest the expression of his thought indicating the line of his work. My own part must of necessity be very perfunctory.

In view of the combined departments of teaching which are to be his, it is in my heart to say one earnest word to my brother. I can not say it better than to put it in the words of Holy Writ:—"Remove not the old landmarks." I say this word, not because I have any reason to doubt the loyalty of thought to established standards on his part. Any whisper of such doubt would have prevented his choice for the place. But I say it because of the mighty trend of thought in these days—the claim that the marks of real advanced thought are set far beyond the old established lines—the feeling that to be confined to the old limits is to be adjudged obsolete. And I am led to say this word because in the very departments committed to him our brother is entrusted with the task of making and guarding these old landmarks of sacred truth.

\* An address delivered by Dr. Dunbar, as President of the Board, at the installation of the Rev. M. Coover, D.D., as Professor of Church History and New Testament Exegesis in the Theological Seminary of the General Synod of the Lutheran Church, Gettysburg, Pa., September 13th, 1905.

*"Professor of Church History and New Testament Exegesis."*  
I do not know the history of this combination—how these two came to be joined in one chair. It is not for me to question the wisdom of the conjunction. But it is evident that the combination lays an immense responsibility upon the man to whom it is committed.

*New Testament Exegesis.*

No department of study goes more vitally to the very foundations of truth. We look to the men who study the Bible in the original to bring to us the very essence of biblical truth. They give the cue to our religious thinking. They give shape to our systematic theology. They set the pace for our interpretation of Scripture. They give the trend to the preaching of the Word.

And so it comes to pass that a false exegesis vitiates the system of theology, undermines the foundations of sound doctrines and sends a false note into the utterances of the pulpit. It is the very center of biblical criticism. It forms the basis either for a firmer and more intelligent faith or for the desolation of destructive theories of the Word.

Vast, unestimated and inestimable, tremendous are the responsibilities of those to whom is committed the exegetical interpretation of God's Word—whose office it is to teach and train the preachers of a generation in their understanding of God's Word. And never has it been more so than in these days, when consummate learning and distinguished scholarship is engaged in the task—when the critical interpretation of the Bible has become the very summit of scholarship—and when negative criticism is regarded as the mark of the most acute intellectuality.

So, my brother, you will pardon me and will understand that I do not even suggest a suspicion of personal doubt, when I say to you, as you enter upon this work of opening the very intent of the Bible to those young men who are to be the expounders of gospel truth—when I say, with trembling earnestness: "Remove not the old landmarks."

*Church History.*

Rightly or wrongly connected, the combination of Church

History with New Testament Exegesis increases the responsibility of the teacher.

Church History! It is a field so vast that few men can compass it—no man can master it, its volumes form libraries. Its study forms a university of its own. We deem ourselves happy today in having selected one who has given years of discriminating study to this department. For any but a student of Church History to have undertaken the work of teaching Church History would have been absolute presumption.

Church History! Not alone because of the vastness of the field does its teacher assume a great responsibility, but because of its intricacies and complications. Its movements are as complex as are the mazes of human theories. Error has drawn its lines across the field as well as truth, and they are marked with just as much pretension and prominence. To teach Church History demands the discrimination of the clearest thinking and the soundest faith, the most acute vision and the best-balanced conservation.

Church History! In its pages is to be found the most vivid testimony to truth. Dr. Wolf said: "The living facts of history are the best practical illustrations of the nature, character and aims of Christianity. Next to Revelation no realm of truth has richer instruction than the department of History. It is largely necessary to a full understanding of Revelation. It is the best commentary on Revelation. It is the strongest proof and confirmation of Revelation." It contains the record of errors, reveals their weakness, and gives us the story of their disastrous overthrow. Error has no originality. The error of each age is but the repetition of old errors. As has been said of Mrs. Eddy: "She was too ignorant ever to have heard of Berkeley, and to have read Turgot's History of Philosophy, in which her hypothesis is ridiculed a hundred years ago as the first guess of every beginner, was beyond her power." The lines of truth were fixed long ago. The history of the Church is the abiding record of established fundamental truths.

And so you will pardon me if again I say to you with all earnestness, "Remove not the old landmarks." As you teach these young men, fix their minds upon the oft-proved fallacies

of errors. And let the fixed landmarks of truth stand out clear and distinct, as the mighty ranges of mountains stand out the impassable boundary lines between truth and error, the intellectual life and death, spiritual joy and spiritual desolation.

And is there not enough to give us serious concern and to cry out with all the intensity of earnestness? When gifted men, even devout men, like Harnack, are subverting history with apparently the most acute intellectuality and much conscientious devotion to truth, when great universities are swept from their moorings and become sources of error, when whole bodies of Christians are driven from the safe protection of their established creeds, when current literature teems with old errors in new dress—need I ask pardon in saying to you with all earnestness tonight as you enter upon your high and holy work: “Remove not the old landmarks.”

There are certain landmarks of truth clearly and distinctly fixed—great primary truths in the realm of religious thought. Out of the mystery of light they appear, a body of truth mighty not because of its multitude, but mighty because of its towering forms: The idea of a Personal God and a Divine Creator—the Fall of Man and Original Sin—the Divinity of Christ and its attendant doctrine of atonement—immortality, eternity after death, with its attendant facts of an eternal heaven and eternal hell. These are fundamental truths. There they stand. The dim gray dawn of human history falls around them—gray and venerable with age, yet showing no signs of weakness, or indications of tottering, momentous and eternal realities, realities which rest on grounds of their own, mighty boundary lines of truth which sweep in tremendous circles around all the vast realms of human thought, old landmarks.

These landmarks are fixed, immovable, permanent. Intolerance, Bigotry, Dogmatism this? So be it. But dogmatism whose home is in the heart of revelation, dogmatism which reflects the character of its divine author “with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning,” dogmatism of truth against dogmatism of error. The true creed of Christendom is like Christ in his heavenly throne, “the same yesterday, to-day and forever.”

These ancient doctrines as set forth in Scripture constitutes a revelation complete, perfect, final. Does this seem to narrow down the field of human thought? Does this seem to antagonize human progress? Is this tyranny of creed-ideas over human mind? Why, there is an infinitely broader realm in the unseen than in the seen. Why, it is an infinitely greater achievement to penetrate to the source of power than to be carried out by the streams of the outcome of power. Why, the sublime laws of Spirit open reaches infinitely vaster than all the laws of matter, through which the human mind may soar with unfettered pinions. The sphere of human thought is not to create, but to explore the faith once delivered to the saints.

We would put forth not one finger to check the advancing tides of life in all its hundred departments. Let them roll on and out like the waves of ocean from the shore. But the main lines of truth must stand firm, like the rock-bound shores—the dividing lines between that which is stable and that which is unstable—the utmost bounds of the great main-land of Truth. Far out upon its outer verge stands written that last curse of this Book of Revelation, the seal at once of its divine origin and completeness: "If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this Book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the Book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the Book of life and out of the holy city and from the things which are written in this Book."

The logic of it all is that the Church of Jesus Christ, as the grand conservator of truth, must move and be recognized as moving in the forefront of the great onward movement of the world; that within her sacred walls where truth is enshrined and, by the power of that truth, must be fulfilled the great promise and accomplished the great work of the redemption of the world and the elevation of mankind. By the mercy of God we are in the true line of advance, and then only, when "we have fallen into the ranks of that mighty movement of humanity which, as it traverses the ages, follows the uplifted banner of the cross, and when it would sing its hymn of human progress repeats instinctively the Creed of the Apostles."

## ARTICLE VI.

## THE STUDY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.\*

BY PROFESSOR M. COOVER, D.D.

The Bible is a unique literature. It arose not through man's striving after fellowship with the unseen; not by man's lifting himself ethically upward; but by God stooping downward to lift man up into fellowship with himself. Not by apotheosis of man, but by incarnation of God came the history of the world's greatest religion.

The Old Testament prepares; the New Testament executes. The prophet expresses the ideal; Christ makes real. The old covenant embraces a race of men; the new covenant embraces all men. The old is engraven in stone; the new is a spontaneous principle in the soul. The old compels by statute; the new woos and leads by impulses of moral worth. The old is specially for society; the new for the individual. The Old Testament is a lamp; the New Testament is an illumining soul.

But the soul has a body, and the Word of God is handed down to us in written characters. As the Word was made flesh to reveal God, and only the spiritually sympathetic could see God in the Christ and behold his glory; so the will of God has been given us incorporated in language by which God's purpose is adequately revealed only to the spiritually discerned.

There are three important aspects of the New Testament literature to be considered: the philological, the supernatural, and the historical; the content of the word relative to written character, the supernatural and inspirational in relation to the word, and the historical continuity and outcome.

## I. THE PHILOLOGICAL ASPECT.

In oral address ready-made ideas are not sent to you from the lips of the speaker. What comes to you is simply sound-

\* Inaugural Address.

waves, orderly vibrations of atmospheric ether. These waves of sound strike the tympanum of the ear and produce a series of sensations from which are built up by the attentive recipient the ideas contained in the mind of the sender. The reader of the printed page sees well-ordered characters with which he has learned to associate certain mental conceptions. In reading or hearing, ideas do not come ready-made, but characters or sounds are transmuted into ideas by the mind trained to receive.

There is no absolute certainty, however, that the idea of the speaker or writer will be identically reproduced in the mind of the hearer or reader. If you and I have been educated in the same school of thought, in the same aspects of philosophy and science, there is the probability that our verbal intercommunications will effect approximately the same ideas in each other's minds. But if the forms of our mental development were different, or if we were separated by time and by national characteristics psychological as well as social, there is no assurance that my utterances would create in you ideas identical with my own.

An adequate use of philology depends upon the correct ascertainment of the content put into the word by the original writer. Differences of education and temperament largely modify the meaning involved in language. The language of the New Testament must have associated with it an adequate historical conception, an appreciation of the age, customs, and mental habits of the writers. Temperamental as well as educational elements and factors must be considered. The student must be saturated with Greek until Greek habits of mind become innate.

Nor is this sufficient. New Testament Greek is Hellenistic. Semitic habits of thought modify language and color its content of idea. The history of the Hebrew race with its characteristic religious consciousness and peculiarities of mental habit figures largely in the proper penetration of New Testament ideas. An acquaintance with the Septuagint, and with Aramaic tendencies of expression, is necessary to an understanding of New Testament language and literature.

The temperamental feature also undergoes a peculiar modification in the religious character of the New Testament writers.

There is a self-repression of passion, a lofty ethical tone, a superiority of historic view, which differentiate their literary product from the literature of the first Christian century. An additional element of inspirational content affected the minds of the writers. New Testament idea is both revelatory and inspirational, and mere literary study cannot penetrate that idea. The reverential mind, the spiritually susceptible mind, alone can interpret the true content of that which is the product of inspiration. The mind of the Spirit as well as the trained mind of man must coalesce. The elucidation of the text can efficiently proceed only from the illuminated man, and that illumination should consist of more than mere intellectual sympathy with the subject. Spiritual possession of the interpreter's mind is a necessary factor for the discernment of that idea the content of which is spiritually given for a spiritual end.

There is constant danger to the exegete of becoming an antiquarian of words, or of being led into an opothoeisis of abstractions. This must be corrected by a sense of historical principles. The contributions to exegesis made by historical study, when pursued in serious earnestness, are sane and profitable. The supremacy of historical fact must be recognized over the suppositional or merely inferential.

There is danger of interpretational defect from oversight of facts. The reproach of subjectiveism may arise through slight of facts or through assumptions incompatible with ethical principles. A system may be established by deductions from mere theological notions. A subjective expectancy due to predilections and presuppositions of a planned system not infrequently violates textual exposition. An idea may naturally have its implications, but presuppositions in their unfolding issue in a defective exegesis. A depreciation of history, and the neglect of sober concrete fact are subversive of truth. Such an inhospitable attitude will firmly stand in the way of well-established historic conclusions. Indifference to concrete fact, and opposition due to previously assumed notions may cause

the text to be treated tortuously by subtleties and sophistries to the oversight of the spiritual purpose of the record. There is too often a reluctance to admit what would necessitate a change in some system hypothetically coördinated, and a stoutness to maintain what is historically indefensible. Even immutabilities are sometimes relative and must give way to ascertained results secured by faultless investigation. Established sequences have the right of recognition and of incorporation into the body of truth.

Exegesis must not be abstractly critical, nor exclusively historical; but should be conducted with sympathy for ethical truth, and with discerning appreciation of the spiritual content. The divine word is not for mere intellectual refinement, nor breadth of historical religious conception, but for the salvation and elevation of the whole man. A thirst for knowledge and for keen understanding of religious verities should imply more than mental satisfaction as a goal.

There should be the concomitant of noble religious consciousness, and a worthy moral purpose. The ethical intellect is not to be improperly restrained. Intellectual sincerity should not be absent from spiritual dependency, but the reverent mind should have the attitude of confidence in God when facts of biblical exposition and interpretation are not plain. To forbid inquiry is to stultify the intellect.

Philological study historically and ethically conducted is a necessary feature for the comprehension of the language which conveys to us so great a religious import. It is the divine word that intelligently and dispassionately communicates to us spiritual verities.

By it we come into close contact with the mind of God and are able to read his thoughts. But we must remember that the word of the text is a symbol, the content of which may be vitiated by what we put into it. The word is not idea, but only suggests it; the human mind transposes it into thought, and the content of that human mind which reflects upon the word may not reflect the true idea embodied.

The word is but symbol or character, it is mind that calls the thought into existence; and the color of that mind with

its peculiarities may unconsciously give a false interpretation. The textual word is the occasion of that which is impalpable and sometimes illusive to the mental grasp. The divine mind which regulated the record must accompany the perception of the reader of the record to reach the spiritually revelatory. The ascertainment of the true text of scripture is an important factor in reaching the revelation. The Lower criticism is an indispensable procedure for the establishment of the true text.

But in matters of criticism where the subjective element sometimes finds play for tentative conclusions the moral aim must not be overlooked. The New Testament was recorded and wrought in human experience and is a living word. Having been divinely inwrought, the divine factor must aid in its adequate evolution and exposition.

## II. THE SUPERNATURAL AND INSPIRATIONAL ASPECT.

The world is now being interpreted in terms of cosmic force. The whole cosmos is so coördinated that material movement is declared to account for all development from the atom to impalpable idea in the human brain. A regulative principle underlies the ascent of matter from star dust to reasoning intellect.

Though natural law is not a causative thing, but only a name given to the orderly sequences of things observed, yet it is viewed as some sort of regulative principle propelling matter in its gyrations and evolutions. A primary causative principle to introduce life into organisms is deemed scarcely necessary; for nothing is dead or ever has been dead. All material nature is alive. The crystal and the vegetable fiber push forward into orderly forms. Everything feels and has a greater or less degree of life. The mineral feels magnetic forces and is drawn. *Panbiotism* eliminates the necessity for a primal source of life. Everything existing has the sense of feeling, from nebulae or star dust in the rotary evolution of worlds to the consciously self-directing creature. Matter has never been dead, and there is no need to call in a Creator of life.

And matter not only feels, but thinks. The crystal is not self-conscious, but acts intelligently in its self-constructive powers. The plant is not a reflective creature, but acts with

intelligent forthreach. All matter is subconsciously automatic. Teleology is simply the orderly movement of psychical matter.

*Panpsychism* eliminates the necessity for the special introduction into the cosmos of soul or spirit life. All nature thinks consciously or unconsciously in degree according to high or low organism. The innate principle of forthreach in matter works upward from incognizant psychic action in inorganic nature to the delicately produced chemical scintillations in man's brain effecting self-consciousness and thought. Thought is a function of matter, but not dead matter; for there is no such thing as dead matter. There is no real distinction between matter and mind. Man is nothing psychically but feeling. Ratiocination is the ferment of oxygen and hydrogen. Thought is the scintillation of chemical electrons. Pain is the sensation of jarring repellant atoms; pleasure, the social joy of blending chemicals. The thinking creature is a mechanical contrivance operated by living forces which leave nothing unexplained.

There is no matter without mind. Intelligence is posited in every form of life. There is mind all the way down to the protozoic cell, and all the way up to the complex action of the philosopher's brain.

The mind of thinking man is but a specialized form of universal intelligence, a refined form of sentient substance, the highest efflorescence of matter. The atom is everything that man is in latent potential life. The spontaneity of the atom makes man.

Ethics is embraced in the same material system. Man's ethical conceptions and regulations are an economic development, an evolution in the history of man's personal interests.

There may arise a peculiarity in this specialized sentient substance called the mind of man in which there appears the conception that nothing exists but the thought of the thinker. Instead of mind being a function of matter, matter is but a function of mind. This is only a variety of specialized nerve energy, the upturned face of a once down-looking atom.

Though all cosmic nature thinks, yet no psychic action is really voluntary. The forthreach of the atom is centrifugal energy. Matter flees from the sum of absorbing solidarity

into the form of individuality, and attains in man an assumption of voluntary self-direction, the consciousness of seeming free-will.

But this centrifugal force is equally balanced by centripetal energy, which holds all things in check. All forces are braided together in a network of determinism. All matter feels and thinks, but there is no dynamic freedom. Though forces of energy seek individuality, all are suppressed into one central solidarity of plan from which there is no escape. This is the trend of Monism. No personal architectonic mind superintends cosmic action, for the cosmos has in itself both material energy and mind potency.

Whatever psychical power may be posited in this schematic cosmic regime it is still materialism rampant. There is no place for absolute personality as a first cause.

To the philosophic mind considering this scientific aspect the living psychic force in the cosmos assumes the phase of the Divine Immanence. The onetime theory that the Absolute Consciousness is the sum of all finite consciousnesses through which alone the Absolute has reached self-consciousness has been inverted, and now the finite consciousness is but a derivative from the Absolute, shares in its attributes, and by selective attention to one thought-form after another is able to rise into relative self-absolutism. This personal absoluteness of the growing finite, however, never attains to real endless personal existence, but remains a phase of the one sole monistic principle.

Continuity of self-consciousness after the dissolution of the body and soul of man can scarcely be maintained. The monism is after all but a pantheism.

\* In this rarified materialistic regime there is no room for any supernatural. Face to face with this phase of science stands religion today. Cryptically coalescing with Christianity is the philosophy of the divine immanence, which is in some forms allied to this aspect of cosmic nature. Of the supernatural there is no necessity; for nature itself is super-substantial. Inspiration viewed from the philosophic standpoint is but a more lively divine immanence in man; and from the standpoint

of materialistic science it is but cosmic emotion, the habitual admiration of the profound grown ecstatic. It is the more fervidly glowing psychic matter in the mind of the religious genius.

But whatsoever potency be posited in the primal form of matter or energy, who or what is the primary cause? The first link is undiscovered and is deemed undiscoverable by science. Which is the harder to conceive, an eternity of matter; or an eternity of personal will? The choice lies between an eternal God, and eternal star dust. Those who choose eternal nebulae put an unconscious God into it, and being cryptically theistic in primal principles, the development of the system must end in pantheism. There is a subliminal supernatural at the inception of the system under the form of monism. Its advocates cannot allow the term supernatural, but it nevertheless is super-substantial as psychic matter, which is but another name for the same thing. In this guise inspiration is psychic energy full-orbed in literary genius.

Simplicity of conception starts not with thing, but with thought. A personal self-conscious Creator is the standpoint of personality and the only adequate standpoint to reason from; for reason exists whence reason comes. An ethical personality stands at the threshold of material existences, and ethical personalities are the aim and end of the process. If man close the door to the incoming God, Theology will pass to Christology, and Christ will come in the flesh, a door of entrance which can again be closed only with blood on the threshold, in which returning man cleanses his steps.

The creed wisely affirms two supernatural events; a supernatural birth, and a supernatural resurrection to life. These were wrought upon Christ, and all that comes in between the birth and death of the Redeemer is but a natural outflow of his supernatural character. The miracles of Jesus are appropriate actions of his unique personality.

His own unpremeditated conduct also gives witness to his unique personality. He is tempted to do not the weakly human, but the humanly impossible. Satan reaches the self-consciousness of Jesus in the predominant part of his person-

ality. The tempter reaches out to elicit susceptibility not in Christ's human, but divine nature. It would be no temptation to you to turn stone into bread; for you could not do it. It was a temptation to Jesus because he could do it. This unique form of self-witness to the divine character of Jesus is most peculiar and potent. It excludes invention, because it is no part to be played by the expected Messiah, and is too subtle for the literary craftsman.

But may not Jesus have been an unbalanced enthusiast tempted to do the fanatical? Then he would have tried to do the impossible and failed. May not Jesus have been self-deceived, or perhaps a willing deceiver of others?

A twofold moral question obtrudes itself here, and demands an answer. Jesus claimed to work miracles. Was he himself deceived, or did he accommodate himself to prevalent expectations of the power of the Messiah and suffer himself to deceive others?

His own ethical character is at stake, and he is in danger of invalidating his teaching by his unethical qualities. The answer as well as the question is on the moral plane. His every temptation was ethically conquered to the denial and exclusion of all selfishness.

His sanity in teaching is beyond question. The ethical implications of the gospel record bear no blurred stamp. An evil tree does not bring forth good fruit. The excelling fruit of Christianity cannot come from a deceived fanatic, nor from a deceiver whose consummate skill lay in deluding observers.

Nor can the supernatural element in the gospels be but a chronicle of legendary traditions. The brevity of the period between the facts and the record preclude the possibility of legendary growth. And more trenchant than this is the peculiar interrelation of deed and doctrine in the career of Jesus. His teaching and miraculous conduct coalesce so absolutely that they cannot be severed without reciprocal contradiction. If the miracles be not true, the teaching of Jesus in John's gospel cannot honestly be extricated from its occasions and environments. If the whole assumption of the supernatural lies with the reporters of Jesus who in their literary craft imposed on

him works he did not do ; then his words he did not say ; and the gospels remain a unique fiction which only a Jesus could invent.

When we evaporate the miracle, we evaporate the morality of the gospels, and the sincerity of the Christ-character. Then the authenticity of Christianity is not in Christ, if he be not historically presented in the gospels ; and a new history must be subjectively formulated to coördinate his conduct and speech when critically sifted.

The authenticity then resides in an interpretation of Christ subjectively reached, which does not rest on historic grounds. We do not then have a factual Christ, but an eclectic interpretation of him.

If the gospel records be legendary and not historic ; if they be the outcome of ecstatic admiration for a mere consummate genius, we have a fictitious product so sane, unique, and life-giving, that the fiction must be an inspired product. The inspiration of the writers must be assumed or inferred even upon the ground of their work being a character fiction. We can evaporate the historic fact not by a superficial explanation of the nature of the fact, but only by a supernatural substitution.

A legend dealing with ethical supernaturalism becomes trivial with attributes contributed by fancy. The historicity of the gospels alone accounts for their logical consistency.

### III. THE HISTORICAL ASPECT.

The phenomena of human character have a significant place in the weaving of history. There are three universal religions, and each has a personal founder. Ethnic religions die with the nations which foster them. They are founded on poetry, legend, and customs, breathing the religious aspirations of the people. But Buddha, Mohammed, and Christ are founders of universal religions, which still live.

Buddha's life is involved in myth, yet he is an historical character. Mohammed is somewhat environed by legend, but nevertheless stands out with sufficient distinctness to give historic proportions to his life and work. But Christ has a four-fold history of unique quality and distinct impression. It is ethically sane above all others.

There is a worthy thought product in Buddhism; a fatalistic obduracy in Moslemism; but in Christianity alone is there a profound ethical civilization. There is no need of laying exaggerated stress on the exclusively moral excellence discernible in Christian ethics incorporated in religious character, business integrity, financial stability through brotherhood confidence, and social and industrial progress, to show the superiority of the religion of Christ to that of other founders. It is not an uncritical acceptance of truth to admit dynamic moral relations and spiritual aspirations in Christian teaching undiscoverable in the detached and fragmentary phenomena of other religions. We need not search long to find significance in the Christ-life and teaching in sympathetic relations to man's need. Speculative aptitude is not required by the honest investigator to penetrate the meaning and sympathetically to appreciate the religious forces embraced in Christianity, which are fundamental and determining for stability and civilization, and efficient for all forms of progress, as well as for human redemption. The mere literary antiquarian may find equal thought-fancies, profound speculative assumptions, and moral maxims in oriental literature. But he will discover nothing concretely caused and historically motivated comparable with biblical literature and history. He need not even spiritualize scripture with what he may deem an import irrelevant to its historic significance to recognize the superior moral outcome. He can formulate and systematize on basal facts and moral forces now prevalent in Christian social order as products of the religion of Christ, and not on opinions of plausibility manifested in the beauteous imagery and stilted precepts of poetic morals. Incorporation of rare ideas which lack assimilation with lofty character hints of incongruity and falsity somewhere.

The observer can compare theoretic with factual propositions, mental imagery of moral aspiration with concrete moral conduct among men, and holding subjective considerations in abeyance, reach no hasty inference in declaring the supremacy of Christ over other masters, and the superiority of his moral influence over the potency of the poetic precepts of Buddha or Confucius.

The New Testament is not a mere theoretic religious treatise, a pious disquisition to soothe aching hearts. Its concrete Savior towers above a legendary ethical teacher. The historical aspect of the New Testament is profoundly ethical both in content and resultant effect in human character. The assumptive assertion that the gospels are legendary may be dismissed to honorable retirement since it has done its work by arousing reverent criticism, which by historical inquiry and critical exegesis has made adequate defence and exposition of the New Testament as authentic history.

History is not a matter of dates; but of persons and moral principles. Carlyle says, "The history of the world is the history of the great men who have figured in it." Epochs and events are dominated by personalities. Next to the supreme and unique personality of Christ stands the intrepid Saul of Tarsus. The apostolic age is ancillary of all the fire and glow of subsequent church life. The principles of operative Christianity are deductions from plain history, and not inductions of laborious theses insinuated into a revised and theory-constituted record of events. No arbitrary eclectic method of dealing with the facts can banish the outstanding features, the moral principles and forces of the apostolic age. There is historic harmony and cohesion in the cosecutive record of the Apostolic Church, with implicit relations of orderly facts and forces. The facts are real, and not mere mental pictures. Though the order of sequences may not be entirely uninterrupted in the flow of Paul's missionary events, we have always light enough to discern conclusions which will not contravene historic consistency and healthy divine revelation.

We are not called to surrender the supernatural in a consecutive history of events. The epistolary literature of Paul is not the child of mere circumstances, the product of ephemerals. A divine factor dominates the apostolic development. The study of Paul's career as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles brings to the understanding the situations as reflected in his epistolary expression. His missionary experience in Galatia, Macedonia, Achaia, and Ephesus, furnish the historical environment and the psychological and social conditions amid which

the letters arose. His stay in Corinth amid his acute experiences gives acquaintance with the circumstances, a clear ascertainment of social and factional relations, which contribute to a more adequate penetration of his letters. The objective historic grounds, the chronological framework, and the occasions of speech and action, stand out boldly. Instead of the exegesis of words, which may be left to the commentary to be consulted on occasion, the exegesis of apostolic history should be the chief work of the New Testament student, who wishes to master the facts for moral and religious use. The mastery of the Acts of the Apostles lays the foundation, which reflects plainly the geographical, social, and religious environment of Paul's epistolary correspondence.

True exegesis is largely involved in history. The historical study of the apostolic age is a theological discipline which will eliminate the resorting to hypothesis for the solution of peculiar situations and obscure moral causes. In this study will be found the explication of some dark difficulties attending the life of Paul. Didactic power will be found embedded in facts of historic revelation when the genesis of New Testament epistolary products is interpreted in historic terms. The historic disclosure will make the distinctive features of moral and spiritual truth more easily and comprehensively grasped.

The product of the study will not result in mere value judgments, the cavalier acceptance of good ethical and religious effects, which have no substantial historic grounds. But the product will be a veritable reproduction of fact and pleromic revelation. The arbitraments of undecided beliefs respecting apostolic literature will give way to plain coördination of historic facts. History makes emphatic protest against mere intellectual theory. The product of imaginary or subjective conditions must vanish when confronted by historic radiation proceeding from a personal apostolic actor, whose situations civic, religious, and psychological, appear in a rightly interpreted record.

The fundamental principles of the apostolic age stand forth boldly enough in outline to dispense with the considerations of a too free literary criticism. History subjectively considered,

and forsooth crucially tortured, is psychologically variable under the treatment of exponents who are disparate in moral perception and feeling. A sympathetic religious consciousness and an ethical motive are necessary concomitants of biblical study.

A false view of Christ, and a tortured treatment of New Testament literature entail errors of belief which reappear again and again in various forms in the history of the Christian Church. The trinity of persons in the Godhead has shown itself to be a necessity for man's religious nature. The human desire for divine fellowship cries out for satisfaction.

Teach that Christ was a docetic appearance, a mere phantom of physical presence in the world, a spirit with a seeming body, a Christ not come in the flesh, and the tie of fellowship with God is severed. Antichrist is a principle that breaks the bond of communion with the manifested God. Emanations of beings subordinate to God, angels and other operative spiritual ministers will then be posited as intermediaries between sinful man and the exalted God, who dare not come into close fellowship with material nature lest he be contaminated.

Then Paul must rebuke the Church at Colossae for the worship of angels. In the cry for fellowship false teachers had taken away the real Christ, and resort was made to angel worship. Evaporate the human nature of Christ by an overdue exaltation of his divine nature, and say that Mary was the mother of God; then Nestorius will arise and claim fellowship with higher life by declaring that Christ is come only in the flesh to be near to man. Eliminate, or forget the Holy Spirit; and Montanus will claim communion with God by a personal incarnation of the Spirit. Let the Roman Church extol the divine nature of the Redeemer to a neglected aspect of his human nature; and the Virgin Mary, and numerous saints, will become intermediaries between men and God. The sense of fellowship has been lost through a lost Christ, and prayer will be offered to beings humanly sympathetic to moral needs. Let Unitarianism and the school of Harnack deny divinity in Christ; and the philosophy of the divine im-

manence in man will take the place of the divine trinitarian relation.

The soul is satisfied in none other than a divine-human Savior, and history repeats itself in theology and philosophy to appease the spirit of man astray in his religious faith. The word of God is both history and revelation suited to the absolute need of fallen man.

Its exposition historic and textual is for salvation, and that salvation is widely effected only by a proper conception of its revelatory truth.

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## ARTICLE VII.

### USE AND ABUSE OF SYMBOLISM.

BY REV. W. H. FELDMANN, A. M.

Carlyle, or some one, once said, "My blessings on Cadmus, or whoever it was, that first invented letters." When we think of their use and value, we too will rejoice! For by the art of symbols, not only in letters, but also in picture and statuary, we are able to record the thought and life of the world, from its remotest past down to our own times. Who can ever truly estimate the value of that system of marks known as the alphabet in its varied combinations known as words; the power of pictures; the influence of sculpture? All this is symbolism—a given character representing a definite object and calling up that specific image every time we interpret it. Symbolism is the telepathic cord between mind and matter, man and man. We use it for the incitement of ideas in our own minds, as well as the means of communication with others. It is the circulating medium in every walk of life. The trades, the arts, the sciences, domestic relations and social intercourse all employ it for conveying thought and inducing action.

The acme of all life's thought and action is embodied in religion. Though spiritual, it too is bound up with the temporal; it too employs symbolism to give expressions to its life and truth. Who has ever looked on Thorwaldsen's Christ in the original

or some reproduction and not had a wealth of thought and suggestion spring out of the nail pierced hand or spear pierced side? How we are transported from the dead marble to the living Christ! All our emotions are called into play; our imagination is winged and our feelings set on fire by the hints those outstretched hands contain. Who has ever looked on Hoffman's "Christ in Gethsemane," and not realized the value of prayer?

Do they not point to underlying truths; are they not genetic in power and life, pregnant with soul-stirring persuasion and parental of wholesome spiritual enthusiasm? If these things are good and wholesome in the "art gallery," magazine, "Sunday school lesson leaf," in books and parlors, why not in the sanctuary of the Lord?

It is a matter of fact that every form of religious thought whether of ancient or modern times, has sought to give material expression to the unseen objects of its devotion in form and symbol. The Parsee and his sun-emblem, Thor and Woden and the Walhalla, as well as thousands of shrines in every land attest to the truth; and the more perfectly they symbolized, the more tenacious became the hold on the people. The history of Christian missions warrants the assertion. The untutored Fijian yields to the Christian missionary much sooner than the educated Japanese. Furthermore, it is to be noted that as long as they held *honestly* to these symbols they possessed a power for good over their lives. However, all these systems have long since been degraded into hollow mockeries. The stocks and stones are sad relics of what they formerly represented! Many reasons for this can be given, but a simple and all-sufficient one is this; their symbols *never* embodied facts—they were counterfeits, not counterparts of truth; and the best proof thereof is the effete and decadent conditions of the natives blighted by the same. A lie is ever pernicious.

Idol-worship and its dire consequences, as well as the abhorrence around by its cruelties and practices, together with the stern commands of Mt. Sinai, and also the desire that our faith and worship be as unique as its truth is original, has led many

a Christian to look askance at all embodiment of spiritual truth in *any* material form.

Extremes are, as a rule, too sweeping in their declaration.

A symbol as a secondary may be a helpful factor in religious life when it is to the truth itself what the illustration is to the sermon. But alas, it has been subjected to abuses. These have been so flagrant that they have caused many to lose sight of the use entirely; with them symbolism is an unmitigated evil.

That abuses did and do arise is natural. That much damage was and is done is only too true. But let us never forget that it is the good thing missed that causes the greatest trouble, even as a half truth is a greater mischief-maker than a whole lie. Symbolism suffers for these very reasons. Then, too, zealots are often the worst advocates for the very cause they espouse.

The cry has been raised against symbolism because of its shameful abuse by Rome. No one can deny this. Were Rome seed-sound, however, then the rest would have shaped itself otherwise. Its transubstantiated doctrine must inevitably lead to materialistic symbolism. This is by no means the weakest spot in her system—nor is it as bad as it has been pictured. There is a blind fanticism against the Tiberine Church that is wholly unwarranted. This stupidity has robbed us of many useful lessons she can teach.

Rome and symbolism have been made synonymous; whereas Rome and the *abuse* of symbolism are conterminous. Let us never forget that no Church has worked out externals as she has. One cannot enter a Roman Catholic Church, but instantly the eyes travel to the place of the altar! Did that altar but speak the living truth, what a magnet the arrangement would prove! We can hardly allow any force to the argument, that because it is "Roman Catholic" it *must* be sensual, devilish and without a redeeming trait! These arguments *against*, like the aesthetic argument *for*, are wholly untenable. Prejudice prevails on this subject. A good principle ought not to be condemned because of a bad practice. God uses symbolism. This is the only means whereby the Creator can speak to His creature. Though He *is* a spirit, yet He writes His glory in

the heavens, and the earth preaches His power. The Bible teaches His commands. The Saviour too used this common tendency of the human mind, when He symbolized Himself as a door and a vine; and His Kingdom as a seed, a feast, a vineyard. We call them parables, making known the unseen by the seen, the unknown through the known, the concrete standing as a symbol for the abstract. Thus the abstract truth, "God is love," finds its grandest utterance and culmination in the concrete God-man, Jesus of Nazareth—indeed a divine symbol in a higher sense than Carlyle would ever allow. He was a perfect blending of fact and symbol, truth and action, body and soul. An ideal—yes, the ideal in every way! This points to the reciprocal relation that exists between symbol and fact. When rightly used they mutually strengthen each other. The fact creates the symbol, the symbol sets forth the fact. The history of human thought warrants this assertion; for the mind is ever busy giving symbolic expression to the concrete, and the concrete operation to the abstract. Principles are worked out in practice. Isolated events are grouped and classified under a general characterizing symbol. Let us illustrate that. We are conscious of the fact that God is everywhere, yet we localize His presence in a building called a church; we thereby embody in a concrete object an universal truth. What has been here cited is true at all times and in all places. It is a universal law.

This is done by the spirit-moved Quaker and the incense-loving ritualist. The blind bard who spoke of God as one who "loved before all temples the upright heart and pure," gathered in a room—the church—to worship that God. The so-called prisoner of the Vatican does the same. Thus the antipodes of religious thought and training agree on this one thing—they localize God by the symbol of a church. But from this point they part on diverging lines. The former has left his church bleak and barren, with no marks or designs to distinguish it externally from any other building; "nothing earthly must distract my attention in the house of God," he says: the latter has lavishly decorated the same by adding one embellishment

after another, till nearly all the senses are captivated—"all to the glory of God," he exclaims. The ultra-puritanic devotee would attenuate the whole system of religion into a modern Nirvana: the ultra-ritualist would symbolize the breath of the Holy Ghost if he knew how.

Both extremes nurture onesided tendencies, both leave a vast part of their natures lie waste and undeveloped. Both are sincere and think the other to have misconceived the whole scheme of God. Why is this?

Many factors enter to give a bias one way or the other, such as education and environment, temperament and taste, geographical location, political and natural aspects as well as other external forces.

Personal features are involved in the problem also. One person is subjective and introspective, another objective and extraspective. One is imaginative, impulsive, excitable; another is phlegmatic, methodical, deliberative; one likes adornment, the other simplicity. Both have followed inborn inclinations. One leans to the abstract and subjects the concrete to it; the other employs the concrete and evolves the abstract from it. The one craves spiritual ideas, the other develops spiritual ideals; each obtains what he seeks after and is rewarded according to the intensity of application displayed. Their lives tell the story.

Thus we can account for Greece and her art, Caesar and his conquests, Rome and her ritual, Scotland and her stern simplicity. Thereby we can explain Calvin and Zwingli, Manning, Loyola and Assasi. These men are polar opposites in religious life. What one considers a relic of heathenism, the other treats as the finest development of Christian life. Who is right and what are the grounds of defence? What warrants the use and wherein lies the abuse of symbolism? What are their respective claims?

Let us take up the former for consideration.

The use of symbolism is based on two things; namely, Old Testament precedent, and the laws of thought; the one the plan of God, the other the nature of the mind. Incidentally we would

note that other proofs such as tradition and national tastes and custom are only secondary matters and are dismissed as non-essential.

What part does Old Testament precedents play? The advocate of symbolism justifies his procedure by referring to the temple. By it, he declares, God set the example Himself. God was its author and founder. He insists that what the Lord instituted must have been for the good of the people; and capable of conveying a true conception of the Almighty, or He would never have given it. He points to the minute details to be executed strictly in accordance with the divine behest! Must not the Almighty, he argues, have known that the golden-domed temple with its attractive altar, glowing candlesticks, curling incense, elaborate sacrifices, vested priests and chanting choir, the "Holy of Holies" and a highly wrought ceremonial, would not *mislead*, but rather *lead* the people honestly to worship the unseen, though true and living God? Did He not do it, that things seen might help the worshipper to lay hold on things unseen, and thereby enrich, elevate and ennoble the believer's ideas of His God and Lord? It is to this temple the Greek Catholic, the most extravagant in this matter, refers you in defence of his overladen splendors and gorgeous surroundings. This temple the Roman Catholic points to as prototype of his own and finds here authority for all the sensuous externalism characteristic of that communion. This temple the Anglican claims inspired his conceptions of a church; and justifies his ceremonialism because of it. What shall we answer?

Among the many weak rejoinders a few may be mentioned; namely, that they drifted from God; that their worship became mere cant; that form never insures life; etc. Though true indeed, they in nowise militate against the truth that *God gave it* and gave it for *good*! That this good was possible the noble lives of Moses and David, Elijah and Isaiah, Simeon and Anne prove conclusively. Nor is it a valid objection to attribute this splendor to Egyptian influence, oriental phantasy, the nation's love of display, a desire for the picturesque and dramatic.

Against all these, we simply insist *God gave it!* The plan was divine and its purpose holy, because God was its author. To this we would add that Christ recognized its claims while on earth; and was incensed at the errors and abuses that abounded and thereby misrepresented it.

Though these arguments cannot dislodge the symbolist, yet his defence is a specious one at best; for he has not, judging the temple per se, or in the light of the Old or New Testament, given it the true import or conception intended by the Lord. Beyond all doubt the whole Old Testament economy had but *one* purpose, namely, to evolve faith in the coming Messiah. The paschal lamb, the sacrifice, the temple, etc., were to be creative of faith in a fact not yet accomplished. Theirs was the bud of promise that should find its fruition on Calvary. Symbolism was needed to strengthen and engender faith. How well it met its purpose the eleventh chapter of Hebrews—the Hebrew “Hall of Fame”—clearly shows. But the bud fell away when the fruit matured. The temple is a thing of the past; Christ has taken its place. The symbol is now swallowed up in the fact—Christ Jesus—and only one abiding viewpoint remains from which we can estimate the worth of symbolism, to wit, the New Testament dispensation. Christ’s labors and teachings are to be the norm and guide for the present Church. The fuller revelation of the New Testament makes this plain in the surest sense. It is evident, too, even to the most casual reader, that the genius of the New Testament differs from the Old Testament even as the fruit does from the flower. What does this highest court of appeal say?

Though the New Testament gives no positive injunctions in the matter, yet we know that the process is just the *reverse* of the “law and the prophets.” This points out the true use of all symbolism, namely, to outgrow its very need. A single instance will make it all plain. Take that magnificent piece of symbolism, allegorical in thought and construction, “The Pilgrim’s Progress,” with its “Vanity Fair, lions, Wicker Gate,” etc., are they not all symbolical? Though abounding in the richest of Christian truth and thought, they cannot produce

faith, and therefore mean nothing to the unbeliever. But where faith *exists*, this masterpiece of imagery becomes living to the reader, because his own life is portrayed in the book. The spiritual precedes now.

The sensuous arrangement of the former revelation is displaced and the temple vanishes from our sight. We are to "walk by faith and not by sight," for "God is a spirit and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth." With us the fact must evolve the symbol—now "faith is the substance"—we now must have faith before we can or dare use the symbol. For the Hebrew mind, types and symbols were *creative*, for us they can only be *suggestive*. Then they were almost primary and essential; now they are only secondary and non-essential. But non essential must not be made to mean worthless. Let us not despise the things of bygone days! Christ came to fulfil. They have a rare worth. The one abiding result of the Old Testament regime that we must recognize is this: Its religion stood for a spiritual *fact*, not an esthetic fancy. We would sum up then this argument thus: The Old Testament religion sets forth a fact, not a fancy, it is prophetic not esthetic. Its pictures fade away, its grand truths remain. Since we are not limited now by a fixed set of rules on God's part, it is all the more important that we be governed by sound rules of our own. This becomes at once both harder and easier. Whereas, with the Jew these things were prescribed, we are to work them out in accordance with Sacred Scripture on the one hand and the laws of thought on the other. The second suggestion is before us.

The glory of the Old Testament system was its fact—the coming Messiah. Around it all gathered. We must make that fact the fundamental postulate under this second, even as it was under the first. Neither theory nor fancy, but fact is the great necessity. Christ must be the all for us. We are told "No man hath seen God at any time"—Christ hath revealed Him. The Holy Ghost's entire mission is, to make Him known to us. He is the heart of the Trinity and must be the centre

of the Church. Paul said: "I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified."

Our doctrine is Christocentric; our symbolism must correspond. Patron saints must yield to an all-prevailing Saviour. Our churches are not to be converted into art galleries or halls of fame, with a galaxy of religious heroes to be venerated and adored or even admired. But *one* is to be there, and no one else ought ever be allowed a place within its walls. We can reverently say, the symbolic command is, I am the Christ, thou shalt not have any other symbols beside me. In accordance with this plan we must sweep away all myth and fancy, fiction and tradition. The "holy coat of Trebes," "the Holy Grail," "St. Anne's bone," and the whole museum of rare relics, are to be consigned to the ashheap. According to our views they can be, at best, but pious frauds; but granting, for argument's sake, that they are real and that we might behold a nail from the cross or a thorn from the crown, we would not want it, though a fact, for fear that such an insignificant fact would crowd out an all-controlling one. Incidentally we would here remark that herein lies the danger of the zealous symbolist. He is never satisfied until he has worked out the scheme even to its minutest form, simply because it is a fact. Every leaf is surely part of the tree, but the painter ignores individual leaves in the treatment of his theme. He paints the *tree* not the leaf. Paul and Peter played their part, but Christ is to be the all important and only consideration. Christ divides his glory with none. Partnership is impossible. Our only hope of escape is in the simplicity and grandeur of the Christ. One thing guides, many confuse. Fundamentals are few and fruitful, non-essentials are often complex and misleading.

Fundamentals are always simple. Physics can essentially be summed up in four words, air, heat, light and sound. Geometry is the development of a point. Chemistry is simply the laws of combination and reaction. The same holds good in religious fundamentals when applied to symbolic thought and representation. The purpose that runs through it all is simple, specific and formative. The mind requires this.

It is a self-evident truth that the mind can employ but a certain amount of energy at any one given time. It is likewise true that simplicity is concentrative, whereas complexity is distributive. Paul with the one thing accomplished more than Rome with its myriads. The multiplied attractions of overwrought symbolism have just this scattering effect. Then the eye is taken captive. Nor is it hard to find causes. Symbolism's prescribed course is to feed the soul. But since its materials are earthly it often usurps the place of the spiritual. Failing to feed the inner life, it becomes a matter of loaves and fishes—a thing of the senses. Then there is nothing left but the external adornment. This is the feature of all Romish pictures, relics, etc. They are made to appeal to our earthly feelings and sympathy, bringing before us more of our bodily feelings than those of our spiritual natures. The crucifix with its highly wrought coloring is a single instance among many. This is very effective with sympathetic natures, savages and materialistically minded persons. The cost in money is beyond reckoning. The disestablishment of the French Church is a fair criterion. This leads to a suggestion that is often rightly raised as an argument, namely, that symbolism prevails when prosperity overtakes a nation. This is true. A vast difference marks the Church from the time when persecution drove the Christians to the gravel pits and catacombs and that of Leo X. We know that as the former sturdy spirit of devotion with its martyrdom and service decreased, externalism arose. The girded lion and burning lamp gave way to the mitre and incense. Even as prosperity is the ruin of nations, so it is the death knell of inward spiritual life. When the fire has gone out then the ashes must suffice, and pomp and parade, but no life. The beautiful life gives way to the gorgeous cathedral. Many have in this matter of beauty an argument for decorative splendor. "It is so nice," they say. Estheticism appears to us an abuse rather than a use. The Church is not an art gallery and pastors are not to be hawkers of esthetical wares! The wholesale importation of the classically beautiful has led the people unto a species of religious superficiality. Very often we have

found that in proportion as the pastor was mentally and spiritually of small calibre and his people indifferent, aesthetical features controlled. This inordinate lust for the symbolical has led many to the spectacular and theatrical with its mummeries and shams. When the startling is sought and striven for and affected, so called, as the sole aim, then symbolism is a failure. Though the spectacular may arrest for a season it never feeds the soul. In one sense we agree with Carlyle, worship is transcendent wonder. But a vast deep lies between this and the cheap frippery that tickles the esthetic palate of sensualism! God is a spirit and our worship must tend to increase the spiritual and not the physical. High art in the Church generally means low religion in the heart.

Again, fundamentals are never involved or obscure. Paul had a specific thought that stood out like a beacon in his life and work.

The rules of rhetoric must prevail here—for symbolism is rhetoric applied to things instead of words—clearness first, then force, lastly beauty. Generally the last is sought first. The symbol must make the fact clearer or it has no right to exist. Symbolism is a wilderness-preacher telling of one who is greater. It seeks not its own glory, but rather to lend lustre to its type-giving fact. This is right. The servant must never control his master. The moment the symbol assumes the functions of the fact that gave it birth, it overshadows the same and robs instead of robes the original. Then its inherent worth is gone; religion sinks into idolatry and worship becomes superstition. As with Eli's sons, God is denied and the ark venerated. This is wrong. The "motif" must so stand out, that it will bring before our minds the intended fact in the most unmistakable manner. This was the strength of Old Testament symbolism, and accounts for its success; in other words it must be incapable of misinterpretation; or the error will override the truth and the counterpart becomes a mere counterfeit, giving the whole affair a mysterious aspect; making the symbol a sort of sign or password capable of interpretation by the initiated only—an "open sesame" wherewith the conver-

sant conjure. Others can then show only reverential ignorance for that which soon sinks into a cheap magic. The symbol is dragged into the gutter of legerdemain and is fruitful in superstition only. Better not have a symbol than to use a doubtful one. Superstition's power lies in the truth it misrepresents, not in the error it maintains.

Furthermore, all symbolism must be formative.

We all know the intensest joy experienced by the possessor of a treasure is the first blush of ownership; after that it grows less. This is the joy of possession, but not of expansion. This will do for a diamond, but not for faith. Unless we can expand a symbol and read richer things out of it, it soon clogs. It must contain sources of growth capable of yielding new viewpoints that are deeper and more lasting. Otherwise it crystallizes into a single thought or form and becomes not a living seed but a lifeless pillar of salt—a fetich, an idol, an unreality.

Paul determined not to know anything among the people except Christ and his cross. But this does not mean shallowness or poverty of thought and life! With what wisdom he brought out that fact; making the thought rich by showing all that it meant; becoming thereby a wonderful inspiration to him and all believers! Only a solar thought and truth sends out such rays of light and warmth! Such a symbol is always constructive in conception, and expresses some all-controlling thought and of highest import. It is an algebraic formula of the soul—capable of expansion—grouping many thought's under one head. What a multitude of thought's rush through the mind at the mention or sight of the cross! It suggests at once the plan and scope, as well as the life and hope of the Church: Setting all other truths in perspective, and thus giving us a bird's eye view of the scheme of God. It proves a governor over our personal choice of truths that appeal to us and which we like to over-emphasize—a sin modern Christianity has overindulged in. It is indeed a cornerstone fitly joining the whole edifice, giving proportionate values to all the rest. Christ in the life, in the doctrine and in the symbol. This is the only true course.

To sum it all up briefly, we would say that the use and worth

of symbolism are found in its power of association and suggestiveness as explanatory, and its powers to incite the emotions and imagination and thus to produce enthusiasm. Its abuses we conceive to be these: The supernatural stands ever in danger of being dragged down to the natural; that pomp comes with wealth, ease and luxury; that the theatrical is ever near and leads to shallowness; that man wants to live by rules and will accept anything in this guise; that the natural man receiveth not the things of God, but *will accept a host* of substitutes.

Symbolism is very much like fire, a good servant but a cruel master. Poise and judgment of the finest kind are needed. It takes a skillful driver to keep the sun-chariot from burning the fields of religious life through the senses, and likewise to keep from chilling the same by the frost of intellect.

To pervert slightly the idea inscribed on a classic shrine, we would say, Use symbols, use symbols, but don't abuse symbols.

## ARTICLE VIII.

## THE INDIVIDUAL COMMUNION CUP.

BY REV. J. D. KROUT, A.M.

The subject of the individual communion cups is one of no little moment, one which has raised and still is raising comment from all sides. It is a question which involves not only the clergy; but, since the Lutheran and several other denominations do not recognize the rulership or domination of the clergy, this question hears a voice from the laity. Some good and earnest men are among its vigorous advocates, while others equally good and earnest are equally vigorous in the denunciation of what they term "a new way of celebrating the Lord's Supper." But how and by whom did the suggestion originate? Was it the invention of some fertile mind, or has it been a gradual outcome of years of study and research? These are questions which we must of necessity consider. We find that the use of individual cups, *in modern times*, was first suggested by Mr. A. Van Derwerken, of Brooklyn, N. Y., in the year 1882. In 1887 he wrote an article advocating the use of individual cups in the communion service; but, being opposed by his pastor, he did not publish the article until a year later, when it appeared in the *Annals of Hygiene* of Philadelphia. One year passed ere anyone braved the idea of putting Mr. Van Derwerken's suggestion into practical use. In November 1893 the Psi Upsilon fraternity of Rochester, N. Y., celebrated the Lord's Supper with individual cups. The news spread like wild-fire; like a river gathering new volume as it goes to sea, so this question has gathered new volume as it wends its way into the sympathies of Christian hearts. There are to be found many good people who are always on the alert, ready for any advance thought, and it is for us to determine whether these are justified in defending and advancing the individual cup.

In treating this subject we shall first investigate the biblical account of the institution of the Lord's Supper, and endeavor

to ascertain the mode of administering the *initial* Supper. We are also compelled to deduce from Christ's command the mode in which He wished the Supper to be celebrated. Not only must the Word be preached in its purity, but the sacraments must be administered according to divine command. Only three of the Gospels give an account of the institution of the Supper—Matthew, Mark and Luke—all of whom record *Καὶ λαβὼν ποτήριον*, "and taking a cup." True, Paul in his letter to the Corinthians makes use of the article—*τὸ ποτήριον*. Those who have been the ardent defenders of the *common* cup have held that the use of the article by Paul necessarily limits us to the use of but one cup. But this shall be treated later. It has also been claimed that Christ, when he said, "This is my blood of the New Testament which is for many," pointed to that one cup which he had used and thereby designated the use of one and only one cup. We shall for a *moment* concede them the point, however, we shall ask, Where is that cup to which Christ is claimed to have pointed? If that particular cup was "the blood of the New Testament," then wherein are we justified in celebrating the Lord's Supper, since we have not *that* cup? Again, were it *possible* to produce the *identical* cup which Christ used, how were it possible for all Christians to drink from *that one* cup? The absurdity of this argument against the individual cup lies in carrying it to its logical end, namely, producing that cup to which Christ is claimed to have pointed, and then use no other in administering the Sacrament. It would require long years for *that one* cup to make the circuit, and many would never have the divine pleasure of communing with Christ. Those who have placed so great emphasis on *ποτήριον* have gathered a wrong conception of the word. Thayer in his Lexicon says: "*ποτήριον* by metonymy of the container for the contained, the contents of the cup." Dr. Valentine says: "The Lord's Supper is that sacrament or rite in which, by the institution and words of Christ, bread and *wine* are made to the believer the communion of His body and blood." However, let us go to higher authority; returning to the account as given in Scripture, we see that Christ himself

gave the true definition of the import of *ποτήριον* when he said: "I will drink no more of the *fruit of the vine*, until the day I drink it in the Kingdom of God." Thus the Synoptics and Paul convey the same idea, namely, that the wine was His blood, and necessarily the cups had no essential import. The cup or cups, be they silver, gold or glass, have nothing to do with the validity of the sacrament. The validity lies in the *contents*, and the efficiency in the spirit in which it is received. Says a writer in the Lutheran Quarterly, "If the Church provide the (individual) cups it would be expensive in a membership of 500 or 1000 or 2000." Granted that this would entail more expense to the Church, I would ask, "Is not communion with Christ *cheap* at any cost?" Again, we venture to say that this Reverend Divine has at *least* two cups in his communion set. Would it not be more *economical* to have but one cup? We find many of the great antagonists of the individual cup with at least two cups in use at the Holy Supper. If two cups cause them not to stumble, why should fifty, a hundred, or even a thousand offend their taste? If the use of individual cups is unscriptural, we venture to say that the use of *two common* cups is equally contrary to divine command.

We shall proceed one step farther and assert that not only are individual cups permissible, according to Scripture, but that at the *initial* Supper individual cups were used. As proof for our assertion we cite the fact that at the Paschal feast there were four wine drinking periods, each one of which was known as a *cup*; Christ took one of these cups, or wine drinking periods, when he instituted the sacrament which commemorates His death. Thus it is that the Synoptics say that he took "a cup," meaning that he set apart one of the drinking periods which they should celebrate in remembrance of Him; so also Paul says that he took "the cup," wishing to designate the particular cup or drinking period which was set apart. It is also a well known fact that at the Passover table each person was provided with his cup for individual use. Since this is true, is it not likely that the same custom was observed when Christ transformed the Passover into the Lord's Supper, and also that

*individual* cups were used? Again, religious art tells us that each one of the Apostles had his own *individual* cup at the initial Supper. In the celebrated painting of Leonardo da Vinci, Christ and the Apostles are represented as each having his own *individual* cup. But the question naturally arises in the minds of my readers, "How then was the *common* cup substituted for the *individual*?" The reply is very simple. Might it not have occurred thus? In the times of the hierarchical Church, as in the Roman Catholic Church of today, the cup was withheld from the laity—the pope or priest drinking all the wine for reasons which are known to all. This withholding of the wine from the laity made the numerous cups unnecessary, and since the priest alone drank the wine his cup was the only one retained. Thus when the Reformation came the one cup idea was so rooted and grounded into the lives of the people that to have made a change would have hindered the progress of the Reformation. To us it would seem that the common cup is the fruits, not of strict interpretation, but of the hierarchical Church.

Since the individual cup is not *contrary* to Scripture, and is in all probability more nearly the *correct* mode of celebration, let us view some reasons why it should be introduced into church usage. The *common* cup should be shunned for sanitary reasons. There is an old adage, "Cleanliness is next to godliness." The use of a *common* cup is by no means a cleanly practice, to say nothing of the various diseases which can be transmitted by the use of a *common* cup. As the same cup is passed from person to person, the wine advances to the lips, and then receding carries with it the impurities of the mouth. The cup gradually becomes partially emptied and is then refilled and again passed to the communicants. This refilling process is repeated many times, until at length we have a cup which *may* contain germs of scores of diseases. Professors on Bacteria agree that "from what is known of the biology of these organisms, it can readily be seen that the mouth should form a kind of hot-house or forcing ground for their cultivation." It is estimated that there are at least twenty-two known diseases

which may be communicated from one person to another by the mouth. If the mouth be the hot-bed of germs, why should it be asked of people to open themselves to these germs, when it can be avoided without breaking the divine command? Again, the usage of polite society calls for the adoption of individual cups. When we invite friends to surround our family table, we deem it essential to courtesy to give each person a cup from which to drink; not to do so would be a lack of propriety. Social custom should not be in advance of religious custom. Why *compel* men to do at the Lord's table that which in home life would not only be deemed uncleanly, but the height of impertinence? Behold the communicants as they surrounded the chancel at our first celebration of Christ's Holy Supper. Here we have a man with a much detested growth on his lips; again, we have the constant user of tobacco; now we have one with a throat-and-nasal disease. The detested growth is immersed in the wine, the abominable tobacco is washed from the lips, and the germs of the throat-and-nasal disease are disseminated in the wine. The discreet brother and sister are to follow. And all joy of the divine communion is lost in the thought of the brother who preceded. They sip of the cup timidly, with no thought of the meaning attached thereto, or perhaps they never allow the wine even to touch their lips. They shrink from the idea of opening the system to the germs of disease, and they revolt at the unclean brother who has preceded. This is all eliminated by the *individual* cup. Were it not better for those who believe this bacteria question to be of no consequence, to say with Paul: "If meat maketh my brother to offend, I will eat no more meat while the world stands"? The choice between the *individual* cups and the *common* cup involves a choice between *clean* and *unclean*.

Apart from the sanitary and cleanly aspect is that of its convenience. The individual cup not only expedites matters, but it also relieves the minister of a great nervous strain. In administering the Supper with the *common* cup the minister must be continually on his guard lest he tip the cup too far or per-

chance not far enough; in the one case spilling the wine and causing disorder, and in all likelihood causing the recipient to lose all thought of the solemnity of the occasion; in the other case he will offend the communicant by not allowing him to partake of the blood of our Lord. The tipping of the cup to the proper angle is not only difficult, but also very trying, especially when administering to the "large-hatted" sister, and of necessity requires considerable time.

This brings us to our next point, that of saving time. In this advanced age when congregations swell to the ranks of hundreds and thousands, it is necessary to expedite matters as much as possible. People are no longer willing to sit in the sanctuary and watch the minister as he slowly moves to and fro in administering the Lord's Supper. As a rule the communion services are prolonged to twice the length of the ordinary services, and for this reason we should expedite matters as much as possible. The *individual cup will* expedite the service, and as we have shown it is biblical, historical, sanitary, cleanly and convenient. This is attested by the fact that practically all denominations and sects are using the *individual cups*. This is true not only in America, but the wide world over wherever Christ is preached. The individual cup is making its way rapidly, considering all circumstances. However, its general use will be attained, as all reforms are attained, only by slow and general education, and by bringing scientific truths to the attention of the clergy and of the public; and the time will come when an individual cup may be passed to each communicant, who can partake of its contents without fear of contracting any contagious disease from his brother.

## ARTICLE IX.

## REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

EATON AND MAINS, NEW YORK; JENNINGS AND GRAHAM, CINCINNATI.

*The World as Intention.* A Contribution to Teleology. By L. P. Gratacap, Curator of American Museum of Natural History, New York.

We have here a work of scholarly ability, belonging to the class of books devoted to the discussion of the problems raised by the scientific and religious thought of our times. The author was moved to its production by his conviction that Christianity as interpreted and held by orthodox theology has passed or is destined soon to pass away by reason of the science and knowledge of our times. Being somewhat sympathetic with the methods and aims of the destructive criticism, he estimates the results of its work as much larger and more revolutionary than the facts justify. But there is some conservative element in his spirit, by which he is prompted to seek preservation of various underlying religious truths and principles, from the wreck of the past form of Christian doctrine. "This work," he tells us in "Prolegomena," "is prepared for many who wish to hold fast to the constructive elements of Christianity and yet do no violence to their judgment nor their good faith." For he believes that it has divine sources and that, metamorphosed and reconstrued, its spiritual or religious power will flow on under other conceptions.

With a view thus to save or inspire faith's acceptance of the new and future form of Christian or religious conception he uses the truth that has been long and almost everywhere recognized, the reality of "intention" or "design," which he accepts as the supreme, guiding, and unfailing principle in the world and interpretative of the import of all human life and its economies. The title of the volume evidently means the reality of intention as embodied in the cosmic existence and its order of evolution and proper goal. Even the physical earth carries a grand and far-reaching teleology from the supreme mind. The conception of the "world" is not, therefore, atheistic, but claimed to be theistic, and therefore reconcilable with the Christian view.

The first chapter gives what the author names the "articles of intention"—its elements or characteristics—fifteen of them making, together, his full definition of its meaning. The other chapters explain the World as Intention, the Bible as Intention, Conduct and Creed as Intention, the Church as Intention. The discussion of these presents many truths of interest and importance, as showing them to be in harmony with the Supreme Mind through the cosmic system and pro-

gress, viz., *life*, especially *personal and ethical*. The creative evolution looks to man and his highest elevation.

In the conclusion Mr. Gratacap applies his doctrine of intention to the Bible and Christianity. These, too, he represents to be among its generic products. "The philosophy of the doctrine of intention," he states, "is remedial for those systems of thought which narrowly circumscribe feeling and practice within dogmatic limits, by asserting the emancipative and effective power of good intention; it makes the world clearer as an intention, which by a necessary defectivity from some violent and pervasive obstruction, is only partially achieved, but which is increasingly realized in time; and it helps us in creed and conduct by presenting the conception of an intention, of which man is partly an involuntary agent, though by voluntary submission he can hasten the development and realization of the final result, and in which his personal estimate is determined by his personal *desire* to think and do right."

But our author's philosophy of intention and its movement involves a most destructive and radical transformation of the teaching of the Scriptures and the Church's orthodox theology, with respect to their distinctive doctrines. Though he speaks of "supernatural" as in the world, and even of supernatural "revelation, in his prolegomena on "the supernatural" and the "ordinates of revelation," he reduces these to a merely naturalistic sense. His "supernatural" is only the supreme intention working *on creatively* through the fixed forces and powers of natural cause and effect; and "revelation" is but the increasing product of human discovery or thought. The supernatural and revelation in the accredited sense of Christian theology have no place. The idea of redemption is foreign to his views. Despite the kind intent to preserve some essential elements of religion and ethics out of vanishing Christianity, his effort cannot be accepted as a success. A personal God is pushed back and obscured behind the natural movement of cosmic aim and power, and man is left alone, simply to read nature and life and try to conform himself, religiously and ethically, to his interpretation of it. Indeed the discussion, though learned and able, tends to show how dark and impenetrable is the mystery of the world and human life, if despoiled of the Christian vision of God as our Heavenly Father and of His redemptive love in the gift and self-sacrifice of His eternal Son.

M. VALENTINE.

*Burden Bearing* and other sermons. By John Rhey Thompson, pp. 260.

The book contains sermons preached in Grace Methodist Episcopal Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., 1883-4. The subject of the first sermon gives us the title of the book. There are fifteen sermons in all embracing such subjects as "The Religion of Love," "The Power of the Holy Ghost," "The Credibility of the Resurrection," "The Theistic Basis of Immortality."

It is evident that the author is a preacher of more than ordinary ability and power, and that he holds the truth in sincerity, and maintains the sound principals of revealed truth with ability and clearness. The sermon on strong and loving words of righteousness, plain of speech and honest of purpose, preached not to please man, and no thoughtful reader can fail to be moved by the passion for holiness and purity which characterizes these discourses.

R. H. CLARE.

*Old Truths Newly Illustrated.* By Henry Graham, D. D., pp. 229. Price \$1.00.

The author of this book does not proceed after the fashion of the usual Cyclopaedia Illustrations. He has not given us simply a collection of anecdotes, or quotations, which may be conveniently woven into sermons, or other religious addresses. Instead of this, he has collected from his own storehouse of material, something like two hundred illustrations of religious truth and experience, drawn from history, from service, from nature, and especially from life, which he says, "he has found useful during a ministry of over thirty years in applying divine truths to the audiences which he has been privileged to address."

Perhaps the best use of this book will be to teach the reader how to get, or make illustrations of his own, and this is what every public speaker, and especially every preacher, should learn to do as fast and as far as possible.

The book has two admirable indexes, or tables of contents, one an alphabetical list of the subjects illustrated, and the other a list of the passages of Scripture illustrated. These will greatly facilitate its use.

JACOB A. CLUTZ.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

*Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives.* By Charles Foster Kent, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. Pp. XXXI and 506. Price \$2.75 net.

This is the second volume in the Student's Old Testament series, which is to comprise six volumes, the first of which, *Narratives of the Beginnings of Hebrew History*, appeared a year ago. The present volume commences with Samuel, and carries the history of Israel down to and including the Maccabees, a period of a thousand years. In addition to Samuel and Maccabees it embraces the books of Kings, Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and portions of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Haggai and Esdras. Its contents as summarized in the introduction are: The United Monarchy, History of Northern Israel, History of Judah, Re-establishment of the Jewish Community in Palestine, The Maccabean Struggle and the Life of the Jews of the Dispersion. It is provided with an elaborate Table of Contents, Chronological Charts and Maps and an Index of Biblical passages cited, and closes with an Appendix of Se-

lected Bibliography and a final chapter on Hebrew Chronology. The author has made his own translation from the Hebrew and has arranged his material in chronological order according to the latest conclusions of the critics.

It will thus be seen from the above what a thorough and comprehensive work this really is. It is a veritable storehouse of information, and covers all that can be said on the subject of which it treats. One cannot help being filled with wonder at the vast amount of research and investigation, the unwearied painstaking and the prodigious labor involved in the preparation of this volume.

The author finds upwards of thirty sources or documents from which the various books of the Bible under discussion have been compiled and as these documents are in confusion historically, he separates and readjusts them so as to present a continuous and connected narrative. Of course the Old Testament by this method has been entirely re-arranged and re-constructed and it is difficult to recognize the old book under this new form. The claim is made that this reconstruction is proper and necessary, that by this means the Scriptures become clear and intelligible to the average reader and that without such recasting a correct idea of their contents is impossible. We question whether the facts in the case substantiate this claim. The Bible was read for centuries before the appearance of the critical school, and as far as we can judge was pretty generally understood by its readers. The same may not be said of Prof. Kent's reconstructed Bible, it is often involved, confusing and unfamiliar to the reader.

On page 48 the author speaks of "the original books written by Israel's inspired teachers." We do not comprehend this statement. Does he mean that the alleged hosts of writers, the numerous editors and compilers who brought the books to their present form, and who in the process of their work are said to have perpetrated pious frauds, to have played fast and loose with the text, and interpolated or omitted as pleased them, were inspired teachers of Israel? If so Prof. Kent holds a very low view of inspiration. If these writers were not inspired, then of what value are their writings? They are worthless for they are not an infallible rule of faith and practice. We commend this volume to our readers not because of its resetting of the text, but for the sake of the rich information in the introduction and appendix.

T. C. BILLHEIMER.

SEVERINGHAUS PUBLISHING COMPANY, CHICAGO.

*Dayspring* or Christianity in its rise and progress. Pp. 174. By J. D. Severinghaus, D.D.

This book, well printed, gilt-edged, neatly bound, is sent forth as "a study-book for young Christians and Sunday school workers as furnishing sidelights for an intelligent confession of our most holy

faith." After a pleasing introduction the author gives a description of the Roman Empire, of Palestine, and of historical personages, just before or at the time of the birth of Christ. This is followed by an account of the birth and career of Christ. He then enters the apostolic era and describes the labors of the Apostles and the founding of the Church. Then follows a chapter on the *Inspired Records*, in which we are shown how the Scriptures have descended to us, and are given an account of the canon of Scripture, of the translation of the Bible, and of its circulation. Then comes a chapter on the growth and corruption of the Church, the means of grace and the kingdom of heaven. The *Didache* (both Greek and Latin), the Apostolic Church Order, and the Apostolic Constitutions, the Apocryphal Testimony and Ancient Christian literature, are becomingly discussed. The Testimony in Art and Science, and the Creed of the Early Church are then treated. A general index crowns the whole work and makes its contents readily available.

The work shows wide reading, comprehensive scholarship and the gift of condensation. The little book is a veritable *multum in parvo*. Not only "young Christians and Sunday school workers," but adults will find it a useful compend of information about Christ and Christianity.

The author, who is equally at home in both German and English, and who has served the Church as pastor, editor and professor of theology, for nearly half a century, still looks hale and vigorous, as represented by the portrait which serves as frontispiece to this the latest production of his busy pen.

J. W. RICHARD.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND CO., BOSTON.

The October number of the *Atlantic Monthly* is one that is calculated to attract wide-spread interest. The contributors to it are writers of great ability and they write in this number on subjects that are especially attractive. The article on "The Endless Life" by Samuel McCord Crothers is one that will be appreciatively read.

In writing of "The Fame of Franklin" William MacDonald presents some hitherto unknown facts concerning Franklin. One of the finest papers in this number is the one on "The Cowardice of Culture" by Thomas Wentworth Higginson. Nobushige Amenomori contributes a valuable paper on the late "Lafcadio Hearn, the man" and William Allen White on "The Golden Rule." The fiction in this number is of the usual high order and the essays and poems have decided merit. The contributions to the Contributors' Club are very bright and original. The *Atlantic Monthly* continues to be easily the brilliant leader of all literary magazines. It is now *non-returnable*, so that it is advisable for occasional readers to place their orders with news-dealers a month in advance, but the readers of good literature cannot afford to be without the *Atlantic* regularly.

